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A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.
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Abstract
The proliferation of information and communication technologies in the last
few decades has profoundly influenced the way information is gathered and
processed, and hence raised concerns over privacy. With the advent of digital
technologies, the ease of unauthorized copying of and access to digital content
leading to commercial infringements has motivated the need for developing content
protection technologies. Content protection is a generalized term that essentially
means restricting access to digital content. From a security perspective, it is
to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of content, in its distribution,
reproduction and use.
The goal of this thesis is to investigate privacy issues in content protection
systems and to explore techniques for privacy preserving content protection. The
flourishing of content protection technologies enables a shift to an information
environment characterized by pervasive constraints, universal monitoring, and
automated processing. As a consequence, individuals’ privacy rights are severely
undermined. The fundamental attributes of content protection technologies
determine the intrinsic conflict between preserving the interests of the content
provider or copyright owner on the one hand, and protecting the privacy of the
user on the other.
Our research addresses two issues. The first aims to lay out a generic and
comprehensive framework to support the elicitation and fulfilment of privacy
requirements. First, this framework provides a systematic methodology to model
privacy-specific threats. An information flow oriented model of the system is
leveraged to guide the analysis and to provide broad coverage. The methodology
instructs the analyst on which privacy issues should be investigated, and where
in the model those issues could emerge. This is achieved by (i) defining a list of
privacy threat types and (ii) providing the mappings between the threat types and
the elements in the system model. Second, this framework proposes an extensive
catalogue of privacy-specific threat tree patterns that can be used to detail the
threat analysis outlined above. Finally, this framework provides the means to
map the existing privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) to the identified privacy
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threats, to facilitate the selection of sound privacy countermeasures.
The second part of our research aims to tackle the privacy protection issues
in a number of specific content protection systems; these issues appear when
limited trust is granted to the content or the service provider. Therefore, the
proper balancing between content protection, for the content provider or service
provider, and privacy protection, for the user, remains a research challenge. This
research question is addressed from two aspects: (i) to design privacy preserving
copyright protection techniques for protecting commercial content, for which
we proposed anonymous buyer-seller watermarking protocols; and (ii) to design
privacy preserving systems to manage and protect personal data using content
protection techniques. These include a privacy-friendly architecture to manage
distributed e-Health content, and a personal rights management system to enforce
individual privacy rights.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this thesis. First, the research shows
that just as user behaviour regulation has been chosen as one of the values of
content protection technologies, so can privacy become one of the values embodied
in content protection system design. In addition, the development of content
protection technologies can respond to privacy protection requirements in a goal-
oriented approach, such as following the proposed framework for privacy threat
and requirement analysis, while complying with relevant legislation. Moreover,
instead of impeding privacy, content protection technologies can be utilized to
preserve and protect it. Finally, a number of insights for designers of privacy
enhancing systems are provided; possible future research directions are discussed.
Samenvatting
De vooruitgang van informatie- en communicatietechnologie in de laatste decennia
heeft de manier waarop informatie wordt verzameld en verwerkt grondig be¨ınvloed.
Dit roept echter ook vraagtekens op rond de manier waarop met privacy wordt
omgegaan. De komst van digitale technologiee¨n, het gemak waarmee ongeoorloofde
kopiee¨n kunnen worden geproduceerd, en de toegang tot digitale inhoud –
leidend tot commercie¨le inbreuken – motiveren de nood om content protection
(inhoudsbeschermende) technologiee¨n te ontwikkelen. Content protection is
een algemene term die in feite het beperken van toegang tot digitale inhoud
betekent. Vanuit een veiligheidsoogpunt dient het confidentialiteit, integriteit en
beschikbaarheid van de inhoud te verzekeren in de distributie, reproductie en in
het gebruik.
Het doel van deze thesis is om privacy aspecten van content protection systemen
te onderzoeken en om privacy bewarende technieken voor content protection
te verkennen. De opkomst van content protection technologiee¨n maakt een
verschuiving mogelijk naar een omgeving die gekenmerkt wordt door diepgaande
beperkingen, universele monitoring, en geautomatiseerde verwerking. Als gevolg
hiervan worden de privacy rechten van het individu zwaar ondermijnd. De
fundamentele eigenschappen van content protection technologiee¨n bepalen het
intrinsieke conflict tussen het bewaren van de belangen van de content provider en
eigenaar van het auteursrecht aan de ene kant, en het beschermen van de privacy
van de gebruiker aan de andere kant.
Ons onderzoek belicht twee facetten. In het eerste deel wordt er een algemeen
en uitgebreid kader voorgesteld ter ondersteuning van het bepalen en vervullen
van de privacy vereisten. Eerst voorziet dit kader een systematische methodologie
voor het modelleren van privacyspecifieke bedreigingen. Een informatiestroom-
georie¨nteerd model van het systeem wordt aangewend om de analyse te begeleiden
en te voorzien in een brede dekking. De methodologie schrijft de analist
voor welke privacy kwesties zouden onderzocht moeten worden, en waar in het
model deze kwesties zouden kunnen ontstaan. Dit wordt bereikt door (i) het
definie¨ren van een lijst van privacy bedreigingen en (ii) het verstrekken van de
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mapping tussen de types van bedreigingen en de elementen in het systeem model.
Ten tweede stelt dit kader een uitgebreide catalogus voor van privacyspecifieke
bedreigingsboompatronen die kan worden gebruikt voor het uitwerken van de
hierboven geschetste bedreigingsanalyse. Ten slotte biedt dit kader de middelen
om bestaande privacyverbeterende technologiee¨n (privacy-enhancing technologies,
PETs) te relateren aan de ge¨ıdentificeerde privacybedreigingen, om zodoende de
selectie van solide privacy tegenmaatregelen te vergemakkelijken.
Het tweede deel van ons onderzoek heeft tot doel het aanpakken van de privacy
beschermingsproblemen bij een aantal specifieke content protection systemen; deze
kwesties verschijnen wanneer een beperkt vertrouwen wordt verleend aan de
content- of de service provider. Het juiste evenwicht tussen content protection,
voor de content of service provider, en bescherming van de privacy, voor de
gebruiker, blijft een uitdaging voor verder onderzoek. Dit onderzoeksvraagstuk
is gericht op twee aspecten: (i) het ontwerpen van privacybewarende technieken
voor de bescherming van auteursrecht waarvoor we anonieme koper-verkoper
watermerkprotocols voorstellen; en (ii) het ontwerpen van privacybewarende
systemen voor het beheren en beschermen van persoonlijke data met behulp van
content protection technieken. Deze omvatten een privacyvriendelijke architectuur
voor het beheren van gedistribueerde e-Health data, en een persoonlijke-rechten
beheersysteem voor het handhaven van persoonlijke privacy rechten.
Verschillende conclusies kunnen worden getrokken uit deze thesis. Ten eerste
toont dit onderzoek aan dat net zoals het reguleren van het gebruikersgedrag
gekozen is als een van de waarden van content protection technologiee¨n, zo kan
privacy een van de waarden worden die worden vooropgesteld bij het ontwerpen
van content protection systemen. Daarenboven kan de ontwikkeling van content
protection technologiee¨n beantwoorden aan de privacybeschermingvereisten in een
doelgerichte aanpak, zoals het volgen van het voorgestelde kader voor privacy
bedreigings- en vereistenanalyse, terwijl de relevante wetgeving wordt nageleefd.
Daarnaast kunnen content protection technologiee¨n worden gebruikt om privacy
te bewaren en te beschermen, in plaats van deze te verhinderen. Tot slot worden
een aantal inzichten voor ontwerpers van privacy verbeterende systemen verstrekt;
mogelijke toekomstige richtingen voor onderzoek worden besproken.
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Zusammenfassung
Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologie verbreitete sich in den letzten
Jahrzehnten stark, dadurch wurde allgemein die Art und Weise der Informations-
beschaffung und -verarbeitung wesentlich beeinflusst. Dadurch werden Bedenken
hinsichtlich des Datenschutzes hervorgerufen. Die inha¨rente Leichtigkeit, mit
der auf digitale Daten auch ohne Berechtigung zugegriffen und mit der diese
kopiert werden ko¨nnen, hat die Entwicklung von Inhalteschutzmechanismen nach
sich gezogen. Unter Inhalteschutz verstehen wir dabei allgemein die gezielte
Einschra¨nkung des Zugriffs auf digitale Inhalte, aus Sicht der IT-Sicherheit muss
dieser Vertraulichkeit, Integrita¨t und Verfu¨gbarkeit der Inhalte wa¨hrend deren
Verbreitung, Vervielfa¨ltigung und Verwendung gewa¨hrleisten.
Ziel dieser Doktorarbeit ist es, Probleme von Inhalteschutzsystemen hinsichtlich
des Datenschutzes zu untersuchen und Techniken zur Beru¨cksichtigung des
Datenschutzes im Inhalteschutz zu erforschen. Die universelle Verbreitung von
Inhalteschutzmechanismen kann eine Vera¨nderung der Informationsgesellschaft
nach sich ziehen, welche durch tiefgreifende Einschra¨nkungen bei der Informa-
tionsbeschaffung und -verarbeitung, allgemeine U¨berwachung und automatisierte
Datenverarbeitung charakterisiert ist, wodurch das Recht auf informationelle
Selbstbestimmung des Einzelnen ernsthaft untergraben wu¨rde. Die grundlegenden
Eigenschaften von Inhalteschutzsystemen bedingen einen inha¨renten Konflikt
zwischen der Wahrung der Interessen des Inhalteanbieters oder Urhebers auf der
einen und des Schutzes des Privatspha¨re der Benutzer auf der anderen Seite.
Unsere Forschungsarbeit behandelt zwei Problembereiche. Im ersten zielen
wir darauf ab, eine generische und umfassende Methodik zu entwickeln, die
die Erfassung und Erfu¨llung von Datenschutzanforderungen unterstu¨tzt. Zum
einen erlaubt diese Methodik die systematische Modellierung datenschutzrel-
evanter Bedrohungen, wobei ein informationsflussbasiertes Modell des Inhal-
teschutzsystems zur Steuerung der Analyse und zum Erzielen einer breiten
Abdeckung genutzt wird. Dieses Vorgehen weist den Analysten darauf hin,
welche Datenschutzprobleme wo im Modell zu untersuchen sind. Erreicht wird
dies durch (i) die Klassifikation der Arten von Datenschutzbedrohungen und (ii)
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xdas Verbinden dieser Bedrohungsarten mit den Elementen des Systemmodells.
Zum anderen wird im Rahmen unserer Methodik ein umfassender Katalog von
datenschutzspezifischen Bedrohungsbaummustern vorgeschlagen, welcher zur de-
taillierten Ausarbeitung der soeben beschriebenen Bedrohungsanalyse verwendet
werden kann. Des Weiteren erlaubt es diese Methodik, den identifizierten
Datenschutzbedrohungen bestehende privatspha¨reunterstu¨tzende Technologien
(englisch “Privacy-Enhancing Technologies”, PETs) entgegen zu setzen, was die
Auswahl geeigneter Gegenmaßnahmen erleichtert.
Der zweite Teil nimmt sich des Datenschutzproblems in einer Anzahl konkreter
Inhalteschutzsysteme an. Unter der Annahme, dass neue Datenschutzbedro-
hungen immer dann entstehen, wenn den Inhalten oder dem Inhalteanbieter
eingeschra¨nktes Vertrauen entgegengebracht wird, stellt das Abwa¨gen zwischen
Inhalteschutz (aus Sicht des Inhalte- oder Dienstanbieters) und Datenschutz (aus
Sicht des Benutzers) eine Herausforderung fu¨r die Forschung dar. Wir na¨hern uns
diesem Forschungsthema aus zwei Perspektiven: (i) mit dem Ziel, den Datenschutz
beru¨cksichtigende Schutzsysteme fu¨r kommerzielle Inhalte zu entwickeln, wofu¨r
wir ein anonymes Ka¨ufer-Verka¨ufer-Wasserzeichenprotokoll vorgeschlagen haben;
und (ii) durch den Entwurf privatspha¨refreundlicher Systeme zur Verwaltung und
zum Schutz perso¨nlicher Daten auf Basis von Inhalteschutzsystemen, darunter
eine privatespha¨refreundliche Architektur fu¨r verteilte Inhalte in elektronischer
Gesundheitssorge sowie ein perso¨nliches Rechteverwaltungssystem zur Durchset-
zung individueller Datenschutzrechte.
Aus dieser Doktorarbeit ko¨nnen einige Folgerungen gezogen werden. Zum einen
demonstriert diese Forschungsarbeit, dass nicht nur die Reglementierung von Be-
nutzerverhalten, welche ha¨ufig als zentrale Eigenschaft von Inhalteschutzsystemen
gesehen wird, sondern ebenso auch der Datenschutz ein zentrales Anliegen solcher
Systeme werden kann. Des Weiteren ko¨nnen mittels der vorgestellten Methodik
zur Datenschutzanforderungs- und Datenschutzbedrohungsanalyse auf zielorien-
tierte Weise gesetzeskonforme und privatspha¨refreundliche Inhalteschutzsysteme
entwickelt werden. Daru¨ber hinaus wurde gezeigt, wie Inhalteschutzsysteme
zum Schutz der Privatspha¨re eingesetzt werden ko¨nnen, anstatt zu einer Bedro-
hung derselben zu werden. Schließlich werden fu¨r Entwickler zuku¨nftiger
privatspha¨refreundlicher Systeme nu¨tzliche Hinweise erarbeitet und mo¨gliche
weiterfu¨hrende Forschungsthemen besprochen.
List of Symbols and Acronyms
Sets and Elements
c ∈ C a ciphertext
K key space
k ∈ K key
M, C plaintext space, ciphertext space
m, p ∈M a message or a plaintext
R real numbers
{0, 1}n bit-string of length n, i.e., any piece of digital data
({0, 1}∗ indicates an arbitrary length).
Operators
⊙M linear operator in the plaintext space
⊙C linear operator in the ciphertext space
⊕ the exclusive-or operation or addition modulo 2, or
watermark embedding operation in the message space
(depending on the context)
⊗ denotes the watermark embedding operation in the
encrypted domain
+ addition defined in the Galois field GF (pn)
× multiplication defined in the Galois field GF (pn)
⊕c a function that adds c to the input (modulo 2)
⊕c(x) = x⊕ c
a||b the concatenation of the strings/values a and b
|a| bit-length of a bit-string a
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Functions, Algorithms and Services
ψ real world protocol
Anon anonymization algorithm to issue a context-specific identi-
fier from a global identifier
BDec buyer’s decryption, outputs a message m on input a
ciphertext c and a secret key skB
BEnc buyer’s encryption, outputs a ciphertext c on input a public
key pkB and a message m
BKeygen buyer’s key generation, outputs public key pkB and a
private key skB
Check algorithm to check whether the complaint from the seller is
correct
Deanon deanonymization algorithm to convert a context-specific
identifier from a global identifier
Detect algorithm to detect watermark from a pirated copy and to
send the transaction record to a judge
Dk decryption with key k ∈ K
DocAnon service to pseudonymize part of a document Doc
DocDeanon service to convert a pseudonymized document back to the
non-pseudonymized version
Ek encryption with key k ∈ K
Fψ ideal functionality
FDRM an ideal functionality for a copyright protection protocol
FREG an ideal functionality for a registration protocol
GSgkg group signature group key generation
GSiss group membership issuing algorithm, interactive algorithms
run by user Ui and issuer I respectively
GSjoin group joining algorithm, for Ui to join a group
GSjudge group signature opening verification algorithm
GSopen group signature opening algorithm, outputs a pair (i, proof )
GSsig group signature creation algorithm, outputs a signature s
of a message m
GSukg group signature user key generation
GSverify group signature verification algorithm
IDConvert service to convert context-specific identifiers
IDIssue service to issue context-specific identifiers
Identify algorithm to recover the buyer’s identity
JDec judge’s decryption, outputs a message m on input a
ciphertext c and a secret key skJ
JEnc judge’s encryption, outputs a ciphertext c on input a public
key pkJ and a message m
xiii
JKeygen judge’s key generation, outputs public key pkJ and a
private key skJ
Query a query service
Request algorithm run by a buyer to request the content from a
seller
Response algorithm run by a seller to deliver the content to a buyer
VerifyId algorithm to verify the recovered identity
WATdet watermark detection algorithm
WATemb watermark embedding algorithm
WATsetup watermarking setup algorithm
π1 zero knowledge proof for fair encryption of private keys
π2 zero knowledge proof for bit encryption
Parameters
(Bi, τ) B’s identity and its opening proof
(i, proof ) a proof proof that a member i has created the signature s
(pk, sk) a public and privacy key pair
(pkB′, skB′) buyer’s one time public and privacy key pair
(pkJ , skJ ) judge’s public and privacy key pair
(s,m) a group signature s of a message m
(upk, usk) a user key pair
ϕ a transaction index assigned by seller
AidX j fixed-length context-specific identifier of entity X in a
context j
b an indicator of the correctness of the registration or
deanonymization process
buyrequest a buyer’s request command (from FDRM to S)
C encryption of the buyer’s private key skB′ to the judge
certB B’s certificate issued by GM
ck encryption of the secret watermarking key swk to the judge
contentID content ID
crs a request of the common reference string
ct encryption of the final watermarked content Y
D a distribution that parameterizes the ideal functionality of
a registration protocol FREG
d an indicator of a pirated copy or
a verified signature (depending on contexts)
deanonym a request of deanonymization
detect a request of dispute resolution or watermark detection
detresp a dispute resolution response command
DidX j patient X ’s electronic health record DocAj ’s document ID
assigned by Hj
xiv
DocX j patient X ’s electronic health record hosted by Hj
ewB B’s encrypted watermark
GidX fixed-length global identifier of entity X
gpk group public key
gsk group member’s private signature key
info a buyer’s transaction record stored in a seller’s record table
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Privacy
The proliferation of information and communication technologies in the last few
decades has raised the concern over privacy as an increasingly prevalent issue.
The development of technology has brought major changes to the patterns of
information dissemination and human interactions. At the same time, the ever-
increasing capacity for information accessibility driven by technological innovations
has brought massive opportunities in terms of abuse of privacy.
When arguing about privacy, scholars and theorists conventionally consider
that privacy encapsulates three intertwined meanings, namely physical privacy
(spatial seclusion and solitude), informational privacy (confidentiality, secrecy,
data protection, and control over personal information), and decisional privacy
(limited intrusion into decision making about sex, families, religion, and health
care), as declared by privacy scholar Anita Allen [47]. Seclusion, solitude, secrecy,
confidentiality, and anonymity are considered requirements for a liberal existence.
The development of these three kinds of privacy differs. The level of physical
privacy – as a byproduct of increased wealth – in modern developed societies is
extraordinarily high by historical standards. In addition, modern human rights
and privacy legislation aids to grant and protect the civil liberties on the rights
to make decisions, thereby ensuring decisional privacy prospers. However, the
situation regarding informational privacy is worrisome. In the rest of the thesis,
the term privacy and informational privacy are used interchangeably.
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1.1.1 Technology and the Informational Privacy Concern
Emerging technologies ease the collection of information, facilitate bulk informa-
tion flow, and enable filtering out information without human intervention, thus
reducing the cost of processing it. We live in an era surrounded by information
and computer technologies, ranging from surveillance and data mining, CCTV
and image processing, Web 2.0 applications such as social networks, e-ID and e-
government, e-commerce and e-health, to cloud computing, smart home, RFID,
and location based services. They have profoundly influenced our way of living.
However, many of them have caused a disastrous erosion of privacy, leading us to
ask whether the age of privacy is over.
The low cost and the high capacity of information transmission and processing
has resulted in a world where the all-encompassing information generated by cyber
activities and online transactions is profiled and individualized. From an economic
point of view, this stimulates the emergence and establishment of new markets in
which the allocation and sharing of information is encouraged.
David Brin in his book The Transparent Society [81] depicts futuristic societies in
which the burgeoning of surveillance technology seems unstoppable and privacy is
overtaken. We will be limited to live with two choices: a world where those in
power know everything about everyone, and a world where everyone is able to know
everything about everyone including the ability to watch the watchers. Despite the
similarities, these are disparate ways of life, representing the opposite relationships
between citizens and their civic guardians. Unfortunately, neither case is fictional
– the first is called Surveillance (literally meaning ‘to watch from above’); the
latter is referred as Sousveillance (stemming from the contrasting French words
sur, meaning ‘above’, and sous, meaning ‘below’). Sousveillance, coined by Steve
Mann [177], is “a practice that originated with the use of eyetap (electric eyeglasses
as described here) and other wearable computing devices, refers both to inverse
surveillance, as well as to the recording of an activity from the perspective of a
participant in the activity (i.e. personal experience capture).”
The privacy concern boils down to “what matters to me is not whether
information about me exists but whether other people can find it. Modern
information processing has at least the potential to drastically reduce that sort
of (informational) privacy”, said writer and scholar David D. Friedman [147], “if
all information about you is readily available to anyone who wants it, you have
no informational privacy. If nobody else knows anything about you, you have
perfect informational privacy. All of us live between those two extremes.” In view
of privacy rights as control but not legal rules, Friedman stated that “privacy
rights as commonly interpreted do not prevent people from giving out information
about themselves, merely from obtaining information about others without their
consent.”
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For example, the rise of social networking online implies that people no longer
have sufficient informational privacy, according to Facebook’s founder Mark
Zuckerberg. Services of this world’s most popular social network – such as
Facebook’s Beacon and its targeted advertising networks – have been considered
a privacy nightmare [233, 160]. When talking about Facebook’s privacy policies,
Zuckerberg said privacy is no longer a “social norm”. “People have really gotten
comfortable not only sharing more information and different kinds, but more
openly and with more people. That social norm is just something that has evolved
over time.” Arguing that online users have become more accustomed to sharing
information online, such as on blogs and other social media services, Zuckerberg
noted, “if I had created Facebook today, as opposed to several years ago, I would
have made user information public, not private, by default as it was for years until
the company changed dramatically in December (2009)” [247].
In response to the question whether Google’s users should treat the search engine
as a trusted friend, Google’s CEO Eric Schmidt commented that “if you have
something that you don’t want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn’t be doing it
in the first place, but if you really need that kind of privacy, the reality is that
search engines – including Google – do retain this information for some time...it’s
important, for example, that we are all subject in the United States to the Patriot
Act and it is possible that all that information could be made available to the
authorities” [297].
Concerning government surveillance and data mining, some believe that individ-
ual’s privacy should yield to governmental or social demands. In the United States,
for example, the 9/11 Commission Report to the Congress [257] recommended
the “(1) presidential guidelines for information sharing, which ‘should safeguard
the privacy of individuals about whom information is shared’; and (2) guidelines
confining the use of a government power which actually materially enhances
security.” The US principal deputy director of national intelligence Donald Kerr
declared that “privacy no longer can mean anonymity. Instead, it should mean that
government and businesses properly safeguard people’s private communications
and financial information” [176].
1.1.2 Debates over Privacy
The debate of the value of privacy concerning eavesdropping and surveillance
originated in ancient times. Privacy has received an increasing attention, since
the middle of the twentieth century. Scholar Deborah Nelson wrote in her book
Pursuing Privacy in Cold War America [217], “since the end of 1950s the cry of
‘the death of the privacy’ has rung out from a wide variety of sources: journalism,
television, film, literature, law enforcement, philosophy, medical discourse, and
more”. The pioneer privacy advocate Alan Westin in his 1967 book Privacy and
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Freedom [289] already indicated that there is “a deep concern over the preservation
of privacy under the new pressures from surveillance technology.” Today, the
problem of technology with the rising concern over privacy remains fundamentally
the same.
Values of Privacy
Preserving the value of privacy against other social interests and norms has
always been a controversial and contradictory proposition. Some assert that
privacy nearly vanished; others argue that the threat to privacy is illusive. Some
proclaim privacy to be inviolable; others advocate privacy can be eroded in needs
of conflicting social values.
Legions of commentators and scholars have warned of diminishing privacy in
modern societies. Privacy is recognized in a large part of the world as a
fundamental right, essential for freedom, democracy, and human well-being.
Professor and privacy feminist Anita Allen in her thought-provoking essay Coercing
Privacy advances the propositions about the liberal conception of privacy (i.e.,
government ought to respect and protect interests in physical, informational,
and proprietary privacy) and the liberal conception of private choice (i.e.,
government ought to promote interests in decisional privacy and allow individuals
to make many of the important decisions concerning friendship, sex, marriage,
reproduction, religion, and political association). According to Allen, “although
the liberal conception of private choice is flourishing ... the liberal conception of
privacy is not”.
Privacy legal scholar Daniel Solove [274] pointed out the pluralistic nature of
privacy’s value, “privacy is a set of protections from a plurality of problems that all
resemble each other, yet not in the same way. The value of privacy is not uniform,
but varies depending upon the nature of the problems being protected against.”
The opposite side argues that privacy is “detrimental, antisocial, and even
pathological,” and people are no longer interested in privacy since they “have
nothing to hide” [273]. Legal scholar Fred Cate [92] describes privacy as
an “antisocial construct” that “conflicts with other important values within
the society, such as society’s interest in facilitating free expression, preventing
and punishing crime, protecting private property, and conducting government
operations efficiently”. Technological scholar Calvin C. Gotlieb [156] states that
“most people, when other interests are at stake, do not care enough about privacy
to value it”, except for some outspoken “journalists, lawyers, and academics”.
Instead of privacy, Gotlieb suggests that people are interested primarily in
confidentiality, regarding not the collection but the management of data. Judge
Richard Posner [246] views privacy as the “right to conceal discreditable facts
about himself”. “When people today decry lack of privacy, what they want, I
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think, is mainly something quite different from seclusion: they want more power to
conceal information about themselves that others might use to their disadvantage”.
In other words, privacy is likely to be invoked when one needs to hide something
that consists of negative information about a person.
The Privacy Tradeoff?
Appalled by today’s global political environment, especially after the events of
9/11, many people in the US and some parts of the world have declared that they
are willing to give up civil liberties such as privacy in the name of security, that
this trade-off seems to be a “fait accompli” [265]. Due to its profound importance
and increasing prevalence, both academia and popular media repeatedly debate
the balance of security versus privacy: should it balance the degree to which an
individual’s privacy is compromised against potent national security interests? In
such a debate, prevailing opinion was that a tradeoff exists between privacy and
security: in order to get more of one, it will be at the expense of another. However,
this fundamental dichotomy is questionable.
Many people tend to respond to the ever-increasing privacy destructive activities
– such as government surveillance and data mining – with the argument that
there is no problem because they have nothing to hide. “The nothing to hide
argument is one of the primary arguments made when balancing privacy against
security”, analyzed Solove [273], “it is an argument that the privacy interest is
generally minimal to trivial, thus making the balance against security concerns
a foreordained victory for security”. In other words, the argument reflects a
comparison of the relative value of the privacy interest being threatened with the
government interest in promoting security. Unfortunately, privacy is often traded
for security or convenience. In reality, people routinely give out their personal
information and willingly reveal intimate details about their lives online. In a 2009
poll in the US [277], 69% of the 551 surveyed users would consider having their
identities verified when making an online purchase (e.g. by looking at incoming
data such as the machine’s unique hardware signature or its Internet address or
less sophisticated authentication techniques such as cookies, or programs that
collect browser data), on the condition that their personal data is not collected
and the relationship with the vendors is trusted. About 75% of the surveyed users
believe computer authentication is preferred for the convenience of remembering
passwords or answering pre-selected personal questions.
When balancing privacy against security, instead of focusing the discussions on
whether a particular information collection activity should be barred or not, both
sides of the debate ought to consider the amount of oversight and accountability
when the government engages in particular forms of information gathering. The
fundamental problem of the “nothing to hide” argument and its variants is that it
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conceives privacy in a singular and narrow way, focusing on one or two particular
kinds of privacy problems (e.g. such as information collection and secondary
use), while ignoring the other pluralistic aspects of privacy harm involved beyond
exposing one’s secrets to the government [273]. Solove [273] declared that “the
security interest should not get weighed in its totality against the privacy interest.”
Alan Westin [289] believes that new technologies alter the balance between privacy
and disclosure, and that the rights of privacy may limit government surveillance
to protect democratic processes.
The US principal deputy director of national intelligence Donald Kerr [176] claimed
that for “safety and privacy, I work from the assumption that you need to have
both. These two components of security – safety and privacy – are the crux of much
of what we’re doing in the intelligence community.” Security commenter Bruce
Schneier [266] contests the privacy tradeoff with the statement that “security and
privacy are not opposite ends of a seesaw; you don’t have to accept less of one to
get more of the other. The debate isn’t security versus privacy. It’s liberty versus
control. If you set up the false dichotomy, of course people will choose security over
privacy – especially if you scare them first. But it’s still a false dichotomy. There
is no security without privacy. And liberty requires both security and privacy.”
1.1.3 Privacy Definitions
Privacy is a complex concept that encompasses profound and rich meanings.
Without understanding the privacy definitions and problems, privacy cannot be
addressed in a meaningful way. To meet the needs of understanding privacy
in a comprehensive manner, there are a number of attempts to conceptualize
privacy by a wide range of jurists, legal scholars, philosophers, psychologists, and
sociologists. Privacy is an abstract and subjective concept, and the understanding
and definition of privacy varies depending on social and cultural contexts, study
disciplines, stakeholder interests, and application domains.
Privacy as Informational Self-determination
Dated back to the 1960s, Alan Westin’s research is seen as the first significant
work on the problem of consumer data privacy and data protection. Westin [289]
defined privacy as: “Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others. Viewed in terms of the relation of the individual to social
participation, privacy is the voluntary and temporary withdrawal of a person from
the general society through physical or psychological means, either in a state of
solitude or small-group intimacy or, when among larger groups, in a condition
of anonymity or reserve.” This definition is often referred as informational self-
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determination in the literature. He further claimed privacy as a process that
“each individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in which
he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication
of himself to others, in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set
by the society in which he lives [289].”
According to Westin [289] privacy is described as four states: Solitude, meaning
the individual is separated from the group and freed from the observation
of other persons; Intimacy, meaning the individual is part of a small unit;
Anonymity, meaning the individual while in public still seeks and finds freedom
from identification and surveillance; and Reserve, meaning the creation of a
psychological barrier against unwanted intrusion by holding back communications.
Four basic functions of privacy in society are outlined by Westin [289], namely
personal autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation, and limited and protected
communication.
Privacy as Individual Rights
Privacy rights are inherently intertwined with information technology. In response
to new information and communication technologies, Warren and Brandeis
declared that information which was previously hidden and private could now
be “shouted from the rooftops”, and privacy is referred as “the right to be let
alone” [288], focusing on solitude and the freedom from intrusion, and protecting
persons and their belongings from warrantless search.
Privacy as Access and Control
A variety of views on privacy have been proposed – such as characterizing privacy in
terms of access and control – and in part summarized in [113]. Ruth Gavison [150]
argued that interests in privacy are related to concerns over accessibility to others,
and the concept of privacy is best understood as a concern for limited accessibility;
one has perfect privacy when one is completely inaccessible to others. Privacy
can be gained along three axes: secrecy (access to information about the person),
anonymity (knowledge of the person’s identity), and solitude (access to the physical
proximity of the person).
Adam Moore [210], building on the views of Gavison and Allen, conceived privacy
as the right of individuals to “control access to oneself and to personal information
about oneself ”. He argues that privacy is relative to species and culture, and
is objectively valuable. Moore claimed that privacy, like education, health, and
maintaining social relationships, is an essential part of human well-being [113].
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Privacy as Pluralistic Resemblances
Daniel Solove surveyed the criticisms of various scholars regarding each other’s
conceptions of privacy: although each of the privacy conceptions described above
elaborates upon certain dimensions and contains countless insights, “settling upon
any one of the conceptions results in either a reductive or an overly broad account
of privacy” [271]. He pointed out that traditional theories attempt to define
privacy by isolating a common denominator in all instances of privacy, that is,
they seek to conceptualize privacy as a unitary concept with a uniform value that
is unvarying across different situations. He argued that “the attempt to locate
the essential or core characteristics of privacy has led to failure” [271]. Instead of
conceptualizing privacy with the traditional method, Solove attempted to lay the
groundwork for a pluralistic understanding of privacy, as “privacy is not reducible
to a singular essence; it is a plurality of different things that do not share one
element in common but that nevertheless bear a resemblance to each other” [274].
Privacy is articulated as a set of protections against a plurality of distinct but
related problems. Each problem has elements in common with others but not
necessarily the same – they share family resemblances with each other.
The methodology is from bottom up, as “a set of protections against a related
cluster of problems”, such that it will help resolve a wide array of privacy problems.
Solove reconstructed privacy in four dimensions [274]: a method (to understand
privacy as a plurality of things), a degree of generality (to work out contextually
instead of in the abstract to provide a framework for understanding a broad range
of privacy problems), a structure that accommodates variability (to leave room
for significant variability in norms and cultures), and a focus (to focus on privacy
problems). The framework to understand privacy in a pluralistic way will be
reviewed as the privacy taxonomy in Section 1.1.4.
Privacy and Data Minimization
According to the European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC [140], the
principle of data minimization means that “a data controller should limit the
collection of personal information to what is directly relevant and necessary to
accomplish a specified purpose. They should also retain the data only for as long
as is necessary to fulfill that purpose. In other words, data controllers should
collect only the personal data they really need, and should keep it only for as long
as they need it”.
The data controller is “the person or administrative entity that determines the
purposes and means of the processing of personal data on behalf of an institution or
body” [140]. The data controller is responsible for the security measures protecting
the data.
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Data minimization requires that the possibility to collect personal data about
others, the personal data collected, and the retention time of the collected data
should be minimized. The main property of Privacy-Enhancing Technologies
(PETs) is to limit the release of personal data and to preserve the unlinkability
property as much as possible.
1.1.4 Existing Privacy Taxonomy and Notions
Taxonomy of Privacy
In 1960, legal scholar William Prosser synthesized the cases emerged from Warren
and Brandeis’s 1890 article The Right to Privacy [288], and discerned privacy as
a legal concept to constitute four distinct torts [251]. These privacy torts are
contoured as four categories: (1) intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into
private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; (3) publicity
which places a person in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation of
name or likeness.
In 2006, a taxonomy of privacy has been proposed by Solove [272, 274] as a
framework for understanding privacy in a pluralistic and contextual manner from
a social and legal perspective. Solove’s taxonomy is an extension of Prosser’s four
categories of privacy torts, motivated by two reasons. One reason is that “Prosser
focused only on tort law, and the law of information privacy is significantly more
vast and complex.” Another reason is that “Prosser wrote over 40 years ago, and
new technologies have given rise to a panoply of new privacy harms.”
According to Solove, the focus is shifted from conceptualizing the vague term
privacy toward the specific activities that impinge upon privacy and pose privacy
problems. With the ultimate purpose to aid the development of privacy law, this
taxonomy is “an attempt to identify and understand the different kinds of socially
recognized privacy violations” [272].
Solove’s privacy taxonomy consists of four constitutive categories of privacy
invasive activities: (1) information collection (surveillance and interrogation), (2)
information processing (aggregation, identification, insecurity, secondary use, and
exclusion), (3) information dissemination (breach of confidentiality, disclosure
exposure, increased accessibility, blackmail, appropriation, and distortion), and
(4) invasion (intrusion and decisional interference). Each group encompasses a
variety of harmful activities as included between brackets. Each type of problem,
and why it can be problematic, will not be discussed in this section due to space
limits. We refer to [272, 274] for in depth explanations.
Ann Bartow [62] responded to Daniel Solove’s taxonomy and criticized that it
is “in failing to label and categorize the very real harms of privacy invasions
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in an adequately compelling manner.” In Bartow’s view, the Solove taxonomy
of privacy suffers from the lack of identifying “the compelling ways that privacy
violations can negatively impact the lives of living, breathing human beings beyond
simply provoking feelings of unease.” Bartow pointed out that Solove “devotes
substantially more energy to explaining causality than he does to explaining
impact. This renders the taxonomy incomplete and unsatisfactory.” Bartow
suggested that “a more effective taxonomy would dramatically and thoroughly
document the consequences of privacy violations in very visceral, dramatic ways.”
Anonymity Terminology and Notions
A consolidated terminology of privacy has been proposed by Pfitzmann and
Hansen [237]. It motivates and develops a number of definitions, includ-
ing anonymity/identifiability, (un)linkability, (un)detectability, (un)observability,
pseudonymity, partial identity and digital identity, and identity management. The
new terminology differs from early definitions – such as ISO IS 15408 [3] – defining
privacy in terms of data minimization. In addition, the relationships between these
terms are described, and the defined properties are sketched.
This terminology is developed based on a setting where senders send messages to
recipients using a communication network. It is therefore fair to state that the
terminology is derived from perspectives related to anonymous communication.
The terminology can be extended for other settings (such as users querying a
database or customers shopping in an e-commerce shop) and derived by abstracting
away the names of sender, recipient, and message. The definitions are made
from the perspective of an attacker, who may be interested in monitoring which
communication is occurring, which patterns of communication exist, or even in
manipulating the communication. The attacker may be an outsider tapping
communication lines or an insider able to participate in normal communications
and controlling at least some entities. In addition, the privacy terminology is
defined from a probability perspective. It is assumed that the attacker uses all
information available to him to infer the probabilities of the items of interest (IOIs),
such as who sent or received which messages.
To clarify the definition, a subject (or an entity) is regarded as a possibly acting
entity such as a human being (i.e., a natural person), a legal person, or a computer.
The setting that the terminology is based on can be concretely defined as a system,
with a number of properties. First, the system has a surrounding, meaning that
parts of the world are outside the system. In addition, the state of the system may
change through actions within the system. We will follow the concept of subject
and system in the rest of the thesis.
Hevia and Micciancio [161] formally defined a group of anonymity notions in the
context of anonymous communication, in which users try to send messages to
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Table 1.1. The anonymity notion by Hevia and Micciancio and the terminology
by Pfitzmann and Hansen match between terms
Anonymity notion in [161] Anonymity variant in [237]
Relationship anonymity
Relationship unobservability
Sender Unlinkability (SUL) (Σ, U) Sender anonymity
Receiver Unlinkability (RUL) (U,Σ) Recipient anonymity
Sender-Receiver Unlinkability (UL)
(Σ,Σ)
Sender anonymity AND recipient
anonymity
Sender Anonymity (SA) (?, U) Sender unobservability
Receiver Anonymity (RA) (U, ?) Recipient unobservability
Strong Sender Anonymity (SA*)
(?,Σ)
Sender unobservability AND recipi-
ent anonymity
Strong Receiver Anonymity (RA*)
(Σ, ?)
Recipient unobservability AND
sender anonymity
Sender and Receiver Anonymity
(SRA) (♯, ♯)
Undetectability
Unobservability (UO) (?, ?) Sender unobservability AND recipi-
ent unobservability
each other without revealing their identities. The notions capture the intuitive
properties of anonymous channels defined in [237]. The framework proposed
in [161] starts with the usual properties of communication networks, for instance,
considering whether an attacker sees (U) the values of the messages sent/received
for each sender/recipient, or only (Σ) the number of messages sent/received for
each sender/recipient, or only (♯) the total number of messages, or (?) meaning
nothing, as starting point to define several variants of anonymity. The anonymity
notions proposed by Hevia and Micciancio [161] are compared with the terminology
by Pfitzmann and Hansen [237] in Table 1.1. Take the associated mnemonic
notation in the left column after the name and abbreviation: the first item of
each pair describes what can be learned about each sender, and the second item
describes what can be learned about each recipient.
The privacy notions that cover multiple anonymity and unlinkability variants
were further extended by Bohli and Pashalidis [73], as Anonymity (AN), Strong
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anonymity (SA), Weak anonymity (WA), Strong unlinkability with participation
hiding (SUP), Strong unlinkability with usage hiding (SUU), Weak unlinkability
(WU), Weak unlinkability with participation hiding (WUP), Weak unlinkability
with usage hiding (WUU), and Pseudonymity (PS). The relations and structure of
different notions is also completed, with the introduction of an application-agnostic
hierarchy that presents potentially different degrees, where the correspondence
between digital elements and users remains hidden from an adversary. Beyond
those notions specific to anonymous communications as in [161], previously isolated
privacy notions pertaining to group signature, anonymous communication, and
secret voting systems are included in the hierarchy defined in [73], and thereby
effectively made comparable. Bohli and Pashalidis also suggested [73] that it could
be possible to place the privacy definitions pertaining to other system types, such
as anonymous credentials, data anonymization systems, and sensor information
systems into the privacy notions hierarchy. However, this remains a subject of
future research.
1.2 Content Protection
In recent years, the unprecedented prosperity of digital and information tech-
nologies has introduced significant challenges to protect digital content in their
creation, distribution, storage and use. Digital content may have a variety of
formats, ranging from text documents to multimedia content, including image,
audio and video.
Prior to the development of digital technologies, content was presented in analog
forms, and the reproduction, usage, and distribution were at the price of content
quality degradation. As a consequence, consecutive generational copies usually
resulted in notable quality degradation, which in turn reduced the commercial
value. This, together with existing analog copy protection techniques, discouraged
illegal analog copying. In contrast, with the advent of digital technologies, new
tools have emerged, enabling quality assured copies of the original content at a low
cost. Digital media offers a number of advantages, including perfect reproduction,
where copies produced are indistinguishable from the original content, and cost
reduction for storage and distribution because of the efficient compression methods,
where high-quality content can be stored on lower-capacity media and transmitted
through lower-bandwidth networks.
Moreover, the development of the Internet has opened potentially limitless
distribution channels for the electronic commerce of content. On one hand, this
brings considerable advantages allowing more businesses to expand, costs to drop,
and the introduction of personalized customer experience. On the other hand,
the newly inspired opportunities raise the need for protecting the ownership
rights of copyrighted digital content. The ease of unauthorized copying and
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access to digital content motivates many commercial infringements. This was
worsened with the Internet ever-increasing bandwidth and the capacity of digital
storage, together with the worldwide digital communication and distribution
mechanisms. Additionally, more illegal copies being reproduced and distributed
automatically raises difficulties of tracing piracy across national borders and
identifying individuals offering or receiving pirated content. These driving forces
motivates the development of technological solutions for digital content protection,
in compliance with corresponding legislation.
1.2.1 Basic Concept
Digital content protection is a generalized term that essentially means restricting
access to digital content. From a security perspective, it is to ensure confidentiality,
integration, and availability of content, in its distribution, reproduction and use.
Content protection mechanisms conventionally target copyright protection, copy
protection, and conditional access for multicast or unicast media. The major tasks
that the content protection mechanism is expected to accomplish include, but
are not limited to, copy protection, usage monitoring, distribution tracing, usage
control, secure distribution of content and access keys, authentication of content
source and receivers, association of digital rights with content, and renewability
of content protection systems. These are the basic security requirements for
an end-to-end content protection system, suggested by Arnold, Schmucker and
Wolthusen [55], and by Eskicioglu and Delp [137].
Copy protection mechanisms guarantee that no additional replication is allowed
than the permitted copies. Such schemes rely on the integrity of the copying
devices and on specific device features to block illegitimate copying.
Usage monitoring mechanisms require that all usage information of content by
users must be recorded or communicated to the content or rights owner. Such
schemes mainly establish monitoring solutions for multimedia content, for instance,
to determine royalty payments and the verification of broadcasting of commercials
in accordance with contracts.
Distribution tracing mechanisms ensure that transmission information of content
is created and recorded with features identifying the source or the destination of
the transmission.
Usage control mechanisms require that the content or rights owner approves before
any operation or use of the content. This implies the controlled access and usage
facility.
Secure distribution of content and access keys means that multimedia content is
compressed, packaged, and encrypted (e.g. with a symmetric cipher) in secure
multimedia content distribution. Moreover, the decryption key for receiving
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devices is usually encrypted (e.g. with a public key cipher) and distributed in
a separate secure channel.
Authentication of content source and receivers refers to that before copyrighted
content is transferred from one device to another, the source and receiving devices
mutually authentication each other to provide evidence of licenses.
Association of digital rights with content implies that rights are embedded in
the content using metadata or watermarks, or with right expression languages
to express the rights of a party to a certain asset.
Renewability is needed to ensure forward security. The idea is to allow a content
transmitter to identify the compromised devices and prevent the transmission
of protected content, in case that legitimate devices are compromised to permit
unauthorized use of content. For example, in the High-bandwidth Digital Content
Protection (HDCP) system [131], each video receiver is issued a unique set of
secret device keys (e.g. including a RSA private key), matched with a non-secret
unique Receiver ID. The HDCP service provider (in this case, the Digital Content
Protection LLC [38]) may determine that an HDCP Receiver’s RSA private key has
been compromised, and places the corresponding Receiver ID on a revocation list
that the HDCP Transmitter checks during authentication. The HDCP Transmitter
is required to manage system renewability messages (SRMs) carrying the Receiver
ID revocation list. The validity of an SRM is established by verifying the integrity
of its signature with the Digital Content Protection LLC public key. In this way,
renewability allows an HDCP Transmitter to identify the compromised devices
and prevent the transmission of HDCP Content, as specified in [131].
Another example of renewability is from the content protection system of – the next
generation DVD – Blu-ray Disc. Blu-ray Disc’s content protection system includes
three primary components: AACS, advanced access content system, BD+, a Blu-
ray specific enhancement for content protection renewability, and ROM Mark, a
measure unique to Blu-ray Disc to guard against mass production piracy and sale
of unauthorized copies of pre-recorded media. Blu-ray Disc employ the Advanced
Access Content System, which provides different decryption keys, each of which
can be invalidated should one of the keys be compromised. Revoked keys will not
appear on future discs, rendering the compromised players useless for future titles
unless they are updated to fix the issue. BD+ technology, developed by BD+
Technologies LLC [37], is based on the Self-Protecting Digital Content (SPDC)
concept [141]. The goal is to prevent unauthorized copies of Blu-ray discs and the
playback of Blu-ray media using unauthorized devices. BD+ is effectively a virtual
machine in authorized players that can execute code included on discs to verify,
authorize, revoke, and update players when needed. Since the content protection
program is on the disc rather than the player, this allows for updating protection
programs by simply having newer programs included on newer discs. Therefore,
it gives content providers an additional means to respond to organized attacks on
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the security system by allowing dynamic updates of compromised code [114].
With end-to-end security as an essential requirement, digital content needs to
be protected in every stage of its lifecycle in order to prevent piracy losses and
encourage the sustainable development of digital markets. One of the fundamental
problems of an end-to-end content protection system is not only to ensure that the
illegitimate consumers cannot access the requested content, but also to be capable
of controlling how the content is used once it is in the user’s possession.
1.2.2 Content Protection Core Techniques
Most content protection mechanisms rely on cryptography and multimedia security
techniques. These techniques serve one or more of the requirements commonly
sought after in information security and privacy from confidentiality through
anonymity. In the following, an overview of the core techniques for content
protection will be provided, and it is assumed that readers are familiar with basic
principles of cryptography [204] and multimedia security technology [148].
Encryption and digital watermarking are recognized as the core techniques for
content protection. Encryption [204] prevents unauthorized access to digital
content, being the first line of defense and relying on reversible mathematical
transformation based on a secret key. The limitation is that, once the content is
decrypted, it does not prevent illegal replication by an authorized user.
Digital watermarking [102, 60], as the second line of defense, is a technique that
allows some information to be embedded in digital content. Watermarking has a
number of applications, as detailed in [60, 55]. When used for content protection
for images or videos, the watermark embedded in the original content should be
imperceptible and robust against various attacks.
As an application of watermarking, fingerprinting [60] can be used to identify
the content and to associate it to a customer. The fingerprint can be either an
intrinsic feature of the content or some external information embedded in it. At
the algorithmic level, watermarking is the function that embeds this information,
while fingerprinting refers to the complete protocol between content provider and
a customer.
1.2.3 State of the Art of Content Protection Systems
In the past few years, a variety of content protection systems have been proposed
and implemented in commonly used digital distribution networks. The five primary
components to distribute digital content are satellite, cable, terrestrial, Internet,
and prerecorded media including optical and magnetic media. Apart from this,
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the components to store and process digital content in a digital home network
(DHN) include a cluster of digital devices, such as PC, digital TV (DTV), digital
video cassette recorder (DVCR), DVD player, set-top box and so on [139].
The state of the art content protection systems can be categorized into three
groups, according to the taxonomy suggested by Eskicioglu and Delp [137], namely
Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems – unicast- and multicast-based – for
Internet distribution, Conditional Access (CA) systems for satellite, cable, and
terrestrial distribution, and Copy Protection (CP) systems for distribution within
digital home networks. Generally speaking, industry is particularly interested in
developing digital content protection systems, including information technology,
motion pictures, and consumer electronics. Note that this classification is not
absolute. For instance, the content protection for IP/TV leads to merge of DRM
and CA systems; the content protection mechanisms in Blu-ray Disc is in fact a
hybrid of all three (DRM, CA, and CP) systems.
Regardless of the model used, the entities that involved in the content protection
life cycle are the content owner, the content distributor, the customer with a
compliant receiving device, and the clearing house. The content owner (sometimes
as content provider) creates and packages – compresses, encrypts or watermarks –
content according to established rules. The content distributor delivers content to
consumers through distribution channels. The customer purchases and consumes
content according to usage rules. The clearing house keeps track of financial and
usage information. The following paragraphs provide an overview of three different
models for content protection systems.
DRM Systems for Internet Distribution
Digital Rights Management (DRM) refers to the protection, distribution, modifica-
tion and enforcement of the rights associated with the use of digital content [148].
Modern DRM Systems typically encrypt content with symmetric encryption;
the content decryption key and usage rights are delivered in separate packages,
separating the purchase and the delivery. Since the introduction in the mid 1990s,
the research and development of DRM has been through ups and downs. It is a
controversial topic from various viewpoints, such as the rules and controls imposed
by the content industries contradicting the fair use and free speech principle for
privacy. It is a multi-disciplinary subject where technology, law, and economics
influence each other reciprocally; it is impossible to make scientific statements
about DRM only from the view of one discipline without basing them on premises
from the other disciplines. In order to focus the discussion, we mainly consider the
distribution of digital content on the Internet, whereas the DRM systems within
many companies’ intranets are set aside.
DRM allows content providers to specify their own business model in managing the
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Figure 1.1. Architecture of Digital Rights Management systems for Internet
distribution described in [195, 148]
use of the content, such as pay-per-use or time-limited use of content, e-commerce
with superdistribution [211, 290], subscription, multiple views of a movie, and
restrictions on transferring a song to a portable device, and so on.
From a technical point of view, a DRM system exploits cryptography – such as
symmetric ciphers, public-key ciphers, and digital signatures – as the cornerstone
for its security features, that include data confidentiality, key management and
distribution, data source authentication, and security policies.
Despite the varying structure among DRM systems, a generic DRM system
architecture for electronic delivery through the Internet [195] is shown in Figure 1.1.
In this setting, it is assumed that there is a one-to-one communication (i.e. unicast)
between the server and the customer’s receiving device. The following steps
summarize the information flow in a DRM-supported Internet distribution system:
1. The content provider (or seller) packages, such as inserting a watermark,
and encrypts the content. The watermark may include information about
the content provider, retailer, or extra information such as rights.
2. The protected content is placed on a server (e.g. connected with a web portal)
for downloading or streaming. It can be located with a search engine using
a proper content pointer.
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3. The customer requests the content from the server, whereby a purchase
transaction is usually required.
4. After the client device is authenticated, the content is delivered to the
customer. Public key certificates are commonly used for the entity
authentication process. Depending on the DRM system, the usage rules
and the decryption key may either be pre-negotiated between the content
provider and the customer or need to be separately obtained from the clearing
house or other registration server in the form of a license. The content or
other licenses are protected so that only the client is able to retrieve the
information.
5. The customer obtains the content, decrypts it and uses it according to the
negotiated rules.
6. The clearing house collects customer’s payment records or usage history at
certain times.
7. At the same time, payment and other information such as system and
security updates are transmitted to the customer.
8. In the end, the customer’s payment and usage information are sent to
appropriate parties, including content providers and distributors.
This aforesaid unicast model can be extended to multicast networks in which
content is delivered to a group of customers. In such a setting, three basic security
features should be provided [148]. Primarily, only the legitimate group members
have access to the current group communication. Additionally, legitimate group
members should be able to authenticate the source and content of the group
communication, in the case group members do not trust each other. Furthermore,
it should support dynamic group management so that group membership can be
granted or revoked whenever necessary. Similarly to the unicast case, the multicast
systems also provide copyright protection for the content.
In both cases, compromised client devices or software will be included in the
revocation list to allow servers to block content delivered to them. This, combining
with updating DRM system components, ensures system renewability and forward
security.
One of the most important issues of DRM technologies is interoperability. Most
DRM systems work only in closed, monolithic systems that are designed not to be
interoperable. It is monolithic in the sense that a DRM system typically supports
a single protected content format and system for expressing and enforcing content
usage rules. This non-interoperability can cause a series of negative effects, as
declared by Ton Kalker [225]. Consumers are put off by content and services
that do not work with all of their devices. Device manufacturers can choose
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to either integrate a single DRM technology, thereby limiting the flexibility of
their devices, or implement multiple DRM technologies adding to the cost of their
devices. Content distributors are limited to choose DRM systems supported by
popular devices, restricting their ability to address a broader set of consumers with
different devices. Consequently, content providers see a lower business value due
to the fragmented market.
In order to address the interoperability issue, a DRM interoperability framework
Coral [14] was developed by a collection of content providers, service providers,
consumer electronics manufacturers, and some technology companies. Fundamen-
tally, the Coral Framework is designed to provide monolithic content distribution
systems with a means to exchange any information that can enable the consumer
to experience interoperability. The idea is to provide a standard DRM independent
method for encoding a proof of purchase, e.g. using Rights Tokens [225], to
minimize barriers to consumer access to content of all types, regardless of device,
location, or time.
Conditional Access Systems
A generic architecture of Conditional Access (CA) systems [148] is shown in
Figure 1.2. Such a CA system allows access to services based on payments or
a number of security requirements, such as entity authentication (identification),
data origin authentication, authorization, registration and so on. The content or
service provider distributes content via satellite, cable or terrestrial transmissions
to the end users with free-access to access-control such as Pay-TV and Video-on-
Demand [138, 198, 134]. Instead of limiting ourselves to digital television systems
which are often referred to, we broaden the definition to all sorts of application
domains, such as services delivered through e-Health networks via cable [142, 71],
as long as the functional setting fits in the general architecture.
This is the second approach for content protection; it is usually developed by the
CA providers who are specialized in protecting both analog and digital content and
in offering secure processing environments. The major components and common
stages of a typical CA system are described as follows:
1. The content owner creates the content to be delivered to the CA provider,
and compresses the digital content to minimize the communication band-
width requirements.
2. The content is transferred to the CA provider in order to be protected and
packaged with the entitlement information indicating access conditions.
3. The CA provider protects the content – for instance using encryption or
watermarking – and delivers the protected content to the receiving device or
a web portal connecting with a customer.
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Figure 1.2. Architecture of Conditional Access (CA) systems described in [148]
4. If the customer is authorized to access the content, it is decrypted (or
decoded) by the receiver (or decoder) and sent to the display unit for
viewing. One of the critical tasks of a security module, such as a smart
card, is to recover decryption keys. It also provides a secure environment to
process security related information or functions such as authorization and
temporarily stored purchase and usage information.
5. The billing and payment information, together with the collected purchase
history and usage information are transmitted to a back-office, through a
one-to-one link between the back office and the receiver.
6. In the meanwhile, information such as authorization and system security
updates are delivered from the back office to the customer’s receiver.
7. Finally, the collected payment and usage information are transferred to
appropriate parties, such as the content owner, the CA provider, or other
service operators.
Copy Protection Systems
Copy protection systems for distribution within digital home networks (composed
of a cluster of digital devices) have the following aspects: (1) protection of content
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on storage media, such as optical media, (2) protection of content across digital
interfaces, such as Digital Transmission Content Protection (DTCP) and High-
bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP), and (3) management of rights
associated with the content.
Unlike the aforementioned two approaches for content protection, the copy
protection problem is considered to be the least promising to solve for a number
of technical, legal and economic reasons [148, 153]. First of all, copy protection
systems require devices and interfaces in home networks to be developed with
a consensus among different stakeholders and manufactures. This makes the
requirement determination and integration process difficult. Second, the ever-
changing copyright legislation introduces controversial prohibitions subject to
different interpretations. Finally, it is unclear who should pay for the copy
protection in digital networks, and suitable business models are still under
consideration.
Two groups of technologies are recognized as useful tools in designing solutions
namely encryption-based and watermarking-based. As copy protection system
structures vary among various application scenarios, instead of a general
architecture, a collection of copy protection systems for optical and magnetic
storage and two major digital interfaces [55] are briefly reviewed in the following
paragraphs.
Copy protection solutions on optical media include Content Scramble System
(CSS) for video on DVD-ROM [106, 61], where the CSS-protected video is
decrypted during playback on the compliant DVD players; Content Protection for
Recordable Media and Pre-Recorded Media (CPRM/CPPM) [2] for audio/video
on DVD-R/RW/RAM, where A/V (audio/visual) content is re-encrypted before
recording on a DVD recordable disk, and during playback the compliant player
derives the decryption key; and a variety of watermarking schemes [199, 72, 9]
for audio on DVD-ROM or video on DVD-ROM/R/RW/RAM, where invisible
watermarks are embedded into the audio or video content, and the compliant
playback or recording device detects the Copy Control Information (CCI)
represented by the watermark and responds accordingly. Besides, the advanced
access content system (AACS), BD+, and ROM Mark, are deployed copy
protection mechanisms on Blu-ray discs [114].
Copy protection solutions on popular digital interfaces include Digital Transmis-
sion Content Protection (DTCP) [259] for the IEEE 1394 connection interface
of A/V component communication and control, where the source device and the
receiver authenticate each other and establish shared secrets; and High-bandwidth
Digital Content Protection (HDCP) [131] for Digital Visual Interface (DVI)
and High Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI), where the video transmitter
authenticates the receiver and they establish shared secrets. In both solutions, the
A/V content is encrypted across the interface and the encryption key is renewed
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periodically.
To enable copy protection and to define the conditions under which a consumer
is authorized to make a copy, essentially, the Copy Control Information (CCI) is
usually associated with the content. This can be achieved by either including the
CCI in a designated field of the content, or embedding the CCI into the content
as a watermark. For instance, the CCI makes use of the two Copy Generation
Management System (CGMS) bits for digital copy control: “11” for copy-never,
“10” for copy-once, “01” for no-more-copies, and “00” for copy-free. After an
authorized copy, the compliant recorder could embed a new watermark to represent
“no-more-copies”. It is critical to assure the integrity of the CCI that unauthorized
modifications can be prevented.
1.3 Privacy Issues in Content Protection
The proliferation of content protection technologies enables a shift to an informa-
tion environment characterized by pervasive constraints, universal monitoring, and
automated processing, which would severely undermine an individual’s privacy
rights. The fundamental attributes of content protection technologies create
the intrinsic conflict between the basic starting point of preserving the interests
of the content provider or copyright owner, and protecting the privacy rights
of the user. The capabilities of content protection technologies have been
criticized for implicating the user’s privacy, by creating the potential for vastly
increased collection of information about individual’s intellectual habits and
preferences [100, 235, 143].
The all-encompassing information aggregated and processed by content protection
systems is typically personalized, such as one’s transaction history, usage habits,
purchasing behaviors or other profiling information. It places the customers
a priori into an adversarial relation with the content provider. Moreover,
the fact that information is at times gathered coercively or secretly, weakens
the trust of customers in the content providers or service operators. It may
further encourage customers to resist the content protection-engaged activities or
deliberately provide false information. This in turn causes the content providers
and service operators to pursue the information more aggressively, resulting in a
vicious cycle.
Content protection systems collecting and monitoring an individual’s information,
on behalf of content providers or service providers, are often considered to be highly
invasive for privacy of the individual, unless significant design and implementation
efforts are expended to restrict such violations [143]. This is of particular concern
in environments where content protection systems may be abused for surveillance,
profiling, or similar privacy invasive activities, leading to the obstruction of
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individuals’ privacy rights. The limitations of portability and interpretability (e.g.
rights are tied to specific devices that would require either a separate purchase
or licensing to transfer the rights to another device), along with the possible loss
of privacy due to the precise auditing and billing, can be viewed as placing the
customer at a significant disadvantage, which may well balance or substantially
outweigh any additional convenience for customers and, as a result, lead to an
overall rejection of content protection support business models and the protected
content [55].
1.3.1 Existing Privacy Enhancing Content Protection Systems
Early digital rights management systems for content delivery are device-based;
they bind content to a device, and are considered overly restrictive, because it is
difficult to transfer rights to other devices. Two approaches have been proposed
to address this issue. The first approach is domain-based DRM [181] in which
digital content can be transferred freely between the devices within the authorized
domain. Deployed examples include Open Mobile Alliance DRM [7] and Apple’s
Fairplay [53]. The second solution is a user-centric approach named person-based
DRM [181], where rights to access content are granted to users instead of devices to
allow a user to access the content anytime, anywhere, and in any device. Deployed
examples include Philips’ Personal Entertainment Domain (PED) DRM [182]. In
the following, two approaches to design a protection system are introduced: (1)
privacy preserving content protection systems (for commercial content); (2) DRM-
based content protection systems (for personal content) which is a person-based
DRM system.
Privacy-Preserving DRM
A privacy-preserving DRM system (PPDRM) is described in [235]. These systems
exploit (both persistent and short-term) user pseudonyms and provide a means of
managing usage rights of commercial digital content, while preserving the privacy
of users so that the content they purchased and the actions they took cannot be
linked to a specific identity. The generalized architecture is shown in Figure 1.3.
Entities in the basic PPDRM system include the user, the content provider (CP)
and the compliant device (CoD), a device that behaves according to the DRM rules.
Related to the CoD, there is the compliance certificate issuer for compliant devices
(CA-CoD). Moreover, there is the smart card (SC), which is the user ID device,
and this entity is interchangeable with the user himself. Related to the smart card
there are the smart card issuer (SCI) and the compliance certificate issuer for smart
cards (CA-SC). Note that sufficient tamper resistance and detection mechanisms
were provided in the original protocol as described in [235], but are omitted in the
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Figure 1.3. The basic architecture of the privacy-preserving DRM system
described in [235]. The entity include the user and her smart card (SC), the
content provider (CP) and the compliant device (CoD). Auxiliary entities are the
compliance certificate issuer for the compliant device (CA-CoD), the smart card
issuer (SCI) and the compliance certificate issuer the smart card (CA-SC)
following paragraph. For instance, each message described below is appended with
its hash value and a signature, in order to ensure that the transferred messages
have not been modified. The simplified transactions performed involving the basic
PPDRM system are briefly described in the following steps:
1. The user acquires a smart card anonymously. The smart card is issued by
SCI, to create a pair of user keys (pk, sk) with the user’s secret PIN. Note
that no one should be able to make an association between the user’s real
identity and the pk, and the private key sk is securely stored on the smart
card and is not accessible to others (except for the SCI).
2. After an anonymous payment is made, the user’s SC sends the public key pk
to the CP.
3. The CP checks the legitimacy of the pk with the SCI and creates a license
for that content. The content itself is encrypted by the CP with a symmetric
key Sym, randomly chosen by the CP, and sent to the user.
4. The user’s SC sends pk with a request for the compliance certificate to the
CA-SC.
5. The CA-SC generates a pseudonym for the SC, say a random number RAN
, and issues the compliance certificate to the SC.
6. The user’s device CoD proves its validity by means of a CoD compliance
certificate which is issued by the CA-CoD.
7. The license and the content are transferred from the SC to the CoD. Once
the CoD has been checked, the SC proves its validity by showing the
pseudonymous compliance certificate to the CoD.
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8. The SC checks the compliance certificate of CoD, and receives the encryption
pk[Sym ∥ Rights ∥ contentID] of the content key Sym, the usage rights and
the content from the SC.
9. The SC decrypts the message, and sends the values Sym, the rights and the
content ID back to the CoD. The device CoD accesses the content.
In this PPDRM scheme, user privacy is achieved in the DRM system by decoupling
the user’s real identity from his identifiers (pseudonyms) in the DRM system
(i.e., pk and RAN ), or by decoupling the user’s real identity from (contentID,
Rights, Sym). Therefore, the real identity of the user cannot be revealed even
by collusions of the parties above, since no party knows that identity; unless an
attacker can obtain user-related information from the CoD after a content access
transaction happens. This scheme essentially provides a similar privacy protection
mechanism as that of the direct anonymous attestation of TPM (Trusted Platform
Module) [80].
This PPDRM system can be extended to allow a user to further protect his privacy
by purchasing content under different pseudonyms, such that unlinkability of user’s
transactions is assured. The various pseudonyms of the user must however be
certified by a trusted authority (the CA) to guarantee security. This is achieved
by pseudonym certification calculated from the user’s public key pk by the CA.
DRM Technologies for Personal Content
The DRM concept can not only be used to protect commercial content, but also
be exploited to design systems to protect personal content. In contrast to the
significant effort put into the protection of copyrighted commercial content in DRM
systems, controlled sharing of personal content is often ignored. To address this
issue, a person-based DRM approach used for protecting ownership and controlled
sharing of private content in home digital networks is presented [190]. The idea is
to extend classical DRM systems for commercial content to protect private content.
This effectively means that the user who is the content owner takes over the role of
content and license provider, and therefore becomes involved in content creation
and protection processes.
The privacy requirements in a content protection system have various aspects [190]:
(1) users (as content owners) should be able to specify which content and to whom
they will share; (2) the system must support co-ownership and manage the content
sharing in various ways; (4) the system should support transfer of ownership; and
(5) the users should be able to remove the content.
The proposed scheme uses a hybrid cryptographic approach, where a personal
content is encrypted with a symmetric content key. The content key is encrypted
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with the public keys of, and distributed to, the entities that have the access rights
to the content. The above-mentioned privacy requirements are satisfied such that
protecting and sharing personal content, ownership transfer, multiple ownership,
and content or ownership deletion are supported.
1.4 Research Questions
This thesis aims to study privacy preserving content protection techniques and
analyze private information flows in content protection systems. The research
questions to be investigated in this thesis are divided into two parts, and are
outlined in the following paragraphs.
1.4.1 Modeling Privacy Threats and Properties
The first part of the research focuses on providing a comprehensive framework
to model privacy threats and requirements. There are a number of fundamental
questions to be explored, including conceptualizing privacy properties and threats,
evaluating the relation between privacy and security properties, and designing a
generic methodology to identify privacy threats and elicit privacy requirements in
application-dependent systems.
As an introduction, Section 1.1.4 provides an overview of a number of privacy tax-
onomies and notions developed in the literature. Solove’s privacy taxonomy [272]
identifies different kinds of socially recognized privacy violations and problems,
from the social and legal viewpoint. The purpose of this taxonomy is to aid the
development of the body of law that addresses privacy issues. It shifts the focus
from the vague term privacy to the specific activities that pose privacy problems.
The terminology by Pfitzmann and Hansen [237] provides definitions of privacy
properties in review of anonymous communications; it is widely recognized and
used in the community that researches privacy technical problems. The relation
of privacy notions by Hevia and Micciancio [161] and its extension by Bohli
and Pashalidis [73] essentially use the intuitive properties of anonymous channels
defined in [237], and provide a formal proof of relations among privacy notions.
There is a gap in existing work, namely there does not include exist a taxonomic
framework that captures privacy threats and identifies privacy properties to aid
the development of a privacy enhancing system. The privacy properties and the
derived threats should be taxonomized, based on the existing terminology and
go beyond the scope of anonymous communication, to cover a broader concept
of privacy, such as data or content privacy. This is motivated by a pragmatic
reason – consider the fact that modern design of privacy enhancing systems is
often accomplished using an ad-hoc approach. Regardless of the technical solutions
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provided, during the design process, there is a need for a privacy taxonomy for
system analysts and designers to identify the privacy property or evaluate privacy
threats in the targeted system. As a systematic approach to build in privacy
is needed, it is worth the effort to investigate an exhaustive and comprehensive
methodology to map privacy properties to privacy threats, to identify the threats,
and to elicit privacy requirements.
1.4.2 Designing Privacy-Friendly Content Protection Systems
The second part of the research focuses on exploring and designing individual
privacy-friendly content protection systems. This question can be investigated
from two viewpoints: (1) content protection systems with privacy preserving
properties to protect commercial content, and (2) privacy preserving systems to
manage and protect personal data using content protection systems or techniques.
The proper balancing between content protection and user’s privacy protection
remains a challenging issue. It raises a number of questions: how should the
development and implementation of content protection technologies respond to
privacy protection requirement and legislation? As user behavior regulation is
already chosen to be one of the values of content protection technologies, could
privacy also become one of the values embodied in content protection system
design? How can content protection technologies be utilized to preserve and
protect privacy?
Traditional content protection systems are based on the convention that content
and service providers or rights owners are trustworthy, meaning that the
adversarial model excludes such entities. Therefore, this kind of system focuses
solely on protecting content and is hence limited to the provider-centric point of
view. The customers (or users) have lost control of their private information.
A paradigm shift from provider-centric to user-centric takes place, that is, content
providers are granted less trust and more incentives for privacy are desired by
users. In a user-centric content protection system, content users are put back in
the center of interest and are given control over personal information, for instance
the users are able to specify which information (content) can be accessed by whom.
This implies that users have the possibility to specify policies for how their personal
information can be collected and processed.
To achieve this, it is necessary to enable privacy protection features in content
protection technologies. For instance, anonymity or pseudonymity may constitute
a requirement in content protection systems, i.e., the recipient of the content or
the entity to which rights are granted may not be associable with an individuals’
identity (either customer or content providers) unless it is associated with their
pseudonyms.
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The following paragraph briefly touches upon the controversial privacy issue
inherent in content protection systems and highlights the two distinct strands
of interest. In a DRM-supported Internet distribution system, there exists
a contradiction between the content protection requirement – such as the
content providers’ desire for copyright protections and traceability for the
copyright violator – versus individuals’ privacy interests such as anonymity (or
pseudonymity) and transaction unlinkability of customers.
In an e-health network, which can be viewed as a conditional access system, one
of the contradictory issues is to provide an overview of a data subject’s private
information history (e.g. an overview of a patient’s medication record) under access
control versus restricted disclosure of the content subject’s identity or sensitive
information.
Another group of conflicting forces lays between the ease of broadly spreading
personal content, such as images, and the rights of an individual to control the
distribution of that very content. This problem rises against the background
of widely used personal hand-held mobile devices which enable personal data
to be conveniently collected and transmitted. Therefore, the adversary model
is extended; and the adversaries not only include the classical ones, such as
government and cooperate, but also ordinary citizens. To address this new privacy
threat, there is the motivation to design and propose a personal rights management
system.
This thesis will present selected privacy preserving solutions in an attempt to
resolve the aforementioned contradicting forces between content protection (i.e.,
content providers trace and collect user information) and privacy protection (i.e.,
allow users to gain control over personal information), in order to enforce both the
content provider’s rights and the user’s rights at the same time.
1.5 Outline and Summary of Contribution
This dissertation begins with an introduction to the privacy concerns in the
information age, and motivates the necessity for content protection techniques,
from which a number of privacy issues in content protection systems are pointed
out. The rest of the dissertation will follow the research questions as outlined in
Section 1.4. To facilitate the assessment of the research contribution demonstrated
in this thesis, the following paragraphs summarize the contribution of each chapter.
The content described in these chapters has been published in proceedings of peer-
reviewed international conferences [125, 123, 129, 115, 116, 118, 128, 121, 122],
international journals [130, 124, 258, 120], and book chapters [126, 119].
Chapter 2: Privacy Threat Analysis Framework. This chapter sets forth a
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comprehensive and generic taxonomic framework to model privacy threats and
elicit privacy requirements in application systems. Although informational
privacy has become an identified priority in our society, few systematic and
effective methodologies exist that deal with privacy threats thoroughly. First,
this chapter provides a systematic methodology to model privacy-specific
threats. Analogous to STRIDE in the Security Development Lifecycle to build
in security, an information flow oriented model of the system is leveraged to
guide the analysis and provide broad coverage for building in privacy. The
methodology instructs the system analysts and designers on which privacy issues
should be investigated, and where in the model those issues could emerge. This
is achieved by (i) defining a list of privacy threat types and (ii) providing
the mappings between threat types and the elements in the system model.
Second, this chapter provides an extensive catalogue of privacy-specific threat
tree patterns that can be used to detail the threat analysis outlined above.
Finally, this chapter provides a guideline to map the existing privacy-enhancing
technologies (PETs) to the identified privacy threats. Therefore, the selection
of sound privacy countermeasures is structuralized.
Chapter 3: Anonymous Buyer-Seller Watermarking Protocols. This chapter inves-
tigates the privacy problems in a DRM system for Internet distribution between
a seller (as the content provider) and a number of buyers (as the customers),
and proposes a series of anonymous buyer-seller watermarking (BSW) protocols.
Buyer-seller watermarking protocols integrate watermarking techniques with
cryptography, for copyright protection, piracy tracing, and privacy protection.
The proposed BSW protocol is based on homomorphic public-key cryptosystems
and dynamic group signatures, and is able to provide all the required security
properties, namely traceability, anonymity, unlinkability, dispute resolution,
non-framing (i.e. malicious sellers cannot frame honest buyers), and non-
repudiation (i.e. guilty buyers cannot deny having created illegal copies),
simultaneously.
We have also worked out efficient implementations of BSW protocols, suggesting
its practical relevance that this technique can be successfully used in practical
applications. The implementation results are only briefly discussed in
Appendix C. More details can be found in [129, 115, 116, 117].
Chapter 4: Privacy Friendly Architecture to Manage Distributed Personal E-Health
Information. This chapter lays out an architecture to manage distributed
personal e-Health information, in order to address the contradiction between
privacy protection for the patient and the distribution of medical data.
Primarily, the goal of such an e-Health system is to provide a patient-centric
lifelong view on medical history under conditional access. This requests the
authorized accessibility to a particular patient’s healthcare information anytime,
anywhere, on any device. Considering the distinguishing features of e-Health
systems, especially, that health data are sensitive by nature, a privacy protection
mechanism is proposed which limits the trust in service providers, in order to
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facilitate a privacy enhancing sharing of distributed e-Health information.
Chapter 5: Personal Rights Management for Individual Privacy Enforcement. This
chapter introduces the concept of Personal Rights Management – an architecture
that manages personal data and enforces individual privacy rights. With the
ubiquitous use of digital camera devices, especially in mobile phones, privacy is
no longer threatened by governments and companies only. The new technology
creates a new threat by ordinary people, who could take and distribute pictures
of an individual with no risk and little cost in any situation in public or private
spaces. Fast distribution via web-based photo albums, online communities and
web pages expose an individual’s private life to the public. Social and legal
measures are increasingly taken to deal with this problem, but they are hard to
enforce in practice. This chapter proposes a model for privacy infrastructures
intended towards the distribution channel such that as soon as the personal
content is publicly available, the exposed individual gets an opportunity to find
it and take appropriate action without any delay. Digital rights management
techniques were applied in the proposed infrastructure, and the use of data
identification techniques such as digital watermarking and robust perceptual
hashing were proposed to improve the distributed content identification.
Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Research. This chapter draws conclusions from
the aforementioned research questions, and discusses future research directions
to further strengthen and deepen the research presented in the previous
chapters.
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Chapter 2
Privacy Threat Analysis
Framework
2.1 Introduction
Privacy becomes increasingly important in the current society. Most of the
information is now digitalized to facilitate quick and easy access. It thus becomes
important that this digital privacy is sufficiently protected to prevent personal
information from being revealed to unauthorized subjects. A stepping stone of
security and privacy analysis is threat modeling, i.e., the “black hat” activity of
looking into what can possibly go wrong in a system. Threats are crucial to
the definition of the requirements and play a key role in the selection of the
countermeasures. Methodologies and knowledge are two important pillars for
security and privacy requirements engineering [202]. Unfortunately, the state
of the art lacks systematic approaches to model privacy threats, elicit privacy
requirements, and instantiate privacy-enhancing countermeasures, accordingly.
Indeed, there is an asymmetry for privacy with respect to security concerns.
These latter have a far better support in terms of methodological approaches
to threat modeling. For instance, in the goal-oriented requirements space, KAOS
provides a methodology to systematically analyze a system’s anti-goals (and the
corresponding refined threats) and therefore derive security requirements [283].
The same holds in the area of scenario-based techniques. For instance, Microsoft’s
STRIDE is an industrial-level methodology to eliciting threat scenarios and,
thence, deriving security use cases [163]. Notably, a significantly sized body of
reusable knowledge is also available in the secure software engineering community.
Security knowledge is often packaged in the shape of checklists and patterns. For
instance, STRIDE comes bundled with a catalogue of security threat tree patterns
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that can be readily instantiated in the system at hand so as to elicit a close-to-
exhaustive set of potential security threats. Unfortunately, privacy is still lagging
behind.
2.1.1 Previous Work
Privacy Requirements Analysis
Mylopoulos et al. [213] are the first to point out that complexity of an information
system is determined partly by its functionality (i.e. what the system does) and
partly by its non-functional requirements (also referred as constrains, goals, and
quality attributes), and the non-functional requirements “play a crucial role during
system development, serving as selection criteria for choosing among myriads
of decisions”. They proposed a comprehensive framework for representing and
using non-functional requirements during the development process in a process-
oriented approach. The framework consists of five basic components – goals, link
types, methods (i.e., goal decomposition methods, goal satisficing methods, and
argumentation methods), correlation rules, and the labeling procedure – as the
representation of non-functional requirements in terms of interrelated goals. As
suggested by Mylopoulos et al. “such goals can be refined through refinement
methods and can be evaluated in order to determine the degree to which a set
of non-functional requirements is supported by a particular design” [213]. This
framework can serve as the foundation for the proposed privacy requirement
analysis methodology.
The privacy guidelines provided by Microsoft describes some basic privacy
concepts [29], such as different types of consents or data minimization concepts.
Besides, a number of guidelines are presented for selected scenarios concerning
the following principles: notice, choice, onward transfer, access, security, and data
integrity. However, it only contains a flat list of the required and recommended
guidelines and does not intend to describe a more structured approach. These
guidelines can still be used as inspiration to determine possible threats, for example,
to extend our catalogue of threat trees.
In the documentation of SDL version 3.2 [30], privacy is also partially considered,
but only at a generic level. For example, the threat modeling process described
in the forth stage of SDL only mentions that a design review with the privacy
expert is necessary. SDL also presents ten general privacy guidelines. An example
guideline indicates that it is important to collect the least sensitive form of data.
At this stage, privacy is not yet well integrated in SDL.
Yu and Cysneiros [298] presented a framework using i∗, an agent-oriented
requirements modeling language, to deal with privacy requirements. This
framework however focuses on reasoning about privacy and does not provide
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a structured methodology to examine the different privacy objectives. Liu et
al. [194] proposed a framework also using i∗ to deal with security and privacy
requirements, which was inspired by the work of Yu and Cysneiros. They use
four different analysis techniques to create a complete model: attacker analysis,
dependency vulnerability analysis, countermeasure analysis and access control
analysis. Although this framework contains the attacker analysis technique which
is similar to our idea of examining the possible privacy threats, the framework is
again mainly meant to reason about privacy but lacks the necessary knowledge to
empower the (non-expert) privacy analyst.
Miyazaki et al. [207] defined a computer-aided privacy requirements elicitation
technique. This technique returns the appropriate requirements for the system to
be compliant with the law, based on a questionnaire that the system engineer fills
out. This is in contrast to our methodology, which helps the analyst eliciting the
privacy requirements in accordance to the stakeholders’ wishes.
From Privacy Requirements to Privacy Solutions
Several taxonomies have been proposed to create a link between privacy
requirements and privacy solutions. This section gives an overview of some
existing taxonomies which can be integrated in our threat modeling process to
link the privacy requirements obtained by our methodology to the optimal privacy
enhancing solution(s).
The taxonomy of privacy goals, described by Anto´n et al. [52], is to analyze website
privacy requirements. Privacy goals are divided into protection goals and (anti-)
vulnerability goals. The Code for Fair Information Practices is used to categorize
the protection goals, namely notice and awareness, choice and consent, access and
participation, integrity and security, and enforcement and redress. The (anti-)
vulnerability goals are classified according to the manner in which they violate
the user’s privacy. The corresponding goals are monitoring, aggregation, storage,
and information transfer. These goals are used to analyze and compare privacy
policies and do not intend to link privacy requirements to general privacy solutions,
instead, limited to website privacy requirements.
The Pris method [173] presents a structured way to create systems which adhere
to the specified privacy requirements. It consists of four different phases: 1) Elicit
privacy-related goals, 2) Analyze the impact of privacy goals on organizational
processes, 3) Model affected processes using privacy-process patterns, and 4)
Identify the technique(s) that best support or implement the above processes.
The last step uses a table that classifies privacy implementation techniques in six
categories, a) Administrative tools, b) Information tools, c) Anonymizer products,
services and architectures, d) Pseudonymizer tools, e) Track and evidence erasers,
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and f) Encryption tools, and it can be an interesting source of inspiration to
determine appropriate privacy solutions.
Wuyts et al. [294] created a hierarchical taxonomy which categorizes privacy into
objectives. The objectives are divided in two branches. The proactive branch
focuses on concealing the association between the data and the identity of the
user before it is shared with the system, while the reactive branch focusses on
guarding the relationship between the data and the identity when the data is
already shared. Each objective corresponds to a number of strategies, which are
a sub-classification of the objectives. These strategies can then be linked to their
corresponding solutions. This paper only provides a sample solution for each
category and does not provide a full overview of all existing solutions.
2.1.2 Summary of Contributions
This chapter contributes to the aforementioned dimensions, both from method-
ologies and knowledge review points, by providing a comprehensive privacy
threat modeling framework to support the elicitation and fulfillment of privacy
requirements.
First, this chapter provides a systematic methodology to model privacy-specific
threats. Analogous to STRIDE, an information flow oriented model of the system
is leveraged to guide the analysis and to provide broad coverage. The data flow
diagram (DFD) notation has been selected, as described in Section 2.2. The
methodology instructs the system analyst or designer on what issues should be
investigated, and where in the model those issues could emerge. This is achieved
by defining a list of privacy threat types and providing the mapping of the threat
types and the elements in the system model. This part of the methodology is
described in Section 2.5. Note that the privacy threat types have been identified
in contrast with well known privacy objectives, as summarized in Section 2.4.
Additionally, this chapter provides an extensive catalogue of privacy-specific threat
tree patterns that can be used to detail the threat analysis outlined above. In a
nutshell, they refine the privacy threat types by providing concrete examples. The
catalogue is described in Section 2.6, while Section 2.7 illustrates how to instantiate
the threat tree patterns in order to elicit the misuse cases.
Finally, this chapter provides the means to map the existing privacy-enhancing
technologies (PETs) to the identified privacy objectives. Therefore, the selection
of sound privacy countermeasures is simplified. This is described in Section 2.8.
The work described in this chapter has been published in [130].
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2.1.3 Chapter Outline
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 briefly reviews the preliminaries
including the Data Flow Diagram to model application systems and the security
threat modeling framework STRIDE. An overview of our proposed LINDDUN
methodology for modeling privacy threats, eliciting privacy requirements, and
selecting privacy enhancing technologies accordingly is provided in Section 2.3.
Section 2.4 summarizes the privacy objectives, from which the privacy threat
types can be identified. Section 2.5 further elaborates the LINDDUN methodology
by introducing the privacy threat categories based on the privacy properties and
the mapping of these categories to the DFD elements. An extensive catalogue
of privacy-specific threat tree patterns are provided in Section 2.6, whereas the
instantiation of the threat tree patterns to elicit the misuse cases is described
in Section 2.7. The elicitation of privacy requirements from the documented
misuse cases is explained in Section 2.8.1. Section 2.8.2 proposes a number of
privacy enhancing countermeasures to the identified privacy threats in a software
or hardware based system. The proposed methodology is discussed in Section 2.9,
and the chapter concludes in Section 2.10.
2.2 Preliminaries
2.2.1 Data Flow Diagram
An application system can be graphically represented using Data Flow Diagrams
(DFD) that consists of the following elements: data flows (communication data),
data stores (logical data or concrete databases, files, and so on), processes (units
of functionality or programs) and external entities (end-points of the system like
users, external services, and so on). For threat modeling, trust boundaries are
also introduced to represent the border between trustworthy and untrustworthy
elements.
Let’s take a Social Network 2.0 use case as a running example to be discussed
throughout this chapter. The DFD is an abstract representation of a social
network application, as depicted in Figure 2.1, where online users share personal
information such as relationship status, pictures, and comments with their friends.
In this DFD, the user is represented as an entity to interact with the system. The
Social Network 2.0 application contains two processes (the portal and the service)
and one data store which contains all the personal information of the users. The
trust boundary shows that the processes, the data store, and the communication
between the two are considered trustworthy.
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Figure 2.1. The Data Flow Diagram (DFD) of a Social Network 2.0 application
2.2.2 Security Threat Modeling – the STRIDE Approach
Security, in contrast to privacy, has already been well integrated in the Security
Development Lifecycle (SDL) [163] as a well-established methodology. The SDL
process consists of a set of activities that can be integrated in each step of the
development lifecycle of application systems. The main advantage of the SDL
approach is the reduction of the number of security vulnerabilities and the total
cost of the system development, by eliminating security vulnerabilities at an early
stage of development.
To build security in software or hardware based systems, an important aspect is
to consider how an attacker might compromise the system security by exploiting
design flaws and building the necessary countermeasure mechanisms in the system.
In this respect, the threat modeling plays a key role. In fact SDL has integrated a
systematic approach for security threat modeling called STRIDE. In this section,
we will briefly review the STRIDE threat modeling process, and its nine key steps
are summarized in the following paragraphs.
1. Define use scenarios. As a first step, system’s key functionalities will be
determined and use case scenarios will be defined.
2. Gather a list of external dependencies. A number of external dependencies
need to be defined, such as the operation system that the system functionality
depends on, the database it uses, and so on.
3. Define security assumptions. In the analysis phase, often decisions are
based on implicit assumptions, which may not always apply anymore after
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Table 2.1. Security concerns with corresponding security threats and DFD
elements susceptible to threats (DF-Data flow, DS-Data store, P-Process, E-
External entity), proposed by the Security Development Lifecycle (SDL)
Security property Security threat DF DS P E
Authentication Spoofing × ×
Integrity Tampering × × ×
Non-repudiation Repudiation × × ×
Confidentiality Information Disclosure × × ×
Availability Denial of Service × × ×
Authorization Elevation of Privilege ×
a second iteration, therefore, it is important to explicitly note down all the
assumptions, to have a good understanding of the entire system.
4. Create external security notes. Because each external dependency can have
its view on security, it is useful to list all the restrictions/decisions made by
the external dependencies. An example of such a security note is which ports
are open for database access or HTTP traffic.
5. Create one or more DFDs of the application being analyzed. The system
is decomposed in relevant (either logical or structural) components and for
each of these parts the corresponding threats are analyzed. This process is
repeated over increasingly refined model until a state is reached where the
residual threats are acceptable.
6. Determine threat types. The STRIDE threat taxonomy is used to identify
security threat types. STRIDE is an acronym for Spoofing, Tampering,
Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of
privilege. These threats are the negation of the main security properties,
namely confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, authorization
and non-repudiation.
7. Identify the threats to the system. Each element of the data flow diagram
is assigned to a set of susceptible threats. Table 2.1 gives an overview of
the different DFD elements with the corresponding security threats they are
subject to (marked with ×).
To identify which threats are applicable to a specific system, threat tree
patterns can be used. For each valid intersection in Table 2.1, a threat tree
pattern suggests the possible security-related preconditions for the STRIDE
category, in order to help analysts determine the relevancy of a threat for
the system. An example threat tree is presented in Figure 2.2. Each path of
the threat tree indicate a valid attack path. Note that some trees cascade.
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For example, the tree in Figure 2.2 shows the conditions that could lead to
tampering threats against a process. The node indicated as a circle (or oval)
in the threat tree means a root threat, that cascades to another category. The
node indicated as a rectangle suggest a concrete threat in an attack path.
The arrows connecting the nodes in general refer to a OR relation among the
various preconditions, unless it is indicated explicitly with “AND” to refer
to a AND relation.
Afterwards, the identified privacy threats that are relevant to the designated
system are documented as misuse cases, as a collection of threat scenarios
in the system.
Figure 2.2. Example security threat tree pattern of tampering a process
8. Determine risk. For each threat, SDL has determined the appropriate
security risk level, which can be used to define the priorities of the threats
to be resolved.
9. Plan mitigation. In the final step of the methodology, the risk of the threat is
reduced or eliminated by introducing proper countermeasures and defenses.
Mitigating a risk to the threat corresponds to eliminating one attack path in
the threat tree. An overview of some possible mitigation technologies linked
to each security property is provided.
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2.2.3 Security Threat Modeling Techniques
STRIDE comes with the main advantage of an extensive, reusable knowledge base
(i.e. the threat tree patterns). However, some alternatives to elicit security threats
exist.
Attack trees are similar to fault trees [264]. The root node describes the high-
level attack which is further decomposed in lower-level attack branches. Each
node represents a step that must be successfully executed in order to complete the
attack represented by the parent node. Nodes can be composed in conjunctions and
disjunctions. Attack trees can have both a graphical and a textual representation.
Misuse cases [51] or abuse cases are similar to regular use cases, however with
a focus on the attacker’s actions. Misuse cases have a textual representation,
similar to use cases, and can also be represented in a misuse case diagram, which
summarizes all existing misuse cases for a certain system and their impact on the
system’s use cases. Both techniques can be used to elicit security threats; these
techniques however do not provide methodological guidance to discover additional
threats. Opdahl and Sindre [31] have made an experimental comparison between
attack trees and misuse cases of which the main finding was that attack trees
are more effective for finding threats. Attack trees encourage the use of standard
textbook threats and decomposition in lower-level threats. Misuse case analysis
focuses more on user-level and organizational threats.
KAOS [284], a goal-oriented requirements analysis framework, has been extended
with anti-goals to support the modeling of threats. Such anti-goals express
the goals of an attacker who tries to abuse the system. Although no actual
methodology exists to determine the threats, the root anti-goals are created by
negating all the positive system goals. Next, the anti-goals are refined into trees.
The formal nature of KAOS is an advantage which makes it possible to determine
completeness of the (anti-)goals.
2.3 Our Approach – the LINDDUN Methodology
In this chapter, we propose a systemic approach for privacy threat modeling – the
LINDDUN methodology – to elicit the privacy requirements and select privacy
enhancing technologies accordingly. Each letter of “LINDDUN” stands for a
privacy threat obtained by negating a privacy property. Privacy properties and
threats are briefly described in Sections 2.4 and 2.5, respectively. In the STRIDE
framework for security, explained in Section 2.2, the security countermeasures are
directly proposed after the risk assessment. Therefore, STRIDE doesn’t cover the
elicitation of security requirements. We follow a slightly different approach for
privacy, with an emphasis on privacy requirements elicitation.
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The building blocks of the proposed LINDDUN methodology for privacy are
depicted in Figure 2.3. In the figure, a distinction is marked between the proposed
methodology and the supporting knowledge provided to assist each step. First
of all, a data flow diagram is created based on the high-level system description.
This is followed by mapping privacy threats to the DFD elements using Table 2.4
as a guide to determine the corresponding threats. In particular, a number of
privacy tree patterns from Section 2.6 will be proposed to detail the privacy threat
instances in a designated system, by providing an overview of the most common
preconditions of each threat. Next, the identified privacy threats that are relevant
to the designated system are documented as misuse cases in Section 2.7. A misuse
case presents a collection of threat scenarios in the system. The identified privacy
threats that needs to be evaluated and prioritized via risk assessment. Indeed, due
to both time and budget constraints, not all threats are worthy further treatment.
Note that details on the risk-analysis process are beyond the scope of this work.
Hereafter, the privacy requirements of the system are elicited from the misuse
cases following the mapping in Table 2.6. Finally, appropriate privacy enhancing
solutions are selected according to the privacy requirements. Table 2.7 provides
an overview of the state-of-art privacy enhancing techniques and the mapping to
their corresponding privacy objectives.
Figure 2.3. The LINDDUN methodology and the required system-specific
knowledge
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The fact that the LINDDUN framework and STRIDE are based on similar
approaches creates synergy. Therefore, the privacy and security analysis can
be nicely integrated into SDL, as shown in Figure 2.4. In bold, the nine steps
of the security modeling process are enhanced with privacy-specific activities.
Nevertheless, the aforementioned LINDDUN framework for privacy can be
performed independently from the SDL security threat modeling process. In
particular, privacy assumptions are specified (step 3), and external privacy notes
are considered (step 4). This chapter proposes privacy-specific extensions to the
key steps: determining privacy threat types (step 6) in Section 2.5.1 and identifying
privacy threats (step 7) in Sections 2.5.2 to 2.7. Some initial suggestions for
selecting feasible mitigation strategies towards privacy enhancing solutions are
discussed in Section 2.8. Some initial ideas for step 8 privacy risk assessment are
given in Section 2.7.1. However, this aspect is outside the scope for this thesis.
Figure 2.4. The integration of LINDDUN privacy threat modeling approach into
the SDL threat modeling process
2.4 Privacy Properties
It is not the intention to propose a new taxonomy of privacy definitions in this
chapter. However, it is crucial to have the right basis for the proposed LINDDUN
framework, therefore definitions of privacy properties are elaborately studied and
reviewed in this section. The literature is rich in studies to conceptualize privacy,
and we suggest interested readers to refer to the work by Solove [272, 274]
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for a comprehensive understanding of privacy. Most privacy properties in the
LINDDUN framework comply with the terminology proposed by Pfitzmann et
al. [237], as is widely recognized in the privacy research community.
2.4.1 Understanding Privacy: Hard Privacy Vs. Soft Privacy
The concept of privacy is introduced in Section 1.1.3. This section further
elaborates on the privacy definitions. Privacy can be distinguished as hard privacy
and soft privacy, as proposed by Danezis [109, 111]. The data protection goal
of hard privacy refers to data minimization, or, protection against surveillance,
interrogation, aggregation, and identification, using the taxonomic terms from
Solove [272]. The system model of hard privacy is that a data subject, being an
active security user, provides as little data as possible and tries to reduce the need
to “trust” other entities as much as possible, and it also implies the assumption
that personal data is not divulged to third parties. The threat model includes
communication and service provider, data holder, and adversarial environment,
where strategic adversaries with certain resources are motivated to breach privacy,
similar to security systems.
Soft privacy, on the contrary, refers to the assumption that the data subject
has already lost control of his or her data and needs to trust the honesty and
competence of data controllers. This concept is motivated because it is difficult
for the data subject to verify how his or her data is collected and processed in
practice, for example, there are millions of exposed records per year due to data
breaches at businesses, government agencies and other institutions. In short, the
data protection goal of soft privacy is to provide data security and process data
with specific purpose and consent, by means of policies, access control, and audit.
In the system model of soft privacy, the data subject provides his or her data, and
data controller, as the main security user, is responsible for the data protection.
Unfortunately, it brings the technical disadvantage of soft privacy solutions because
there is no direct control from the data subject and it is impossible to defend
against a malicious data holder or super-user. Consequently, a weaker threat
model applies including different parities with inequality of power, such as external
parties, honest insiders who make errors, and corrupt insiders within honest data
holders. An overview of hard and soft privacy solutions will be given in Section 2.8.
It is argued that privacy should become a first-class security property, suggested
by Danezis [110] for a number of reasons. Primarily, the concept of self-
determination is considered as the most valued security property. In addition,
privacy satisfies valid security needs of some entities, such as freedom from
surveillance and profiling, freedom from compulsion, and exibility to access and
use content and services. Furthermore, comparable with security, privacy needs
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to be technologically supported and laws are necessary but insufficient to protect
privacy.
Besides conceptualizing privacy, another research challenge is to define privacy
properties. Since secure communication channel is one of the basic requirements
for privacy, some classical security properties are desired as privacy properties,
including confidentiality (ensuring that information is accessible only to those
authorized to have access), integrity (safeguarding the accuracy and completeness
of information and processing methods), availability (also censorship resistance,
information is accessible to authorized users), and non-repudiation (one should
not be able to deny what one has done). The official definitions of these properties
can be found in ISO 17799 [10].
In addition, a number of properties are also appreciated, including anonymity
(hiding links between identity and action or a piece of information), unlinkability
(hiding link between two or more actions, identities and pieces of information),
undetectability (or covertness) and unobservability (hiding user’s activity), plau-
sible deniability (opposite of non-repudiation, no others can prove one has said
or done something), and forward security (also referred as forward secrecy and
freedom from compulsion, meaning that once the communication is securely over,
it cannot be decrypted any more).
We decided to include the following privacy properties in the proposed framework,
namely unlinkability, anonymity and pseudonymity, plausible deniability, unde-
tectability and unobservability, and confidentiality (hiding data content, including
access control) as hard privacy properties; user content awareness (including
feedback for user privacy awareness, data update and expire) together with policy
and consent compliance as soft privacy properties. These properties are described
in the following sections. Note that properties such as integrity, availability, and
forward security are also important for privacy. However, we consider them
as typical security properties; hence they are to be considered in the security
engineering framework, such as STRIDE.
2.4.2 Unlinkability
The unlinkability property refers to hiding the link between two or more actions,
identities, and pieces of information. Examples of unlinkability include hiding
links between two anonymous messages sent by the same person, two web page
visits by the same user, entries in two databases related to the same person, or
two people related by a friendship link in a social network.
Unlinkability is defined by ISO 15408 [3] as: “Unlinkability ensures that a user
may make multiple uses of resources or services without others being able to link
these uses together. [...] Unlinkability requires that users and/or subjects are
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unable to determine whether the same user caused certain specific operations in
the system [3].”
The above definition focuses on linking processes (i.e., uses of resources or services)
by the same users. To extend this, the definition from Pfitzmann et al. [237]
focuses on linking objectives (IOIs), and hence refers to the DFD elements of
entity, data flow, and data store. “Unlinkability of two or more items of interest
(IOIs, e.g., subjects, messages, actions, ...) from an attacker’s perspective means
that within the system (comprising these and possibly other items), the attacker
cannot sufficiently distinguish whether these IOIs are related or not [237].”
When referring to comparing whether two or more IOIs are linked, the
aforementioned definition of unlinkability suggests implicitly that these IOIs are of
the same DFD element type. Although it is not explicitly mentioned, the definition
of unlinkability implies that the two or more IOIs are of the comparable types, in
order to facilitate the comparison of these IOIs.
2.4.3 Anonymity
Essentially, the anonymity property refers to hiding the link between an identity
and an action or a piece of information. Examples are anonymous sender of an
email, writer of a text, person accessing a service, person to whom an entry in a
database relates, and so on.
Pfitzmann et al. [237] pointed out that to enable anonymity of a subject, there
always has to be an appropriate set of subjects with potentially the same attributes,
the anonymity set. This leads to the first definition: Anonymity of a subject means
that the subject is not identifiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity set [237].
The definition given above basically defines anonymity as a binary property:
either a subject is anonymous or not. It emphasizes one entity and an entire
anonymity set. To reflect the possibility to quantify anonymity and to underline
that all statements are made from the perspective of an attacker, the definition
of anonymity can be extended as: “Anonymity of a subject from an attacker’s
perspective means that the attacker cannot sufficiently identify the subject within
a set of subjects, the anonymity set.” [237]
Anonymity can also be described in terms of unlinkability. If one considers sending
and receiving of messages as attributes; the items of interest (IOIs) are those who
have sent or received which message. Then, “anonymity of a subject with respect to
an attribute may be defined as unlinkability of this subject and this attribute.” For
instance, sender anonymity of a subject means that to this potentially sending
subject, each message is unlinkable. Correspondingly, recipient anonymity of a
subject means that to this potentially receiving subject, each message is unlinkable.
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2.4.4 Pseudonymity
The pseudonymity property suggests that it is possible to build a reputation on
a pseudonym and possible to use multiple pseudonyms for different purposes.
Examples include a person publishes comments on social network sites under
different pseudonyms and a person uses a pseudonym to subscribe to a service.
Pfitzmann et al. [237] defines pseudonymity as: “A pseudonym is an identifier
of a subject other than one of the subject’s real names. Pseudonymity is the
use of pseudonyms as identifiers. A subject is pseudonymous if a pseudonym
is used as identifier instead of one of its real names.” Pseudonymity can also be
perceived with respect to (un)linkability. Whereas anonymity and identifiability
(or accountability) are the two extremes with respect to (un)linkability to subjects,
pseudonymity is the entire field between and including these extremes. Therefore,
pseudonymity comprises all degrees of (un)linkability to a subjective’s identity.
2.4.5 Plausible Deniability
For privacy, plausible deniability refers to the ability to deny having performed
an action that other parties can neither confirm nor contradict. Plausible
deniability from an attacker’s perspective means that an attacker cannot prove
a user knows, has done or has said something. Sometimes, depending on the
application, plausible deniability is desirable over non-repudiation, for instance, in
an application used by whistleblowers, users will want to deny ever having sent
a certain message to protect their safety. Other examples include off-the-record
conversations, possibility of denying the existence of an encrypted file, denying
that a file is transmitted from a data source, or denying that a database record
belongs to a person.
The relation between non-repudiation and plausible deniability is outlined by
Roe [261]: “The goal of the non-repudiation service is to provide irrefutable
evidence concerning the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event or action. If
we believe that there is a need for this as a security service[...] we must also
concede that some participants desire the opposite effect: that there be no irrefutable
evidence concerning a disputed event or action.” This “complementary service”
is plausible deniability. “Non-repudiation and plausible deniability are mutually
exclusive in that an entity can’t both have and not have sufficient evidence to
convince a particular party that a particular event happened. However, it is
possible to imagine combinations of the two services in which some parties retain
evidence of an event while others don’t, or the evidence is sufficient to convince
some parties but not others [261].”
In particular, it ensures that “an instance of communication between computer
systems leaves behind no unequivocal evidence of its having taken place. Features
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of communications protocols that were seen as defects from the standpoint of non-
repudiation can be seen as benefits from the standpoint of this converse problem,
which is called plausible deniability.”
Mao et al. described plausible deniability in a computer system: “the plausible
deniability property is meant to ensure that an entity A’s involvement in a protocol
run with another entity B does not generate any evidence that can be used to
demonstrate (either by B or by some third party who observes the protocol run)
that A and B did participate in a protocol run. This property[...] is usually
achieved in such authenticated protocols by avoiding the direct signing of identities
in exchanged messages [200].”
2.4.6 Undetectability and Unobservability
The undetectability and unobservability properties refer to hiding the user’s
activities. Practical examples include that, it is impossible to know whether an
entry in a database corresponds to a real person, or to distinguish whether someone
or no one is in a given location.
ISO 15408 [3] defines unobservability as: “Unobservability ensures that a user
may use a resource or service without others, especially third parties, being able to
observe that the resource or service is being used. [...] Unobservability requires that
users and/or subjects cannot determine whether an operation is being performed.”
Essentially, this definition refers an entity (subject) to data flows (e.g. a messages
has been sent), data stores (e.g. a database has been accessed), and processes (a
resource or service has been used).
To be precise, Pfitzmann et al. make the distinction of undetectability from
unobservability. “Undetectability of an item of interest (IOI) from an attacker’s
perspective means that the attacker cannot sufficiently distinguish whether it
exists or not. If we consider messages as IOIs, this means that messages are
not sufficiently discernible from, for example, random noise [237].” While the
anonymity and unlinkability properties require the protection of, instead of an
IOI itself, the relationship between the IOI to a subjects or other IOIs, the
undetectability property requires the protection of IOIs.
Undetectability of an IOI against uninvolved subjects and, at the same time,
anonymity of involved subjects even when IOIs can be detected, is defined
as unobservability [237]: “Unobservability of an item of interest (IOI) means
undetectability of the IOI against all subjects uninvolved in it and anonymity
of the subject(s) involved in the IOI even against the other subject(s) involved
in that IOI.” The definition suggests that unobservability is undetectability by
uninvolved subjects AND anonymity even if IOIs can be detected. Consequently,
unobservability implies anonymity, and unobservability implies undetectability. It
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means, with respect to the same attacker, unobservability reveals always only
a subset of the information anonymity reveals. Later sections of this chapter
will focus on undetectability, since unobservability is in fact a combination of
undetectability and anonymity.
2.4.7 Confidentiality
The confidentiality property refers to hiding the data content or controlled release
of data content. Examples include transferring encrypted email, applying access
control to a classified document or a database containing sensitive information.
NIST [201] describes confidentiality as followings: Confidentiality means pre-
serving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including
means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information. Although
confidentiality is a security property, as the definition above states, it is also
important for preserving privacy properties, such as anonymity and unlinkability.
Therefore, confidentiality is also considered an important privacy property.
Not only crucial for security, confidentiality is, as the definition above states,
also significant for privacy. Several privacy objectives, such as anonymity and
unlinkability, depend on confidentiality. For instance, in order to keep the user’s
identity hidden, the communication between the user and the system needs to
be confidential. Therefore, confidentiality is also considered an important privacy
objective.
2.4.8 Content Awareness
Unlike the aforesaid classical privacy properties, to our knowledge, the following
two properties, namely content awareness, and policy and consent compliance, are
not explicitly defined in the literature. However, we consider them important
privacy objectives, due to their significance to privacy and data protection. With
the emerging of Web 2.0 technologies, users tend to provide excessive information
to service providers and lose control of their personal information. Therefore, the
content awareness property is proposed to make sure that users are aware of their
personal data and that only the minimum necessary information should be sought
and used to allow for the performance of the function to which it relates.
The more personal identifiable information a data subject discloses, the higher the
risk is for privacy violation. To ensure content awareness, a number of technical
enforcement tools have been developed. For instance, the concept of personal
information feedback tools has been promoted [188, 231] to help users gain privacy
awareness and self-determine which personal data to disclose.
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The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) [229] has been designed to
allow websites (as data controllers) to declare their intended use of the information
that they collected about the browsing users (as data subjects). P3P addresses
the content awareness property by making users aware of how personal data are
processed by the data controller.
Although not necessarily privacy-oriented, within the realm of content awareness
objective, another responsibility of the user is to keep user’s data up-to-date to
prevent wrong decisions based on incorrect data. This means that the data subject
or the data controller (depends on applications) is responsible for deleting and
updating inaccurate information. For example, it is crucial to maintain patient’s
data in e-health applications. Imagine a doctor forgetting to mention that the
patient is a diabetic, the absence of information could cause fatal consequences for
patients taking medication without considering negative side effects on diabetics.
To summarize, the content awareness property focuses on the user’s consciousness
regarding his own data. The user needs to be aware of the consequences of
sharing information. These consequences can refer to the user’s privacy, which
can be violated by sharing too much personal identifiable information, as well as
to undesirable results by providing incomplete or incorrect information.
2.4.9 Policy and Consent Compliance
Unlike the content awareness property focused on the user, the policy and consent
compliance property requires the whole system – including data flows, data stores,
and processes – as data controller to inform the data subject about the system’s
privacy policy, or allow the data subject to specify consents in compliance with
legislation, before users accessing the system. According to the definitions from the
EU Directive 95/46/EC [140]: “Controller shall mean the natural or legal person,
public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others
determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.” “The
data subject’s consent shall mean any freely given specific and informed indication
of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data
relating to him being processed.”
A policy specifies one or more rules with respect to data protection. These are
general rules determined by the stakeholders of the system. Consents specify one
or more data protection rules as well, however, these rules are determined by
the user and only relate to the data regarding this specific user. The policy and
consent compliance property essentially ensures that the system’s policy and the
user’s consent, specified in textual form, are indeed implemented and enforced.
This property is closely related to legislation. There are a number of legal
frameworks addressing the raised concerns of data protection, such as the Health
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issued Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [16] in the United
States, the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC [140] in Europe, the Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and Privacy Act [34] in
Canada, the Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988 and Privacy Amendment (Private
Sector) Act 2000 [216] in Australia, and the OECD Guidelines on the Protection
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data [223].
One example of consent compliance is in e-health, for some countries, healthcare
professionals are not allowed to intervene until the data subject has given informed
consent for medical treatment.
There are initiatives to protect data subjects and create openness; however it
is evidently important to ensure that internal rules actually comply with that
promised in policies and consents. Unfortunately, few technical solutions exist to
guarantee the compliance. A possible non-technical solution is to use employee
contracts to enforce penalties (e.g., get fired or pay fines) to ensure compliance.
Another solution is to hire an auditor to check policies compliance. Eventually,
necessary legal actions can be taken by data subjects in case of noncompliance.
Breaux et al. [79] pointed out that to ensure a product that complies with its
privacy and security goals, legal requirements need to be identified and refined
into product requirements, and the product requirements need to be integrated
into the ongoing product design and testing processes. They presented an industry
case study in which requirements of Cisco products were specified to comply
with Section 508 of the U.S. Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 [224].
They developed a set of qualitative metrics to rationalize the comparison of
two requirements. These metrics demonstrate that alignments between legal and
product requirements can be described in detail by using the goal-oriented concept
of refinement. Their analysis revealed that a frame-based requirements analysis
method [78], which itemizes requirements and preserves legal language, is useful
to incorporate legal requirements into a manufacturer’s compliance framework.
2.5 Mapping Privacy Threats to DFD
In this section, we present the privacy threat categories based on the aforemen-
tioned privacy properties. We also discuss how to map these categories to the
DFD elements.
2.5.1 Privacy Threat Categories
As shown in Table 2.2, the methodology considers seven types of threats.
LINDDUN is the mnemonic acronym that we use.
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Table 2.2. In the LINDDUN methodology, privacy properties and the
corresponding privacy threat are categorized as hard privacy and soft privacy
The following section describes LINDDUN components:
1. Linkability of two or more items of interest (IOIs, e.g., subjects, messages,
actions, etc.) allows an attacker to sufficiently distinguish whether these
IOIs are related or not within the system.
2. Identifiability of a subject means that the attacker can sufficiently identify the
subject associated to an IOI, for instance, the sender of a message. Usually,
identifiability refers to a set of potential subjects, called the identifiability
set [237]. In essence, identifiability is a special case of linkability when a
subject and its attributes are involved. Identifiability is a threat to both
anonymity and pseudonymity.
3. Non-repudiation, in contrast to security, this is a threat for privacy. Non-
repudiation allows an attacker to gather evidence to counter the claims of
the repudiating party, and to prove that a user knows, has done or has said
something.
4. Detectability of an IOI means that the attacker can sufficiently distinguish
whether such an item exists or not. If we consider messages as IOIs, it means
that messages are sufficiently discernible from random noise.
5. Information Disclosure threats expose personal information to individuals
who are not suppose to have access to it.
6. Content Unawareness indicates that a user is unaware of the information
disclosed to the system. The user either provides too much information
which allows an attacker to easily retrieve the user’s identity or inaccurate
information which can cause wrong decisions or actions.
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7. Policy and consent Noncompliance means that even though the system shows
its privacy policies to its users, there is no guarantee that the system actually
complies to the advertised policies. Therefore, the user’s personal data might
still be revealed.
2.5.2 Mapping Privacy Threat Categories to The System
This section provides an guideline to identify privacy threats of an application
system. First, a Data Flow Diagram (DFD) is created in correspondence to the
application’s use case scenarios. Second, privacy threats are mapped to the DFD.
Creating Application DFD Based On Use Case Scenarios
DFD is chosen to present a system based on two reasons. First, DFD is proved
to be sufficiently expressive in a number of case studies examined by the authors.
Second, DFD is also used by the SDL threat modeling process, hence by deploying
the same modeling technique an interesting synergy can be created between the
proposed framework and the SDL process.
Running example: Social Network 2.0
In our running example Social Network 2.0, Alice is a registered user of a social
network. Each time Alice updates her friends list, she first connects to the
social network’s web portal. Accordingly, the portal communicates with the social
network’s server, and eventually, the friendship information of Alice and all other
users of that social network is stored in a database.
The DFD for the Social Network 2.0 application was already presented in Figure 2.1
of Section 2.2. Table 2.3 lists the DFD elements.
The creation of the DFD is an important part in the analysis. If the DFD was
incorrect, the analysis results would be wrong as well. Since privacy focusses on
the protection of user’s personal information, it is important to consider where
the information will be stored or passed by, as these are the crucial elements for
building in privacy.
Mapping Privacy Threats to DFD
After the DFD elements are listed, we identify the privacy threat categories for each
DFD element by following the mapping depicted in Table 2.4. Each intersection
marked with the symbol × indicates a potential privacy threat at a corresponding
DFD element in the system.
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Table 2.3. DFD elements in the Social Network 2.0 application
Entity User
Process Portal
Social network service
Data Store Social network database
Data Flow User data stream (user – portal)
Service data stream (portal – service)
Database data stream (service – database)
Table 2.4. Mapping LINDDUN components (privacy threats) to DFD element
types (E-Entity, DF-Data flow, DS-Data store, P-Process)
Threat categories E DF DS P
Linkability × × × ×
Identifiability × × × ×
Non-repudiation × × ×
Detectability × × ×
Information Disclosure × × ×
Content Unawareness ×
Policy/consent Noncompliance × × ×
In essence, each DFD element is subject to certain privacy threats, and the
nature of the potential privacy threat is determined by the DFD element
type. For example, a data flow is subject to a number of privacy threats
such as identifiability, linkability, detectability, non-repudiation, and information
disclosure. The following sections will explain how privacy threats affect DFD
elements. More threat scenarios corresponding to our running example will be
discussed in Section 2.7.
The nature of linkability indicates that the threat affects DFD elements pairwise.
In other words, linkability of a DFD element refers to a pair (x1, x2), where
xi ∈ {E,DF,DS, P} is the linkable IOI. Obviously, linkability at entity, from an
attacker’s perspective means that within the system (comprising these and possibly
other items), the attacker can sufficiently distinguish whether these entities are
related or not. Similar description applies for that of data flow, data store, and
process.
The identifiability threat affects all four DFD elements, such that each DFD
element is made explicit as the attributes that identifiability (or its opposite
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property anonymity) relates to, by forming a pair with a subject. Essentially,
identifiability at each DFD element refers to a pair (x, y), where x ∈ {E} is
the identifiable subject, and y ∈ {E,DS,DF, P} is the attribute identifiability
relates to. For example, identifiability at entity refers to a pair (E,E), meaning to
identify an entity within a set of entities. Identifiability at data flow refers to a pair
(E,DF ), meaning that a message is linkable to a potentially sending or receiving
subject. Identifiability at data store refers to a pair (E,DS), meaning that a
database entry is linkable to a potential data holder or subject. Identifiability at
process refers to a pair (E,P ), meaning that a process is linkable to a potentially
accessing subject.
Non-repudiation, opposite of plausible deniability, is a privacy threat that affects
the DFD elements of data flow, data store and process. Non-repudiation might be
appreciated for some system but undesirable for others. It depends on the system
requirements. For e-commerce applications, non-repudiation is an important
security property. Imagine a situation where a buyer signs for a purchased item
upon receipt, the vendor can later use the signed receipt as evidence that the user
received the item. For other applications, such as off-the-record conversations,
participants may desire plausible deniability for privacy protection such that there
will be no record to demonstrate the communication event, the participants and
the content. In this scenario, non-repudiation is a privacy threat. Even though
entity is the only DFD element being able to (non-)repudiate, the non-repudiation
privacy threat actually occurs at data flow, data store, and process. Similar to
linkability and identifiability, non-repudiation at each DFD element refers to a
pair (x, y), where x ∈ {E} is the non-repudiating subject, and y ∈ {DS,DF, P}
is the attribute it relates to.
Detectability threats occur at data flow, data store, and process, meaning that
the attacker can sufficiently distinguish whether it exists or not. Though in some
applications, techniques such as covert channel and steganography can be used to
protect both messages (data flow) and communicating parties (entity), in this case
the threat actually occurs at data flow instead of entity. In other words, the asset
we want to protect against the detectability threat includes data flow, data store,
and process.
Information disclosure threats affect data flow, data store, and process, referring
to the exposure of information at these DFD elements to individuals who are not
supposed to have access to it.
The content unawareness threat is related to entity, since the entity (data subject
or data controller) is actually responsible to provide the necessary consents to
process personal data and update or delete the expired information.
Policy and consent noncompliance is a threat that affects system as a whole,
because each system component (including data flow, data store and process) is
responsible to ensure that actions are taken in compliance with privacy policies
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Table 2.5. Determining privacy threats (LINDDUN components) to DFD
elements within the Social Network 2.0 application (From left to right: L-
Linkability, I-Identifiability, N-Non Repudiation, D-Detectability, D-Information
Disclosure, U-Content Unawareness, N-Consent/policy Noncompliance)
Threat target L I N D D U N
Data Store Social network database 1 4 × × 7 10
Data Flow User data stream 2 5 × × 8 10*
Service data stream × × × × × 10*
Database data stream × × × × × 10*
Process Portal × × × × × 10*
Social network service × × × × × 10*
Entity User 3 6 9
and data subject’s consents.
Running example: Social Network 2.0
Considering the Social Network 2.0 application, the list of generic privacy threats
to the modeled system is depicted in Table 2.5. This is obtained by gathering
the elements from Table 2.3 and then determining the susceptible threats using
Table 2.4.
The intersections marked with × in Table 2.5 are potential threats that have been
considered as irrelevant to the specific usage scenario. Each intersections that is
indicated with a number (1 to 10) in Table 2.5 means that there will be a privacy
threat at the corresponding DFD element. These items marked with a number are
the threats which we will actually consider. The number represents the ID of the
generic threat and will be used later for ease of reference.
Primarily, we assume that DFD elements within the trust boundary (marked
as dashed line in Figure 2.1) are trustworthy. We trust the processes with
the boundary, as well as all data flows in the trust boundary. Therefore, we
won’t discuss linkability, identifiability, and information disclosure threats on these
elements. We however do not trust the user and its communication with the portal
and we also want to protect the data store containing all the user’s information.
Moreover, non-repudiation and detectability threats are considered irrelevant
for social networks. Presumably, it depends on what privacy properties are
required for a particular social network system. In case plausible deniability and
undetectability would be desirable for a certain application, we should still consider
these threats to each DFD element accordingly.
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Following the above reasoning, ten threats will be examined in detail in Section 2.7,
and they are numbered in Table 2.5. Note that some items are indicated with a
10∗. This means that the policy and consent noncompliance threat affects the
system as a whole (including data flow, data store and process).
2.6 Detailing privacy threats via threat tree patterns
This section presents a (significant) number of threat tree patterns that can be
used to detail the privacy threats to a system. In the STRIDE framework for
security, which was explained in Section 2.2, the security countermeasures are
directly proposed after the risk assessment. STRIDE doesn’t cover the elicitation
of security requirements. A different approach is proposed for privacy. The goal
is to use privacy threat trees to elicit privacy requirements. This can be achieved
in a number of steps. First, the threat tree patterns are used as an indication to
allow system analysts to consider the currently most common privacy conditions
and specific threat instances that can occur in a system. This step is followed by
a selection process through risk assessment, in which less relevant threat instances
are to be ranked with a lower priority and discarded. Details on the risk-analysis
process are beyond the scope of this chapter. In the third step, the identified
privacy threats that are relevant to the designated system are documented as
misuse cases (to be explained in Section 2.7), which assemble a collection of threat
scenarios in the system. Finally, privacy requirements of the system will be elicited
from the documented misuse cases (to be explained in Section 2.8.1).
The privacy threat trees are inspired by the Secure Development Lifecycle (SDL)
and based on the state-of-art privacy developments. These threat trees reflect
common attack patterns and help application designers think about privacy
conditions in the system. This section itemizes the privacy threat tree patterns
and discusses what the designers should consider when designing and testing an
application.
This is assumed that the ideal pattern library is sufficiently large to ensure that all
possible violations will be covered. The threat trees depicted in this section present
our best effort so far. Further completeness of the proposed the trees is subject to
validations by practitioners for applications in real life systems. Comparable to the
SDL threat tree patterns, the privacy threat trees are susceptible to a continuous
improvement process, based on both the existing and the newly discovered threats.
For each marked intersection in Table 2.4, a threat tree exists showing the detailed
preconditions for this specific threat category to materialize. The preconditions
are hence vulnerabilities that can be exploited for a privacy attack scenario.
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2.6.1 Linkability of Entity
Figure 2.5. Threat tree for linkability of an entity
Linkability of entity refers to when an attacker can sufficiently distinguish whether
two or more entities are related or not within the system. This implies that
different pseudonyms can be linked to each other. The threat tree pattern is
depicted in Figure 2.5. One precondition is that data flow or data store is not fully
protected (e.g. unencrypted), which leads to the Information Disclosure threat of
data flow and data store. The second precondition is that Personal Identifiable
Information (PII) can be linked, e.g. based on user temporary ID, IP address,
behavioral patterns such as time, frequency and location, session ID, identifier
and biometrics, computer ID, communication content or any combination of these
factors. The aforementioned data store refers to the identity management system’s
database or any other database which contains personal identifiers of users. Having
accessed such a data store, the attacker could easily link different pseudonyms to
the same user.
2.6.2 Linkability of Data Flow
The linkability of data flow threat tree, as presented in Figure 2.6, suggests
two preconditions. One precondition is that data flows are not fully protected
(e.g. unencrypted), which leads to information disclosure of data flow; and
communications are linkable due to little or insecure anonymity systems deployed.
The other precondition is that communication can be linked. When no anonymous
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communication is deployed, basically the same preconditions apply as for the
linkability of entity threat. Messages are linked to each other by user’s identifiable
information (e.g. based on user temporary ID, IP address, behavioral patterns such
as time, frequency and location, session ID, identifier and biometrics, computer
ID, communication content or any combination of these factors). Alternatively,
when an insecure anonymity system is deployed, traffic analysis is possible to
extract information out of patterns of traffic; passive attacks (e.g. long-term
intersection attacks, traffic correlation and confirmation, fingerprinting, epistemic
attacks (route selection), and predecessor attacks) and active attacks (e.g. N-1
attacks, Sybil attack, traffic watermarking, tagging attack, replay, and DoS attack)
are possible to link entities together. An overview of these attacks can be found
in [112].
Figure 2.6. Threat tree for linkability of a data flow
2.6.3 Linkability of Data Store
Two preconditions correspond to the threat of linkability of a data store, as shown
in Figure 2.7. First, there is insufficient access control of the data store leading
to the information disclosure threat at a data store. Second, insufficient data
anonymization is applied or strong data mining is possible in the data store,
meaning that the stored information still contains sufficient references to the
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corresponding data subject, which makes it possible to link different data items
to each other within the same database. Another possibility is that data can be
linked from one database to another, and hence re-identification [276] is possible.
Figure 2.7. Threat tree for linkability of a data store
2.6.4 Linkability of Process
The threat tree of linkability of process suggests that the only way to prevent
different actions being linked to the same subject is by gaining access to the process,
as illustrated in Figure 2.8.
Figure 2.8. Threat tree for linkability of a process
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2.6.5 Identifiability of Entity
Figure 2.9 shows the threat tree pattern for identifiability of entity. It gives an
overview of the most common situations where an identifiability threat can occur at
an entity. A first precondition is when the e-id is used as login (i.e., the user’s actual
identity is used), meanwhile the data flow between the user and login portal is not
sufficiently protected (i.e., the threat of information disclosure of data flow), and
thus the user’s identity will be exposed. A second possibility occurs when a secret
(e.g. a password) is used as log-in and the relationship between this secret and the
user can be revealed. This can happen if the identity management database in not
secure (e.g. passwords are stored in clear); if the communication channel is insecure
and the communicated passwords are weak and can be connected to the user (e.g.
using a birthdate as password); or if replay attacks are possible (e.g. a keylogger
is installed, the communication can be eavesdropped or the person entering the
secret can be observed). A third possible precondition for the threat is the use of
a token as log-in which is weakly implemented or physically insecure. The final
precondition is that biometrics is used as log-in, which means that biometrics is
retrievable and can be linked to an entity. It is due to information disclosure
of identity management database or data flow which contains biometrics, and
linkability at data store.
2.6.6 Identifiability of Data Flow
The threat tree of identifiability of data flow is presented in Figure 2.10. Similar
to the linkability of data flow threat tree, identifiability of data flow is possible
when data flows are not fully protected, which leads to information disclosure
of data flow; or when the communication can be traced to an entity due to
little or insecure anonymity system deployed. When no anonymity system is
deployed, communication can be traced to an entity by means of identifiable
information (e.g. based on user temporary ID, IP address, behavioral patterns such
as time, frequency and location, session ID, identifier and biometrics, computer
ID, communication content or any combination of these factors). Alternatively,
when an insecure anonymity system is deployed, traffic analysis, passive attacks,
and active attacks [112] are possible to identify the particularly entity of interests.
2.6.7 Identifiability of Data Store
The preconditions for identifiability of data store, as presented in Figure 2.11, are
similar to the preconditions of linkability at a data store. Either there is insufficient
access control of the data store which refers to the information disclosure threat of
a data store; or insufficient data anonymization or strong data mining techniques
62 PRIVACY THREAT ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
Figure 2.9. Threat tree for identifiability of an entity
where applied in the data store, which means that the information stored still
contains sufficient references to the corresponding person to reveal the person’s
identity, and hence it refers to the identifiability threat of entity or the data can
be linked with other relevant information which can lead to re-identification of the
data subject.
2.6.8 Identifiability of Process
The threat tree of identifiability of process is presented in Figure 2.12. The only
condition for the identifiability threat at a process is when access to the process is
not sufficiently secured, and thus it refers to the threat of information disclosure
of a process.
2.6.9 Non-repudiation of Data Flow
Four general preconditions can be applied to the threat tree of non-repudiation of
data flow, as presented in Figure 2.13. One condition is insufficient obfuscation
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Figure 2.10. Threat tree for identifiability of a data flow
Figure 2.11. Threat tree for identifiability of a data store
for data sources or data flows, which means that the attacker can gain access to
at least part of the data flow or data source. This can occur in a number of cases,
for example, there is no automatic replay of broadcasts, such that the sender of a
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Figure 2.12. Threat tree for identifiability of a process
Figure 2.13. Threat tree for Non-repudiation of a data flow
file is sufficiently distinguishable from those who are merely relaying it. Another
example is when a complete decrypted log of all network connections to and from
a user’s computer is disclosed, resulting in the disclosure of the origin of data
flow. The final examples are that there is insufficient protection against censors
or insufficient obfuscation of data extensions, such that operators or users of the
network are able to know where the data comes from.
The second precondition of this threat is that little or a weak deniable encryption
technique is used to protect data flow. One possible attack path is to prove data is
encrypted, either due to the encrypter proves the data is obviously an encryption
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or colluding users prove together that the data is encrypted. The second attack
path is to prove data can be decrypted to a valid plain text, which can occur
when the encrypter decrypts the file or colluding users can cooperate and show
the decrypted message. The third attack path shows that all private keys are
disclosed, and the last path suggests that cryptanalysis is possible to attack the
used encryption scheme.
The third condition is that there are little or weak message authentication codes
(MAC) used to ensure integrity of data flow content, such that an attacker can
forge authentic looking messages and pretend that a certain data flow comes from
a subject.
The final precondition indicates that there is little or a weak Off-the-Record
Messaging (OTR) used, such that in a conversation it is not possible to
provide both deniability for the conversation participants and confidentiality of
conversations content at the same time. Possible attack paths include replaying
of previous transferred messages, and the use of signatures to demonstrate
communication events, participants and communication content.
2.6.10 Non-repudiation of Data Store
The threat tree for non-repudiation of data store is depicted in Figure 2.14. Three
preconditions can apply to this threat, namely a weak access control to the
database, which leads to the threat of information disclosure at the data store;
little or a weak deniable encrypted is used to protect the data, such that data
can be proven to be an encryption or can be decrypted to a valid plaintext; and
subjects with deniability are not able to edit data in the database to cover their
tracks, and it can be either impossible to remove or alter the user’s own data or
impossible to remove or alter someone else’s data concerning the user himself.
2.6.11 Non-repudiation of Process
Non-repudiation of process, as depicted in Figure 2.15 can be achieved in two ways:
either the process loses its confidentiality and information disclosure attacks at the
process are possible, or the process uses a secure log to create an overview of all
actions, which can evidently be traced back to the user.
2.6.12 Detectability of Data Flow
The threat tree of detectability of data flow, as depicted in Figure 2.16 suggests
five preconditions for the threat to occur. One condition is that the system lacks a
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Figure 2.14. Threat tree for Non-repudiation of a data store
Figure 2.15. Threat tree for Non-repudiation of a process
covert channel. This can happen when the covert channel uses too much bandwidth
from a legitimate channel, resulting in the detection of the covert communication.
It can also be because the patterns or characteristics of the communications
medium of the legitimate channel are controlled or examined by legitimate users,
e.g. checking file opening and closing operations patterns or watching the timing
of requests, such that covert communication is detected. The second condition is
side channel analysis on timing information, power consumption, electromagnetic
leaks, as an extra source of information which can be exploited to detect the
communication. The third condition occurs when a weak information hiding
techniques are used, which makes a number of steganalysis attacks possible.
Another condition is when there is no or insufficient dummy traffic sent at some
lower layer of communication network, such that messages fail to appear random
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for all parties except the sender and the recipient(s). Last but not least, the
threat can occur because of a weak spread spectrum communication, resulting in
deficiencies in the establishment of secure communications, resistance to natural
interference and jamming, and detection prevention.
Figure 2.16. Threat tree for detectability of a data flow
2.6.13 Detectability of Data Store
As shown in Figure 2.17, detectability threats in a data store can occur if there
is insufficient access control, which leads to the information disclosure threats
for security, or if insufficient information hiding techniques are applied, such as
information from a data store is revealed due to weak steganography algorithms
employed.
2.6.14 Detectability of Process
Similar to the previously described threats related to a process, the detectability
of process threat, depicted in Figure 2.18, also refers to the threat of information
disclosure of process.
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Figure 2.17. Threat tree for detectability of a data store
Figure 2.18. Threat tree for detectability of a process
2.6.15 Information Disclosure of Data Flow, Data Store, and
Process
The threat tree concerning information disclosure of data flow, data store, and
process, depicted in Figure 2.19, refers to the security threat tree of information
disclosure. This illustrates the fact that privacy properties are part of security
properties, and privacy may depend on security. For more information about the
information disclosure threats we refer to SDL [163].
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Figure 2.19. Threat tree for Information Disclosure
2.6.16 Content Unawareness of Entity
Content unawareness of an entity can occur in two situations: either the data
subject provides more personal identifiable information than required, which has
a negative influence on all the hard privacy objectives; or the data subject does
not keep information updated or does not remove the outdated information, and
it can lead to wrong actions when decisions are based on this information.
Figure 2.20. Threat tree for Content Unawareness
2.6.17 Consent and Policy Noncompliance of The System (Data
Flow, Process and Data Store)
The user’s privacy can be violated when internal system rules do not correspond
to privacy policies provided to the user. This can occur when an attacker tampers
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with the internal policies, which is actually a security threat; or when the policy
rules are incorrectly managed or updated (according to the user’s requests) by the
system administrator.
Figure 2.21. Threat tree for policy and consent noncompliance
2.7 From DFD and Privacy Threat Trees to Misuse
Cases
2.7.1 Risk Assessment
Similarly to STRIDE, LINDDUN can suggest a (large) number of documented
threats. Before the process moves forward, the identified threats must be
prioritized. Only the important ones should be considered for inclusion in the
requirements specification and, consequently, in the design of the solution. Risk
assessment techniques provide support for this stage. In general, risk is calculated
as a function of the likelihood of the attack scenario depicted in the MUC (misuse
case) and its impact. The risk value is used to sort the MUCs: the higher the risk,
the more important the MUC is.
The LINDDUN framework (similarly to STRIDE) is independent from the specific
risk assessment technique that is used. The analyst is free to pick the technique of
choice, for instance the OWASP’s (Open Web Application Security Project) Risk
Rating Methodology [228], Microsoft’s DREAD [191], NIST’s (National Institute
of Standards and Technology) Special Publication 800-30 [221], or SEI’s (Software
Engineering Institute) OCTAVE [169]. These techniques leverage the information
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contained in the MUC, as the involved assets (for the impact), and the attacker
profile as well as the basic/alternative flows (for the likelihood). Many of the above-
mentioned techniques include privacy considerations when assessing the impact
of a threat. However, as a research challenge, a privacy-specific risk assessment
technique is worthwhile to be investigated, as the on-field experience reveals any
inadequacy of state-of-the-art techniques. This goes beyond the scope of this work.
2.7.2 Documenting Threats Scenarios in Misuse Cases
Threat tree patterns are used to detail the generic LINDDUN threat categories
into specific threat instances that can occur in a system. Furthermore, some
threat instances could have been discarded during the risk-analysis step. The
result of the above process should be a collection of threat scenarios that need
to be documented. To this aim, misuse cases can be used. In particular, a
misuse case can be considered as a use case from the misactor’s point of view.
A misactor is someone who intentionally or unintentionally initiates the misuse
case. Alexander [46] provides some example misuse cases, together with the
corresponding (positive) use cases. We chose misuse cases because they represent
a well established technique to elicit requirements and support tools exist as well.
The structure of a misuse case, which is based on the template provided by Sindre
and Opdahl [51] is described below:
Misuse Case Structure
Summary: provides a brief description of the threat.
Assets, stakeholders and threats: describes the assets being threatened, their
importance to the different stakeholders, and what is the potential damage if
the misuse case succeeds.
Primary misactor : describes the type of misactor performing the misuse-case.
Possible types are insiders, people with a certain technical skill, and so on.
Also, some misuse case could occur accidentally whereas other are most likely
to be performed intentionally.
Basic Flow: discusses the normal flow of actions, resulting in a successful
attack for the misactor.
Alternative Flows: describes the other ways the misuse can occur.
Trigger : describes how and when the misuse case is initiated.
Preconditions: precondition that the system must meet for the attack to be
feasible.
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The preconditions refer to the leaf nodes of the threat tree patterns and the basic
(and alternative) flow describes how a miuser could exploit these weaknesses of the
system in order to mount an attack.
Running example: Social Network 2.0
In our running example, we assume that communication and processes within
the social network service provider are trustworthy (see the trust boundary in
the DFD depicted in Figure 2.1). However, we want to protect the data store
against information disclosure. The data controllers could be users, social network
providers, and application providers.
To illustrate how to create a misuse case based on the threat tree patterns,
consider the threat tree of linkability at the data store (see Figure 2.7). The
tree illustrates that in order to be susceptible to this threat, neither the data
store is sufficiently protected against information disclosure nor sufficient data
anonymization techniques are employed. These are the preconditions of the misuse
case. To create the attack scenarios, it is clear that the attacker first needs to have
access to the data store, and secondly, either the user (as the data subject) can
be re-identified (as the basic flow) or the pseudonyms can be linkable (as the
alternative flow). The aforementioned misuse case is presented in this section.
The additional nine misuse cases applicable to the social network example are
described in Appendix A.
MUC 1 – Linkability of Social Network Database (Data Store)
Summary: Data entries can be linked to the same person (without necessarily
revealing the person’s identity)
Assets, stakeholders and threats: Personal Identifiable Information (PII) of the
user.
• The user:
1. Data entries can be linked to each other which might reveal the
person’s identity
2. The misactor can build a profile of a user’s online activities
(interests, actives time, comments, updates, etc.)
Primary misactor : skilled insider / skilled outsider
Basic Flow:
1. The misactor gains access to the database
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2. The misactor can link the data entries together and possibly re-identify
the data subject from the data content
Alternative Flow:
1. The misactor gains access to the database
2. Each data entry is linked to a pseudonym
3. The misactor can link the different pseudonyms together (linkability of
entity)
4. Based on the pseudonyms, the misactor can link the different data entries
Trigger : by misactor, can always happen.
Preconditions:
1. no or insufficient protection of the data store
2. no or insufficient data anonymization techniques or strong data mining
applied
Note that formulating soft privacy threats is less straight-forward and requires
some out-of-the-box thinking for suitable (non-)technical solutions. We refer the
reader to misuse cases 9 and 10 in the appendix as an example of the latter case.
2.8 From Threat Analysis to Privacy Enhancing
Solutions
This section explains the elicitation of privacy requirements from threat analysis
and the selection of mitigation strategies and techniques based on privacy
objectives.
2.8.1 Eliciting Privacy Requirements: From Privacy Threat
Analysis to Mitigation Strategy
Misuse cases describe the relevant (risk-wise) threat scenarios for the system. The
preconditions are based on the threat tree patterns and the basic and alternative
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Table 2.6. Privacy objectives based on LINDDUN threat types (E-Entity, DF-
Data Flow, DS-Data Store, P-Process)
LINDDUN threats Elementary privacy objectives
Linkability of (E,E) Unlinkability of (E,E)
Linkability of (DF,DF ) Unlinkability of (DF,DF )
Linkability of (DS,DS) Unlinkability of (DS,DS)
Linkability of (P, P ) Unlinkability of (P, P )
Identifiability of (E,E) Anonymity / pseudonymity of
(E,E)
Identifiability of (E,DF ) Anonymity / pseudonymity of
(E,DF )
Identifiability of (E,DS) Anonymity / pseudonymity of
(E,DS)
Identifiability of (E,P ) Anonymity / pseudonymity of
(E,P )
Non-repudiation of (E,DF ) Plausible deniability of (E,DF )
Non-repudiation of (E,DS) Plausible deniability of (E,DS)
Non-repudiation of (E,P ) Plausible deniability of (E,P )
Detectability of DF Undetectability of DF
Detectability of DS Undetectability of DS
Detectability of P Undetectability of P
Information Disclosure of DF Confidentiality of DF
Information Disclosure of DS Confidentiality of DS
Information Disclosure of P Confidentiality of P
Content Unawareness of E Content awareness of E
Policy and consent Noncompli-
ance of the system
Policy and consent compliance of
the system
flows are inspired by the system’s use cases.
As a next step, the system’s (positive) requirements can be extracted from the
misuse cases. To this aim, the specification of the privacy requirements is
facilitated by Table 2.6, which maps the types of threats scenarios to types of
privacy requirements. Note that the table is a refinement of the more generic
objectives in Table 2.2.
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2.8.2 From Privacy Requirements to Privacy Enhancing Solu-
tions
Similarly to security, privacy requirements can be satisfied via a range of solution
strategies:
1. Warn the user could be a valid strategy for lower risk (but still relevant)
threats. However precautions have to be taken so that users, especially
nontechnical ones, do not make poor trust decisions.
2. Removing or turning off the feature is the only way to reduce the risk to zero.
When threat models indicate that the risk is too great or the mitigation
techniques are untenable, it is best not to build the feature in the first place,
in order to gain a balance between user features and potential privacy risks.
3. Countering threats with either preventive or reactive privacy enhancing
technology is the most commonly used strategy to solve specific issues.
This section mainly focuses on the last strategy. When countering threats with
technology is chosen as the mitigation strategy, system designers have to identify
the sound and appropriate privacy enhancing technology (PET). We summarize
the state-of-art PETs in Table 2.7 and map these techniques to each of the
corresponding privacy requirements of Table 2.6. As a result, improved guidance
is provided to the system designers over the solution selection process.
Note that the PETs categorization is inspired by the taxonomies proposed
in [294, 173]. Further, Table 2.7 introduces some key primitives of hard privacy
technologies and the state-of-art of soft privacy technologies. New privacy
enhancing solutions keep emerging; therefore a complete list of PETs and best
practices for choosing the appropriate mitigation is beyond the scope of this
chapter. The latest development of privacy enhancing technologies can be found
at [8].
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In summary, privacy protection solutions boil down to either technical or legal
enforcement. In general, privacy technology enables functionality while offering
the highest protection for privacy. Further, Hard Privacy Technology provides
cryptographically strong protections for privacy, assumes no unnecessary leakage
of information, and replies on massive distribution of trust excluding potential
adversary and privacy violators. Soft Privacy Technology (e.g. privacy policy
and feedback tools in Table 2.7) offers protections against mass surveillance and
violations, assumes data subjects sharing of personal data is necessary, and employs
a weaker adversary model.
Running example: Social Network 2.0
Table 2.8 summarizes the selection of PETs based on the privacy requirements
elicited in our running example. It is possible that a more business-oriented
example would suggest different mitigation strategies. Nevertheless, we hope the
example depicted in this section illustrates how the proposed framework can be
applied in real life applications.
In an attempt to make the running example more accessible to the reader, the
system model, the misuse cases, and the mitigation techniques of the Social
Network 2.0 are largely simplified due to the assumption that the social network
providers are semi-trustworthy (i.e., the adversary model consists of external
parties, data holder, honest insiders who make errors, and corrupt insiders). If
different assumptions would hold, different misuse cases should be identified with
a distinct mitigation approach. For instance, if we apply a smaller trust boundary
and assume that the social network provider is totally untrustworthy, then extra
privacy requirements and a stronger threat model would be considered. One
possible misuse case would be that the malicious social network provider, as an
attacker, takes advantage of profiling user’s personal data for its own benefits. In
that scenario, one solution could be building a security architecture out of smart
clients and an untrusted central server to removes the need for faith in network
operators and gives users control of their privacy [49]. Another solution could be
using encryption to enforce access control for users’ personal information based on
their privacy preferences [63, 249].
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Another research discussion is concerning practicality to build user privacy
feedback tools. In short, from a technical point of view, feedback could be realized
by means of data mining techniques (e.g., k-anonymity model) to countermeasure
user identification and data profiling attacks. It compares data user sends to
the social network with a whole set of data composed of data from all networks
users, and checks the “uniqueness” of personal identifiable information (PII) of
the user. With a unique PII, a user has a higher probability to be identified.
Then it warns users each time their activities provoke privacy risks, e.g. shows
a risk level of identifiability by posting a message “you are about to leave the
anonymity safe zone”. There are some research incentives for feedback systems
for social networks [188, 231, 192]. However, this concept implies a paradox that
in order to ensure accurate feedback, the feedback tool itself should be a “perfect
attacker” that knows all the data from all users. Due to the space and scope limit
of this chapter, we cannot discuss this in detail. We encourage interested readers
to formalize the feedback system model and investigate whether it is technically
realistic to realize the feedback concept and beyond which threshold a feedback
could be satisfactory. Intuitively speaking, the aforementioned feedback concept is
not about technical problem purely but more an education problem to raise user’s
privacy awareness. The usability of such feedback tools is also an issue, such as
how to design a user friendly interface and encourage users to use feedback remains
a research challenge.
2.9 Discussion
Despite the fact that the dualism between hard and soft privacy has already
been generically introduced in a few talks [109, 111], to our best knowledge,
this work is the first effort that concretely distinguishes these two concepts
and categorizes privacy properties (and threats) accordingly. In short, hard
privacy properties include unlinkability, anonymity and pseudonymity, plausible
deniability, undetectability and unobservability, and confidentiality. Soft privacy
properties include content unawareness and policy and consent compliance.
Similarly, leveraging the link between privacy enhancing technologies and privacy
objectives, it is possible to make a distinction between hard and soft solutions.
Hard privacy technologies are active in research but inadequate in deployment, due
to cost and technical evolvement restrictions (such as cryptography). Soft privacy
technologies have fewer research activities. With legal compliance as a strong
driver, soft privacy solutions reply on stakeholder’s liability and the tradeoffs
between cost of deploying privacy solutions and potential costs in case of massive
data breach. After all, building in privacy in the system might not be cheap, but
just cheaper than building in no privacy.
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We gained an insight into the proposed methodology that is worthy to be
emphasized:
1. Some privacy threats, in contrast to security threats, affect DFD elements
pair-wise (or sometimes group-wise). For instance, unlinkability implies the
relation of two or more items of interest. As an example, a relation may refer
to a subject (an entity in the DFD) and its attributes (in the data stores).
Consequently, it is straightforward to see that linkability threats always
affect a pair or a group of DFD elements. Similarly, plausible deniability
refers to the pair-wise relation between a subject and the attribute that the
subject wants to deny. We can draw a conclusion that privacy emphasizes
relationships between instances of DFD elements (e.g. two communication
instances of the same data flow cannot be linked) or relationships between a
DFD element and an entity, while security focuses on each individual DFD
component in a more local way.
2. The process element in the DFD is less important for privacy because privacy
cares more about the relationships between entities and data. It is quite
the opposite in the case of security. For instance, all STRIDE threat
categories apply to the process element, while, in LINDDUN, all privacy
attack paths involving the process element are related to a security threat
(namely, information disclosure of process) and not to privacy threats per se.
This observation leads to our next finding.
3. The authors have chosen the DFD notation to represent a system in order to
keep compliance with the STRIDE approach. As STRIDE and LINDDUN
are expected to be applied in a synergic way, this choice fosters the reuse of
the DFD models (and the modeling knowledge) across the security and the
privacy threat analysis.
However, it should be noticed that DFD elements (entities, processes, data
flows, and data stores) represent the technical assets that require protection
from privacy-specific harm. That is, the DFDs expose the privacy-relevant
information concerning the technical assets from the system perspective.
Therefore, the privacy analyst should pay attention to the fact that the
important privacy assets are properly modeled by the DFD. For instance,
data flows should be specific to IOIs in the privacy case.
4. For some privacy properties, an extension of the DFD semantics might be
useful. For instance, for the case of privacy-sensitive information that is
inferred over time, the notion of knowledge is necessary. This could be
annotated in the DFD processes via epistemic constructs and then leveraged
during the analysis.
5. Concerning the privacy threat trees, one can see that many paths lead to
security threats (e.g. information disclosure and tampering). Consequently,
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privacy objectives heavily depend on security objectives (e.g. confidentiality
and integrity of data flow, data store or process). We draw the general
conclusion that it is interesting to analyze privacy threats together with
security threats and the necessary process (and tool) support should be
built to facilitate such activities. This synergy would bring an advantage in
terms of time and cost for system designers to work with. Further, privacy
and security objectives might conflict (e.g. non-repudiation and plausible
deniability, as explained in the previous sections). It is thus useful to perform
the threat analysis for privacy and security altogether and consider both
types of requirements at the same time.
Finally, it is necessary to clarify a few definitions to avoid confusion. Confiden-
tiality refers to hiding the data content; anonymity and pseudonymity refer to
hiding the subject’s identity or hiding the link between identity and action or
a piece of information; unlinkability refers to hiding links between two or more
objectives (actions, identities, and pieces of information); and undetectability and
unobservability refers to hiding a subject’s activity. In particular, unlinkability
of entities means that it is impossible to relate different entities based on some
common personal identifiable information (PII), while anonymity of entities means
that the subject cannot be identified within an anonymity set. Anonymity at data
flow typically means that, in an anonymous communication setting, the subject
cannot be identified from the data flow’s content or side channel information; while
anonymity at data store refers to data anonymization, meaning that the subject
cannot be identified from the content of the data store.
2.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented a comprehensive framework to model privacy
threats in application systems, elicit privacy requirements, and instantiate
privacy enhancing countermeasures. The primary contribution is the systematic
methodology to model privacy specific threats. This is achieved by defining a list of
privacy threat types and providing the necessary mappings to the elements in the
system model. The second contribution is represented by the supporting body of
knowledge, namely, an extensive catalogue of privacy specific threat tree patterns.
In addition, this work provides the means to map the most commonly known
privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) to the identified privacy threats and the
elicited privacy requirements. The privacy threat tree patterns and categorization
of suggested PETs are expected to be continuously updated and improved upon,
since new threats keep emerging, just as privacy technologies keep developing.

Chapter 3
Anonymous Buyer-Seller
Watermarking Protocols
3.1 Introduction
Today’s rapid proliferation of computer networks and multimedia technology
facilitates the efficient distribution of multimedia content. However, it also
eases the reproduction and the distribution of illegal copies, and raised a
number of security issues including copyright protection, traitor tracing, entity
and data authentication. At the same time, more attention has been paid to
privacy protection for users in emerging multimedia applications. Therefore, the
development of techniques in order to meet these needs has become an important
concern.
3.1.1 Previous Work
Digital watermarking and fingerprinting techniques have experienced a surge in
research activities over the last decade, and a variety of elegant watermarking
(fingerprinting) protocols have been proposed [241, 240, 83], allowing content
providers to embed the provider’s information in a distributed content to
preserve the copyright, or a customer’s information to identify copyright violators.
Fingerprinting schemes have been proposed to identify different kinds of digital
content, such as documents [77, 74], images or videos [287, 281, 193], or computer
programs [157]. A first improvement of fingerprinting techniques was the design
of collusion-resistant schemes [69, 74, 281], i.e., schemes that tolerate a collusion
of buyers up to a certain size by preventing colluding buyers that compare their
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different copies from creating a copy that cannot be traced back to one of the
colluders.
Traditional watermarking based fingerprinting schemes assume that content
providers are trustworthy such that they would never distribute content illegally
and always perform the watermark embedding honestly. Unfortunately, in practice,
such assumptions are not fully established. This problem was first identified by
Qian and Nahrstedt as the customer’s rights problem [253], where the watermark is
generated and embedded solely by the content provider (or the seller). A customer
(or the buyer) whose watermark has been found in unauthorized copies can claim
that the pirated copy was created by the seller. This could be done for instance
by a malicious seller who may be interested in framing the buyer. It could be also
possible when the seller is not the original owner but a reselling agent who could
potentially benefit from making unauthorized copies. Finally, even if the seller
was not malicious, an unauthorized copy containing the buyer’s fingerprint could
have been originated from a security breach in the seller’s system but not from
the buyer [253].
The owner-customer watermarking protocol proposed by Qian and Nahrstedt [253]
tries to solve this problem such that the customer provides the owner with an
encrypted predetermined bit-string, and the owner embeds the encrypted value
using an invisible watermarking technique. Upon receiving the watermarked
content delivered from the owner, the customer is able to prove to a third party the
legitimate ownership of the copy in the customer’s possession, since only the buyer
knows the decryption key. The drawback of this protocol is that it doesn’t solve the
problem of irrevocable binding the customer and the specify copy sold to him, and
holding the customer responsible for any unauthorized copies of the same found
in the market. This is due the problem of traditional symmetric fingerprinting
schemes, where both buyer and seller know the copy that the buyer gets. In
symmetric schemes, a malicious seller can release a pirated copy in order to frame
an honest buyer, and a guilty buyer can repudiate the accusation of copyright
infringements by invoking the possibility of being framed by the seller or caused
by a security breach in the seller’s system. As a consequence, the watermark
tracing mechanism is discredited.
It is against this background that asymmetric schemes [241, 242, 68] were
introduced, where only the buyer obtains the exact watermarked content, and
hence the buyer cannot claim that a pirated copy was originated from the seller. In
the asymmetric fingerprinting protocol proposed by Pfitzmann and Schunter [241],
the buyer chooses a secret and sends a commitment to the secret to the seller.
Then buyer and seller execute a protocol at the end of which the buyer obtains
a watermarked content with the buyer’s secret, while the seller does not get any
information. Therefore, when the seller is able to provide the secret chosen by the
buyer, it must be the case that he found a pirated copy, and thus the buyer is
found guilty.
INTRODUCTION 89
In the aforementioned symmetric and asymmetric schemes the buyer needs to
be authenticated by the seller at each purchase. To protect buyers’ privacy,
Pfitzmann and Waidner [242] introduced anonymous asymmetric schemes, where
buyers remain anonymous as long as they do not release pirated copies. Buyers
are required to register at a registration entity prior to any purchase and, if the
seller finds a pirated copy, he can query this registration entity to revoke buyers’
anonymity. First anonymous asymmetric schemes [42] require interaction with
the buyer in case of dispute to find out whether the buyer was guilty or not guilty.
Pfitzmann and Sadeghi [240] and Camenisch [83] proposed schemes that allow
direct non-repudiation, where the seller, upon finding a pirated copy, possesses
enough information to convince a third party of the buyer’s culpability.
3.1.2 Basic Concept
Incorporating cryptography with digital watermarking, a buyer-seller watermark-
ing (BSW) protocol is in fact an asymmetric fingerprinting protocol where the
fingerprint is embedded by means of watermarking in the encrypted domain. The
basic idea is that each buyer obtains a slightly different copy of the digital content
offered by the seller. Such a difference, the watermark (or fingerprint), does not
harm the perceptual quality of the digital content and cannot be easily removed by
the buyer. Thanks to the latter property, when a malicious buyer redistributes a
pirated copy, the seller can associate the pirated copy to its buyer by its embedded
watermark. On the other hand, a malicious seller cannot frame an honest
buyer because the buyer’s watermark and the delivered watermarked content are
unknown to the seller. A complete and sound buyer-seller watermarking protocol
is expected to solve the following BSW problems:
1. The piracy tracing problem. Once a pirated copy is found, the seller
should be able to trace and identify the copyright violator.
2. The customer’s rights problem. When a watermark is inserted solely by
the seller, the seller may benefit from framing attacks to an innocent buyer.
This also causes unsettled disputes. On the other hand, the buyer accused of
distributing an unauthorized copy may claim that the copy originated from
the seller or that there existed a security breach in the seller’s system.
3. The unbinding problem. Upon discovering a pirated copy, the seller can
fabricate piracy by transplanting the buyer’s watermark into other digital
content. Therefore, it is necessary to bind a chosen watermark with a specific
transaction.
4. The anonymity problem. The identity of a buyer should remain
unexposed during transactions unless he is proven to be guilty.
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Table 3.1. Comparison of some existing buyer-seller watermarking protocols with
our protocols. Problems solved by each protocol: 1. (Piracy tracing problem), 2.
(Customer’s rights problem), 3. (Unbinding problem), 4. (Conspiracy problem),
5. (Dispute resolution problem), and 6. (Anonymity/unlinkability problem)
Problems Solved 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Memon and Wong’s protocol [203]
√ √
Ju et al.’s protocol [172]
√ √ √
Choi et al.’s protocol [170]
√ √
Goi et al.’s protocol [152]
√ √ √
Lei et al.’s protocol [189]
√ √ √ √
Zhang et al.’s protocol [299]
√ √ √ √
Shao et al.’s protocol [268]
√ √ √ √
Ibrahim et al.’s protocol [166]
√ √ √
Our protocol
√ √ √ √ √ √
5. The conspiracy problem. Malicious parties may collude with each other
and mount attacks to frame an innocent buyer or to confound the tracing
by removing the watermark from the digital content.
6. The dispute problem. The arbitrator should be able to resolve disputes,
without the buyer revealing her identity or private key.
3.1.3 Existing BSW Protocols
The literature is rich of relevant buyer-seller watermarking protocols. Since the
introduction of the concept by Memon and Wong [203], a number of buyer-
seller watermarking protocols have been proposed. This section summarizes some
previously proposed protocols by Memon and Wong [203], Ju et al. [172], Choi
et al. [170], Goi et al. [152], Lei et al. [189], Zhang et al. [299], Shao et al. [268],
and Ibrahim et al. [166]. The comparison of the related work with our proposed
protocols is depicted in Table 3.1.
• The piracy tracing problem. All of these protocols are able to resolve
the piracy tracing problem, and provide a mechanism for the seller to trace
and recover the identity of a guilty buyer.
• The customer’s rights problem. All these protocols can solve the
customer’s rights problem, since the protocols are designed to be asymmetric,
i.e., the seller doesn’t know the exact value of the buyer’s watermark, neither
does she know the final watermarked digital content that the buyer gets.
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Therefore, the accused buyer for an illegal replication or distribution cannot
claim that the copy is originated from the seller or a security breach in the
seller’s system.
• The unbinding problem. Lei et al. [189] addressed the unbinding
problem in [203, 172, 170, 152] and provided a mechanism to bind a specific
transaction of a digital content to a specific buyer, such that a malicious seller
cannot transplant the watermark embedded in a digital content to another
higher-priced content. The similar design principle is applied by Zhang et
al. [299] and Shao et al. [268].
• The conspiracy problem. Choi et al. [170] pointed out the conspiracy
problem in [203, 172], where a malicious seller can collude with an
untrustworthy third party to fabricate piracy to frame an innocent buyer.
Goi et al. [152] found the conspiracy problem couldn’t be solved through
commutative cryptosystems of [170], further pointed out that schemes
of [203, 172, 170] are vulnerable against conspiracy attacks, and showed that
the protocol’s security shouldn’t rely on any third party. Zhang et al. [299]
applied the principle of [152] and ensured that the buyer’s watermark is
generated by the buyer, instead of a Watermark Certification Authority
(WCA). According to our analysis, we found that the protocols by Lei
et al. [189], Shao et al. [268], and Ibrahim et al. [166] cannot resist the
conspiracy attack, where a malicious seller can collude with a third party,
such that the seller can discover the buyer’s watermark.
• The anonymity problem. The protocol by Memon and Wong [203]
requires the seller to know the buyer’s identity to carry out a transaction.
Schemes of [172, 170] improved [203] by applying an anonymous key
pair in each transaction. However, both protocols require the WCA to
know the buyer’s identity, which means that the buyer’s anonymity is not
preserved against conspiracy attacks. In [152], the buyer is required to
request a signature from the certification authority (CA) of the public key
infrastructure (PKI ) to generate a watermark. However, [152] cannot solve
the anonymity problem efficiently, since before each transaction, the buyer
has to contact the CA for a new signature. The schemes of [189, 299, 268]
employ anonymous certificates, i.e., digital certificates without real identities
of applicants. Unfortunately, transaction unlinkability is not provided:
during all transactions, the anonymous certificate remains the same, unless
the buyer contacts the CA before each transaction for a new certificate, which
is impractical for real life applications.
• The dispute problem. Zhang et al. [299] presented a scheme, derived
from [189], in which no trusted third party (TTP) is required in the water-
mark generation phase and the conspiracy problem is solved. Unfortunately,
we found the existence of dispute resolution problem in [299]: in order to
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resolve disputes the buyer is required to cooperate and reveal his secret key
or his secret watermark to the judge or to the CA. This is unrealistic in real-
life applications. Similarly, schemes of [203, 170, 152] all require the accused
but possibly innocent buyer to reveal his identity or private key. Moreover,
these protocols don’t operate properly if the underlying cryptosystem is
probabilistic, since the data encrypted by the judge or the CA are not equal
to the data provided by the seller. In [172], the buyer creates a key escrow
cipher to escrow his anonymous private key at the judge. The problem of this
scheme is that the buyer’s secrecy could not be guaranteed against conspiracy
attacks if the judge was malicious. In [189], the judge requests the buyer’s
watermark from the WCA, and hence the protocol’s security depends on the
trustworthiness of the WCA.
3.1.4 Summary of Contributions
The contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
Analysis and attacks of two BSW protocols
We present the attacks on two recently proposed BSW protocols by Lei et
al. [189] and Ibrahim et al. [166], and prove that these protocols are not able
to provide security for both the buyer and the seller simultaneously as they have
claimed. Additionally, we show that neither of the protocols works properly with
probabilistic homomorphic cryptosystems, which is an essential mechanism to
provide security for buyer and seller, and to facilitate watermark embedding in
the encrypted domain. Further, we point out that the protocol of Ibrahim et
al. [166] is not able to provide buyer’s anonymity and transactions unlinkability.
Security Definition of BSW Protocols
We provide a security definition for proposed BSW Protocols. Our definition
is generic, in the sense that it captures the security properties required for any
copyright protection protocol that provides buyers with revocable anonymity.
Type I BSW protocol
From the analysis of early BSW protocols in Section 3.1.3, we show that previous
study mainly focuses on the copyright protection issues. However, the existing
solutions to the anonymity protection or dispute resolution problems are either
impractical or incomplete. We propose an anonymous buyer-seller watermarking
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protocol that fulfills the design requirements, and we will name it the Type I
BSW protocol. Different from the predecessors, the Type I BSW protocol makes
improvements on the following aspects:
1. The watermark generation and embedding phase of the Type I BSW protocol
is based on the proposal from Memon and Wong [203]. However, the
proposed protocol extends and improves its predecessors, by incorporating
homomorphic encryption schemes, group signature schemes, and anonymous
communication channels, to ensure revokable anonymity for buyer and
security for both buyer and seller. Our improvement on the protocol’s
security properties ensures that the BSW problems outlined in Section 3.1.2
are fulfilled. Homomorphic encryptions facilitate operations such as
watermark embedding in the encrypted domain. Group signatures introduces
piracy traceability, buyer’s anonymity, and transactions unlinkability. Be-
sides, anonymous communication channels enable both anonymous outgoing
connections and anonymous hidden services. We assume that a public key
infrastructure (PKI ) is available, such that each party has a public and
private key pair certified by a trustworthy registration entity such as the
CA.
2. The Type I BSW protocol supports multiple transactions. The protocol con-
sists of three phases, such as registration, purchase, and arbitration, which
are presented by three subprotocols respectively, namely the registration
protocol, the watermarking generation and embedding protocol, and the
identification and arbitration protocol. Prior to the purchase phase, a buyer
first joins a group by registering the buyer’s identity and PKI certificates.
In return, the group manager or a Trusted Registration Authority issues
the buyer a private group signature key. During the purchase phase,
the buyer may execute the watermark generation and embedding protocol
multiple times with a number of sellers and obtain the desired digital content
anonymously.
3. The Type I BSW protocol doesn’t require buyers to participate in the dispute
resolution phase. Once a pirated copy is found, the corresponding seller will
extract the watermark from the copy and check if it would be related to
any buyer from a particular transaction. If a dispute resolution is necessary,
the seller will go to a trustworthy a legal institution such as a judge from
a civil court for arbitration. Based on the recorded transaction information
provided by the seller, the judge is able to arbitrate whether the suspected
buyer has indeed created the unauthorized copy or not. If that would be
the case, the judge should send a court order to the Trusted Registration
Authority (or the group manager) to recover the buyer’s identity. At the
end of arbitration, the judge is able to inform the seller whether the buyer
is guilty or not, and the identity of the guilty buyer.
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Type II BSW protocol
The Type II BSW protocol improves the Type I BSW protocol in the watermark
generation and embedding phase. Besides the improvements introduced, the Type
II BSW protocol also has the following advantages:
1. In the purchase phase of this protocol, both the buyer and the seller generate
their secret watermarks. With the buyer’s encrypted watermark and the
seller’s watermark, the seller is able to compute a composite watermark.
Next, the seller performs a double watermark embedding: first the seller
embeds a unique watermark to the original content in the plaintext domain,
and then embeds the composite watermark in the encrypted domain. In
this scheme, none of the parties know the exact watermark embedded in the
original content, and only the buyer knows the final watermarked content
that the buyer obtains.
2. One of the main differences between the Type II BSW protocol and the
Type I BSW protocol is that the underlying watermarking scheme is not
limited to permutation tolerant or linear watermarks, such that given the
watermarked content Y1 and Y2, ϕ(Y ) (ϕ is a permutation function) or aY1+
bY2 (a, b ∈ R) is another valid watermarked content. In our protocol, we need
a functionality such that, given a vector of encrypted watermark bits E [wi]
and a contentX, it is able to produce the encrypted and watermarked content
E [Y ]. Every watermarking scheme that is invisible and robust to counter
post image processing or malicious attacks that are possibly encountered
later, and supports the above functionality can be used with our scheme.
Type III BSW protocol
The Type III BSW protocol further improves the Type I and Type II BSW
protocols in a number of aspects:
1. The Type III BSW protocol employs blind and readable watermarking
schemes, homomorphic encryptions, group signature schemes and several
zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge as main cryptographic building blocks.
We prove the security of the protocol when instantiated with any secure
watermarking scheme and with any secure building blocks.
2. The Type III BSW protocol doesn’t require the seller to embed the
watermarks twice in the purchase phase as most of the predecessors do.
Double watermark insertions have the drawback of causing a degradation
of the final quality of the distributed content, thus end up reducing their
commercial value. When applied independently, the second watermark could
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confuse or discredit the authority of the first watermark, thus acting as an
actual “ambiguity attack” [145, 105]. We avoid it by designing a composite
watermark, which is composed of the buyer’s secret watermark, the seller’s
secret watermark, and a transaction index.
3. The Type III BSW protocol avoids the need for the seller to send the
unauthorized content and the secret watermarking key to the judge and,
as a consequence, reduces the communication bandwidth. In the arbitration
phase, instead of the judge obtaining the unauthorized copy and detecting
the watermark from the unauthorized content, the seller sends the watermark
that she extracted from the pirated content to the Judge. In particular,
the buyer’s security (non-frameability) is based, among other properties,
on the IND-CPA security of the homomorphic encryption scheme used to
encrypt the buyer’s secret watermark and the non-frameability property
of the underlying group signature scheme. It means that the seller could
only frame an honest buyer if the seller successful guessed the buyer’s secret
watermark. In order to do so, the seller needs to know the buyer’s secret
watermark. In this regard, it doesn’t matter for the seller to send the pirated
copy or to send the extracted watermark to the judge, since in either case, the
seller cannot frame an honest buyer. In practice, this improvement reduces
the communication bandwidth, e.g. sending a 128-bit watermark instead of
a complete 2-Mbit image.
4. Another contribution of our work is a formal security analysis of BSW
protocols. None of the previously proposed BSW protocols provides a
formal security definition, and proves that the proposed protocol satisfies
the required security properties. We employ the ideal-world/real-world
paradigm [90] to define security of anonymous BSW protocols. Additionally,
we define security for blind watermarking schemes and prove that the
proposed Type III BSW protocol fulfills our security definition.
3.1.5 Details on Publications
The aforementioned contributions of this chapter have been published in [125] for
the Type I BSW protocols, [123, 124, 126] for the Type II BSW protocols, [129,
115, 116] the Type II BSW protocols, where security proof and formal definition
of BSW protocols is in [258]. Efficient implementation results of BSW protocols
are briefly presented in this thesis. Please refer to [129, 115, 116, 117] for more
details.
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B CA
generate (pkB, skB) (pkB, skB) -
issue CertCA(pkB)
CertCA(pkB)
Figure 3.1. The registration phase of Lei et al.’s protocol
3.1.6 Chapter Outline
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, two BSW protocols proposed
by Lei et al. [189] and by Ibrahim et al. [166] are analyzed in Section 3.2. Section 3.3
briefly reviewed the definition and the properties of the cryptographic building
blocks to be employed in the BSW protocols described in this chapter. Section 3.4
provides the generic security definitions for blind watermarking schemes and for
BSW protocols. Our proposed Type I BSW protocol, Type II BSW protocol, and
Type III BSW protocol are described in Section 3.5, Section 3.6 and Section 3.7,
respectively. In Appendix B, we analyze the security of the Type III BSW protocol;
Appendix C discusses the implementation of the Type III BSW protocol. We
conclude in Section 3.8.
3.2 Attacks to existing protocols
3.2.1 Attacks on the Protocol of Lei et al.
In the protocol proposed by Lei et al. [189], the players are the seller S, the
buyer B, the certificate authority CA, the watermark certificate authority WCA,
and the judge J . The protocol comprises three phases, namely the registration
protocol, the watermark generation and insertion protocol, and the identification
and arbitration protocol. The overview of the protocol is in Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2,
and Figure 3.3.
Attack Buyer’s Security
In the protocol, the seller S generates her watermark V and embeds V to the
original content X, as X ′ = X ⊕ V . The WCA generates B’s watermark W ,
and sends S two encrypted values of W with B’s encryption key pkB′ and WCA’s
encryption key, respectively. S embeds the encrypted watermarked, EpkB′(Y ) =
EpkB′(X
′)⊕ EpkB′(W ).
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B S WCA
(pkB′, skB∗)
CertpkB (pkB
′) M1- VerifySig(CertCA(pkB))
VerifySig(CertpkB (pkB
′))
VerifySig(SignskB∗ (j))
generate V
X
′
= X ⊕ V M2- VerifySig(CertpkB (pkB′))
VerifySig(SignskB∗ (j))
generate W
M4 EpkB′ (W ),
EpkWCA (W ),
SignWCA(M3)
Y
EpkB′ (Y ) EpkB′ (Y ) = EpkB′ (X
′
) ⊕
EpkB′ (W )
Note: M1 = {CertCA(pkB), CertpkB (pkB′), j, SignskB∗ (j)}
M2 = {CertpkB (pkB′, j, SignskB∗ (j), X
′}
M3 = {EpkB′ (W ), pkB
′, SignskB∗ (j)}
M4 = {EpkB′ (W ), EpkWCA (W ), SignWCA(M3)}
Figure 3.2. The watermark generation and insertion phase of Lei et al.’s protocol
S J WCA
U ←
det(X,Y )
info-
VerifySig EpkWCA (W )-
W DskWCA (EpkWCA (W ))
EpkB′
′
(W )
EpkB′
′
(W ) ?= EpkB′ (W )
B B from CA
Note: info = {Y,X′ = X ⊕ V,M1,M4}
Figure 3.3. The identification and arbitration phase of Lei et al.’s protocol
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If the WCA would be untrustworthy, a malicious S could collude with the
untrustworthy WCA, S sends EpkB′(W ) back to the WCA. WCA recovers W
via decryption, and sendsW to S. After S obtainsW , she knows all the necessary
information X,V,W to reproduce the watermarked content Y for B. Once S
gets B’s watermark, any important features of the protocol would end up getting
compromised. First, the piracy traceability won’t be achieved, since both the
buyer and the seller might be the traitor. Second, the non-framing property fails,
though the unbinding problem is solved in the protocol. S is able to frame an
innocent B by reproducing and redistributing the watermarked content Y . Third,
non-repudiation fails, even though B doesn’t know W and cannot remove W from
Y . A malicious B can deny his guilt by claiming that the pirated copy was created
by S or a security breach in S’s computing system. In fact, this attack weakens
the security for both the buyer and the seller.
Attack Seller’s Security
Besides the conspiracy attack explained above, a malicious buyer and the
untrustworthy WCA could also collude. In this case, the WCA informs B the
actual value of W directly, so that it is possible for B to remove his watermark
from the watermarked digital content. Therefore, if the WCA is untrustworthy,
the protocol fails to provide non-repudiation and hence security for the seller.
Failure of Probabilistic Cryptosystems
In the arbitration and identification protocol, the WCA is required by the judge
J to decrypt EpkWCA(W ) and obtain the B’s watermark W . Then J performs a
validation on the correctness of EpkB′(W ) sent by S, by computing the encryption
of W from the WCA with B’s public key pkB′. If EpkB′(W ) doesn’t match
EpkB′(W ), then J announces the buyer is not guilty and the protocol halts.
It is obvious that the verification won’t work using probabilistic cryptosystems.
The buyer-seller watermarking protocol requires watermarking insertion to be
performed in the encrypted domain, and it should be achieved by employing
privacy homomorphic cryptosystems. However, all efficient privacy homomorphic
cryptosystems are probabilistic. As a result, the protocol fails to function properly
as claimed.
3.2.2 Attacks on the Protocol of Ibrahim et al.
The players involved in Ibrahim et al.’s protocol [166] are the seller S, the buyer
B, the certificate authority CA, and the judge J . The protocol comprises two
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B S WCA
j -
CertCA(S)
N1 - VerifySig N2 -
EskCA (EpkB
′
(W )) W =
DpkB (EskB (W ))
H
′
(EpkB
′
(W )) ?=
H(EpkB (W ))
X
′
= X ⊕ V
Y
EskS (EpkB (Y ) EpkB (Y ) = EpkB (X) ⊕
EpkB (W )
Note: N1 = {EpkB (W ), EskB (H(j)), EpkCA (EskB (W )), EskB (H(H(j)) +H(W )), CertCA(B)}
N2 = {EpkCA (EskB (W )), CertCA(B)}
Figure 3.4. The watermark generation and insertion phase of Ibrahim et al.’s
protocol
phases, namely the watermarking phase and the arbitration phase. The watermark
generation and insertion protocol is reviewed in Figure 3.4.
Attack Seller’s Security
In the watermarking phase, B generates B’s secret watermark W , and W is
approved by the CA. The watermarked content is Y = X ⊕ V ⊕ W , where V
is S’s watermark. Since B knows W , it is possible for B to remove his watermark
W from the watermarked content Y . Hence, the protocol fails to provide non-
repudiation and traitor traceability.
Ibrahim et al. assume that it is impossible for B to remove W from Y ,
because B doesn’t have access of the original content X or the watermark
embedding algorithm. Unfortunately, the assumption is unrealistic, and it can
be combated by employing a blind watermarking scheme [187, 136], where the
original content is not required to remove the watermark. On the other hand,
there is no technical enforcement to ensure that B can’t get the knowledge of
the watermarking algorithm employed in the protocol. In fact, according to
Kerckhoffs’ principle [175] in cryptography, “a cryptosystem should be secure even
if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge. The system
must not require secrecy and can be stolen by the enemy without causing trouble.”
Therefore, the attack is effective, and this protocol provides neither the basic
traceability nor the seller’s security.
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Failure of Probabilistic Cryptosystems
After S receives the encrypted value EskCA(EpkB
′
(W )) from CA, S decrypts
EskCA(EpkB
′
(W ) using CA’s public key pkCA, and then computes the hash of
the result EpkB
′
(W ), i.e. H ′(EpkB
′
(W )). Next, S computes the hash of EpkB(W )
sent earlier by B, i.e. H(EpkB(W )). S compares the values of H
′(EpkB
′
(W )) and
H(EpkB(W )). If they are equal the protocol continues, else the protocol throws
exception and terminates. The protocol will fail with probabilistic cryptosystems,
since EpkB
′
(W ) computed by the CA and EpkB(W ) provided by B would be
different values. Following the same reason in Section 3.2.1, the protocol fails
with homomorphic probabilistic cryptosystems.
Failure of Anonymity and Unlinkability
The protocol doesn’t specify the registration phase. In each transaction, B provides
B’s PKI certificate CertCA(B) issued by a trustworthy CA to S. Since CertCA(B)
is not an anonymous certificate, S can identify B. Therefore, it is clear that the
protocol fails to provide B’s anonymity and transaction unlinkability.
3.3 Cryptographic preliminaries
3.3.1 Group Signature Schemes
Group signature schemes [96] enable group members, each with his or her private
signature key to produce signatures on behalf of the group. The scheme is called
static if the identities of group members are fixed in the group setup phase, and is
called dynamic if it allows adding and removing members to the group with time.
Dynamic schemes have the advantage that instead of assigning a high level of trust
to a single group manager, they provide more security with a lower level of trust
by separating the group manager into an issuer, to issue private signature keys to
the group members, and an opener, to open signatures. In the following, we recall
the description of dynamic group signature schemes in [66].
The scenario consists of four kinds of parties: a trusted party for system setup, an
authority called the issuer I, an authority called the opener O, and users U that
may become group members. The communication between I and U takes place
over private and authenticated channels.
The scheme consists of the algorithms GSgkg, GSukg, GSjoin, GSiss, GSsig, GSverify,
GSopen, GSjudge. GSgkg outputs an issuer key isk, an opening key osk, and a
group public key gpk on input a security parameter 1k. GSukg outputs a user key
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pair (upk, usk) on input a security parameter 1k. GSjoin and GSiss are interactive
algorithms run by Ui and I respectively. GSjoin receives (gpk, uski) as inputs and
GSiss receives (gpk, isk, upki) as inputs. GSjoin outputs a private signing key gski
and GSiss outputs registration information regi to be stored in a registration table
reg. GSsig outputs a signature s of a message m on input a secret key gsk. GSverify,
on input a signature s, a message m and a group public key gpk, outputs a bit
b = 1 if s is correct and b = 0 otherwise. GSopen, on input the group public key
gpk, the registration table reg, an opening key osk, a message m and a signature
s, outputs a pair (i, proof ), where i identifies the user Ui that computed s (i = 0 if
no group member produced the signature) and proof is a publicly verifiable proof
that i computed s. GSjudge, on input a group public key gpk, an integer i ≥ 1, a
public key upki, a message m, a signature s and a proof proof , outputs b = 1 if
proof is a valid proof that i produced s and b = 0 otherwise.
A dynamic group signature scheme must provide the properties of anonymity,
traceability and non-frameability. Anonymity requires that an adversaryA, unable
to corrupt O, cannot distinguish which of two signers of his choice signed a message
of his choice. Traceability requires that A, unable to corrupt I and O (albeit able
to compromise osk), cannot compute a signature for which either an honest O
cannot identify the user that produced it or cannot compute a proof proof that a
user Ui produced it. Non-frameability requires thatA cannot produce a proof proof
that an honest user computed a valid signature unless the user indeed computed
the signature. We refer to [66] for formal definitions, though the BSW protocols
described in this chapter can be instantiated with any secure group signature
scheme.
3.3.2 Homomorphic Cryptosystem
A homomorphic cryptosystem (or privacy homomorphism) refers to a cryptosys-
tem E which is homomorphic with respect to some binary operators ⊙M in
the plaintext space M and ⊙C in the ciphertext space C, such that ∀m1,m2 ∈
M : E(m1 ⊙M m2) = E(m1) ⊙C E(m2). Homomorphic cryptosystems can be
classified as two groups, namely the ones whose security relies on the “decisional
composite residuosity assumption” (DCRA), and the ones of the ElGamal class
based on “decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption” (DDH). Instead of IND-CCA2,
the strongest security level a privacy homomorphism can reach is IND-CPA.
Roughly speaking, indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack [155] (IND-
CPA) guarantees that an adversary does not get any knowledge about the plaintext
m from the ciphertext c. For instance, the deterministic RSA cryptosystem [260]
and the ElGamal cryptosystem [149] are multiplicative privacy homomorphism.
In contrast to deterministic RSA, ElGamal is IND-CPA. The Goldwasser-Micali
cryptosystem [155], the Paillier cryptosystem [230], and Paillier ’s generalization
the Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem [108] are additive privacy homomorphism.
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Paillier cryptosystem
The public key homomorphic cryptosystem, proposed by Paillier [230] and
generalization by Damg˚ard and Jurik [108], is based on the problem of deciding
whether a number is an N -th residue modulo N2. This problem is believed to be
computationally difficult and is linked to the hardness of factorization N , if N is
the product of two large primes.
Let us now explain what an N -th residue is and how it can be used to encrypt
data. Given the product of two large primes N = pq, the set ZN of the integer
numbers modulo N , and the set Z∗N representing the integer numbers belonging
to ZN that are relatively prime with N , z ∈ Z∗N2 is said to be an N -th residue
modulo N2 if there exists a number y ∈ Z∗N2 such that z = yN mod N2.
For a complete analysis of the Paillier cryptosystem one can refer to the original
paper [230]. The set-up, encryption and decryption procedures are briefly reviewed
in the following paragraphs.
Set-up Select p, q big primes. The private key is the least common multiple of
(p − 1, q − 1), denoted as λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1). Let N = pq and g in Z∗N2 an
element of order1 αN for some α ̸= 0 (g = N + 1 is usually a convenient choice).
(N, g) is the public key.
Encryption Let m < N be the plaintext, and r < N a random value. The
encryption c of m is:
c = E(m, r) = gmrN mod N2
Decryption Let c < N2 be the ciphertext. The plaintext m hidden in c is:
m = D(c) = L(c
λ mod N2)
L(gλ mod N2) mod N
where L(x) = x−1N . From the above equations, we can easily verify that the Paillier
cryptosystem is additively homomorphic, since:
E(m1, r1) · E(m2, r2) = gm1+m2(r1r2)N = E(m1 +m2, r1r2)
and
E(m, r)a = (gm(r)N )a = (gam(r)aN ) = E(am, ra).
3.3.3 Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge
A zero-knowledge proof of knowledge [64] is a two-party protocol between a prover
and a verifier. The prover proves to the verifier knowledge of some secret input that
1The order of an integer a modulo N is the smallest positive integer k such that ak = 1
mod N .
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fulfills some statement without disclosing this input to the verifier. The protocol
should fulfill two properties. First, it should be a proof of knowledge, i.e., a
prover without knowledge of the secret input convinces the verifier with negligible
probability. More technically, there exists a knowledge extractor that extracts the
secret input from a successful prover with all but negligible probability. Second, it
should be zero-knowledge, i.e., the verifier does not learn any information about
the secret input. More technically, for all possible verifiers there exists a simulator
that, without knowledge of the secret input, yields a distribution that cannot be
distinguished from the interaction with a real prover.
To express a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, we follow the notation introduced
by Camenisch and Stadler [89]. For example, PK{(x) : y = f(x)} denotes a “zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge of secret input x such that y = f(x)”. Letters in the
parentheses, in this example x, denote the secret input, while y and the function f
are also known to the verifier. The zero-knowledge proofs employed for the Type
III BSW protocol will be elaborated in Section 3.7.
3.3.4 Verifiable Encryption
Verifiable encryption schemes enable the encrypter to ensure that the plaintext
satisfies certain application-dependent properties without compromising secrecy.
It can be employed in numerous applications including escrow schemes [296, 248],
group signature and identity escrow schemes [56, 179], and digital payment with
revocable anonymity [144, 87]. Specific schemes are proposed in [88] for both
discrete-log- and factoring-based schemes. In the Type I and Type II BSW
protocols described in Section 3.5 and Section 3.6, verifiable encryption is used
for key escrow, such that the buyer can prove to the seller that the plaintext is
valid without revealing any private information, and hence the buyer’s privacy is
preserved.
3.4 Security Definition of BSW Protocols
3.4.1 Blind Watermarking
A blind and readable watermarking scheme [60] consists of a setup algorithm
WATsetup, a watermark embedding algorithm WATemb and finally a watermark
detection algorithm WATdet. After an original content space X is determined,
WATsetup outputs a secret watermarking key swk and a watermark space W.
WATemb(swk,X ,W ), on input swk, original content X ∈ X , and watermark W ∈
W, outputs watermarked content Y . The algorithm WATemb can be computed
in the encrypted domain, where both W and the result Y are encrypted with
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a public key of a public key encryption scheme. The algorithm WATdet(swk,Y )
outputs the watermark W embedded in Y .
A secure watermarking scheme should be robust and collusion resistant. Let d
be a distortion metric that quantifies the distortion suffered by a watermarked
content Y when it underwent signal processing operations such as compression,
filtering, noise addition, desynchronization, cropping, insertions, mosaicing, and
collage. Let Y ′ be a distorted content. The robustness property requires that
under a distortion metric d and a given distortion bound D, given swk output by
WATsetup and Y output by WATemb(swk,X ,W ), a scheme is ϵ-robust if for every
distorted content Y ′, WATdet(swk,Y ′) outputs W with overwhelming probability
1− ϵ, if d(Y, Y ′) ≤ D.
The collusion resistance property requires that a collusion of up to l parties cannot
manipulate or remove the watermark from a watermarked content by comparing
or composing their differently watermarked copies. In other words, it requires that
under a distortion metric d and a given distortion bound D, a scheme is ϵ-secure
against coalitions of size l, if all the p.p.t. adversaries (probabilistic polynomial
time adversaries) win the game defined below with probability less than ϵ [278].
We formalize this property as follows:
Definition 1 (Collusion Resistant Watermarking). The collusion resistance
property is defined through the following game between a challenger C and an
adversary A.
• Challenge. C runs WATsetup to get swk, picks random original content X ∈
X , and, for i = 1 to l, picks random watermark Wi ∈ W and runs Yi =
WATemb(swk,X ,Wi). C sends (Y1, . . . ,Yl) to A.
• Response. A outputs watermarked content Y ′.
A wins if d(Wi, Y ′) ≤ D and WATdet(swk,Y ′) outputs a watermark W ′ such that,
for i = 1 to l, W ′ ̸= Wi. A blind watermarking scheme is l collusion resistant if
all p.p.t. adversaries (probabilistic polynomial time adversaries) A win the game
above with negligible probability.
Current practical watermarking schemes do not provide collusion-resistance
against any p.p.t. adversary. We assume that the watermarking scheme used
to instantiate the protocol fulfills this definition, and thus we can prove that our
protocol is secure against any p.p.t. adversary in Appendix B. When the protocol
is instantiated with a given watermarking scheme, the security offered against
malicious buyers is lowered to the security offered by the watermarking scheme.
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3.4.2 Anonymous Buyer-Seller Watermarking Protocol
We define security following the ideal-world/real-world paradigm [90]. In the real
world, a set of parties interact according to the protocol description in the presence
of a real adversary A, while in the ideal world dummy parties interact with an ideal
functionality that carries out the desired task in the presence of an ideal adversary
E . A protocol ψ is secure if there is no environment Z that can distinguish whether
it is interacting with adversary A and parties running protocol ψ or with the ideal
process for carrying out the desired task, where ideal adversary E and dummy
parties interact with an ideal functionality Fψ. More formally, we say that protocol
ψ emulates the ideal process when, for any adversary A, there exists a simulator
E such that for all environments Z, the ensembles IDEALFψ,E,Z and REALψ,A,Z
are computationally indistinguishable. We refer to [90] for a description of how
these ensembles are constructed. All functionality and every protocol invocation
should be instantiated with a unique session-ID that distinguishes it from other
instantiations. For the sake of ease of notation, we omit session-IDs from the
description of our ideal functionalities.
We define an ideal functionality FDRM that models the behavior and desirable
properties of any copyright protection protocol in which buyers are provided
with anonymity. We consider a setting with five parties: a seller S that sells
protected digital content Y ; a set of buyers B that purchase protected digital
content from S; a registration authority R where buyers must register before
purchasing; a judge J that decides whether a buyer is guilty of releasing pirated
copies; a deanonymization authority D that revokes the anonymity of a buyer when
requested by J . We assume that a group manager GM consists of three entities,
namely a Trusted Registration Authority that generates keys for the involved
parties, a registration authority R, and a deanonymization authority D. FDRM is
parameterized with a set of parties P that contains the aforementioned entities.
FDRM models the properties that a copyright protection protocol should fulfill
under three assumptions. First, the judge J is never corrupted by the ideal
adversary E . Second, parties can be corrupted statically, i.e., the ideal adversary
E decides at the beginning of the protocol execution the set of parties it wishes
to corrupt and cannot modify this set throughout the execution. Finally, FDRM
assumes that uncorrupted buyers never release pirated copies.
Under those assumptions, FDRM requires that, when the seller is uncorrupted,
buyers receive unique protected content Y at each purchase. This unique protected
content, when released as a pirated copy, can be traced back to a single transaction.
(In the case of a buyer-seller watermarking protocol, unique protected content is
computed by embedding a different watermark at each purchase phase.) FDRM also
requires that, if the deanonymization authority D is uncorrupted, an uncorrupted
seller is always able to get the identity of corrupted buyers that release pirated
copies.
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When the seller S is corrupted, FDRM does not require buyers to receive the unique
protected content Y . However, it requires that S is not able to frame uncorrupted
buyers, who by assumption do not release pirated copies. Additionally, it requires
that released pirated copies are traced back to corrupted buyers that collude with
S.
Below we formally describe FDRM. In Appendix B we prove that our Type III
buyer-seller watermarking protocol (Section 3.7) realizes functionality FDRM. This
means that our protocol fulfills the aforementioned properties.
Functionality FDRM
Parameterized with a set of parties P, FDRM works as follows, where b = 1
means the registration or deanonymization process succeeded and d = 1 means
a content is not a pirated copy:
• Upon receiving (register) from buyer Bi, FDRM checks that Bi ∈ P.
Then it sends (register,Bi) to R. If R is corrupted, FDRM receives a bit
(regresp, b) from the ideal adversary E , else it sets b = 1. FDRM sends
(regresp, b) to Bi and, if b = 1, includes Bi in its registration table Treg.
• Upon receiving (request, j) from buyer Bi, where j identifies the item,
FDRM checks that Bi ∈ Treg. FDRM sends (buyrequest, j) to S, who
returns original content (reqresp,X). FDRM computes unique protected
content Y from X . If S is corrupted, FDRM receives (reqresp,Y ′) from
E and sets Y to Y ′. FDRM sends (reqresp,Y ) to Bi and stores (Y ,Bi, d),
where d = 1, in a transaction table Ttra.
• Upon receiving (release,Y ) from E , FDRM sets d to 0 in the entry
(Y ,Bi, d) of Ttra. If no such entry exists, FDRM stores (Y , E , 0) in Ttra.
• Upon receiving (detect,Y ) from S, if d = 1 in the entry (Y ,Bi, d) or
such entry does not exist, FDRM sends (detresp,not guilty) to S and
J . If d = 0, FDRM sends (detect,Bi) to D. If D is corrupted, FDRM
receives a bit (deanonym, b) from E , else sets b = 1. If b = 0, FDRM sends
(detresp,⊥) to S and J , and otherwise it sends (detresp,Bi, guilty) to S
and J .
In Appendix B we prove that our Type III buyer-seller watermarking protocol
(Section 3.7) realizes functionality FDRM in the FREG-hybrid model, where parties
register their public keys at a Trusted Registration Authority and obtain from it
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a common reference string. Do not confuse this entity with the registration entity
R. Below we depict the ideal functionality FREG. FREG is parameterized with
a distribution D and a set of participants P, which is restricted to contain the
registration authorityR, the deanonymization authority D, the buyers B, the seller
S and the judge J . FREG can be implemented with a public key infrastructure.
Functionality FREG
Parameterized with a set of parties P and a distribution D, FREG works
as follows, where (crs) is a request of the common reference string, r is the
common reference string, and v is the registered value such as P’s public key:
• On input (crs) from party P, if P /∈ P it aborts. Otherwise, if there is
no value r recorded, it picks r ← D and records r . It sends (crs, r) to
P.
• Upon receiving (register, v) from party P ∈ P, it records the value (P, v).
• Upon receiving (retrieve,P) from party P ′ ∈ P, if (P, v) is recorded then
return (retrieve,P, v) to P ′. Otherwise send (retrieve,P,⊥) to P ′.
3.5 Type I BSW protocol
3.5.1 Intuition Behind the Construction
The proposed buyer-seller watermarking (BSW) protocols are mainly based on two
cryptographic primitives: group signatures and homomorphic encryption. Group
signatures allow buyers to sign the purchase messages they send to the seller on
behalf of the group of buyers. Thanks to that, the seller can verify the signature
without knowing the buyer’s identity, and thus purchases are anonymous. When a
pirated copy is found and traced back to a particular purchase, the corresponding
signature can be opened to know the identity of the buyer that released the pirated
copy.
Homomorphic encryption allows the buyer and seller to jointly compute an
encryption of the watermark to be embedded in the original content, in such a way
that none of the parties knows the watermark. The encryption of the watermark
is embedded in the encrypted domain, resulting in the encrypted version of the
watermarked content to be delivered to the buyer. This is an essential property of
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all BSW protocols. On the one hand, since the seller does not learn the watermark,
later on a malicious seller cannot produce pirate copies that embed the watermark
in order to frame an honest buyer. On the other hand, a malicious buyer can
neither remove the watermark nor release pirate copies and claim that the seller
has produced them.
The Type I BSW protocol involves four entities: a seller S that is the content
provider and copyright holder, a buyer B that purchases a digital content from S,
a group manager GM that is a trustworthy authority, and a trustworthy judge
J that adjudicates lawsuits against the infringement of copyrights. The protocol
consists of three subprotocols. In the registration protocol, GM generates a group
public key gpk, an issuing key isk and an opening key osk, and issues B a private
signature key gsk before B purchases from S.
In the watermark generation and embedding protocol, B and S engage in an
electronic transaction for some digital content. First, B orders an item j, creates
a group signature, and sends the encryption of B’s secret watermark W to S. S
then performs the first round of watermarking embedding by inserting a unique
watermark V to the original content X to get the watermarked content X ′. The
sole purpose of the watermark V is to enable S to identify a specific buyer from
whose an illegal copy has been potentially generated. Next, S generates a random
permutation function σ to permute the elements of B’s encrypted watermark, and
performs the second round of watermark embedding in the encrypted domain
to insert the permuted watermark into the watermarked content X ′. After the
embedding, S sends the encrypted version of the watermarked content Y to B,
and B can do a decryption to retrieve the watermarked content Y .
In the identification and arbitration protocol, S receives a pirated copy Y and
detects the watermark U in Y . S uses U to relate the pirated copy to a particular
transaction and sends the stored transaction information to J . J adjudicates if
the accused buyer is guilty, and requests GM to open the group signature created
by the buyer to recover the buyer’s identity.
This approach takes care of both privacy protection for B and digital copyright
protection for S. B is only required to interact with the GM prior to transactions,
and with S during transactions, hence no third party is involved. Furthermore, B is
not required to participate in the copyright violator identification and arbitration
process by providing B’s private key or watermark. J is able to arbitrate the case
and expose the identity of an adjudicated guilty buyer through the interactions
with the GM and S.
We define the following assumptions in the proposed scheme. Without these
assumptions, the security property of the proposed scheme cannot be guaranteed.
We assume a public key infrastructure PKI is available, such that each entity
has a public and private key pair certified by the certification authority (CA). The
group manager GM consists of a trusted party (also named as Trusted Registration
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Authority) for group key generation, an issuer (also named as registration authority
R) for group member joining, and an opener (also named as deanonymization
authority D) for group signature opening. Additionally, the GM is assumed
to be only party who knows the link between B’s anonymous keys and identity.
Furthermore, J is assumed to be a predetermined trustworthy entity that manages
secret keys in the judicial system. For instance, in the protocol the buyer sends J
the encrypted private key C = EpkJ (skB′). Later in the arbitration phase, if some
other judge is appointed to resolve the dispute, that judge may ask J to provide
the necessary decryption of buyer’s private key. For consistency, we assume that
the digital content is a still image, although the protocol can be applied to other
multimedia formats such as audio or video.
Justification for the Algorithm Selection
In the protocol, we need to employ an additive homomorphic encryption scheme
that supports the following operation: on input two ciphertexts Enc(pk, x) and
Enc(pk, y) that encrypt messages x and y, outputs a ciphertext Enc(pk, x + y) =
Enc(pk, x) · Enc(pk, y) that encrypts the addition of the messages. The public
key homomorphic encryption schemes that support this operation include the
exponential ElGamal cryptosystem [149], Paillier cryptosystem [230] and Paillier’s
variances. However, the exponential ElGamal cryptosystem requires to extract a
discrete log at decryption, and this makes the cryptosystem only more efficient
than Paillier cryptosystem or Paillier’s variants when the plaintexts are small (e.g.
less than 40 bits), such as for the design of e-voting schemes [104, 178]. In the
watermark embedding phase of our protocol (to be explained in Section 3.5.3),
the seller needs to sends an encryption of the whole image to the buyer. Take a
standard 512× 512 image for example, the seller needs to encrypt about 2M bits,
which is of large computational complexity. To improve the protocol efficiency,
instead of encrypting the image pixel-wise, an image is packed using the composite
signal representation [115]. In such an approach, each encryption encodes several
pixels, and the plaintext corresponding to each encryption will be of thousands of
bits. For example, with 8 bits per pixel, an encryption encodes 128 pixels, and
we have a 1024-bit plaintext. Therefore, the exponential ElGamal cryptosystem
is not suitable for our setting. We choose to employ Paillier [230] cryptosystem
or its variances, such as Damg˚ard–Jurik cryptosystem [108], to instantiate the
encryption scheme (BKeygen,BEnc,BDec) employed in our protocol.
Moreover, the protocol needs to employ a group signature scheme to ensure the
properties of non-frameability, anonymity and traceability. We try to keep our
protocol generic so that any dynamic group signature scheme can be employed. As
an example, the scheme proposed by Bellare et al. [66] is employed to instantiate
the algorithms GSgkg, GSukg, GSjoin, GSiss, GSsig, GSverify, GSopen, GSjudge of
the group signature scheme.
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In addition, our protocol incorporates a robust collusion-resistant watermarking
scheme, such as the watermarking technique proposed by Cox et al. [101], and
a verifiable encryption scheme, such as the scheme proposed by Camenisch et
al. [88], for the key escrow of B’s private key at J so that B can prove to S that
the plaintext is valid without revealing B’s private key.
Finally, the messages in the purchase phase between B and S are transferred
over anonymous communication channels [132] to ensure anonymous outgoing
connections. Anonymous channel provides privacy by preventing eavesdropping
on the communication channel and disclosing the buyer’s identity via opening
the group signature it eavesdrops. Moreover, the messages in the registration
phase and the arbitration phase are transferred over a secure (i.e. encrypted and
authenticated) communication channel.
3.5.2 Type I Registration Protocol
The registration protocol, performed between the buyer B and the group manager
GM, is depicted in Figure 3.5.
1. In the group-key generation phase, GM generates a triple (gpk, osk, isk),
with the group public key gpk to verify group signatures, the issuing key isk
to issue signature keys for the group’s users, and the opening key osk to open
signatures.
2. In order to join the group, B generates a public and private key pair
(upki, uski) and a signing and verification key pair (skB , pkB). Then B runs
the user-key generation algorithm GSukg to generate a public and private
key pair (upki, uski).
3. B creates a signature sigB on pkB using uski, and sends sigB and pkB to
GM. GM verifies B’s signature sigB , issues B a certificate certB , and stores
(sigB , pkB) in GM’s registration table reg. After receiving the certificate
certB from GM, B generates the private group signature key gsk from the
tuple (Bi, pkB , skB , certB).
3.5.3 Type I Watermark Generation and Embedding Protocol
The watermark generation and embedding protocol can be executed multiple
times for multiple transactions between the seller S and the buyer B. The exact
algorithm depends on the underlying watermarking techniques. S and B first
need to negotiate a purchase agreement j on rights and specification of the digital
content X. Hence j uniquely binds a particular transaction to the item of interest
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GM B
1. group key generation secure -
(gpk, osk, isk)← GSgkg(1k)
2. user key generation
(upki, uski)← GSukg(1k)
3. group joining
(pkB , skB)← Ks(1k)
pkB , sigB sigB ← Sig(uski, pkB)
if VerifySig(upki, pkB , sigB) = 1
then certB ← Sig(sks, ⟨B, pkB⟩)
regi ← (pkB , sigB)
else certB ← ε certB-
gsk ← (B, pkB , skB , certB)
Figure 3.5. The registration protocol of the Type I BSW protocol performed
between B and GM
S B
j - 1. (pkB′, skB′)← BKeygen(1n)
C = EpkJ (skB
′), proof pfskB′ for C
generate W , ewB = EpkB′ (W )
m = (pkB′, j, ewB, pfskB′ , C)
2. Verify (pfskB′ , C)
(m, sm) sm = GSsig(gpk, gsk,m)
GSverify(gpk,m, sm)
generate V , σ
X
′ ← X ⊕ V
WATemb(swk, X′ , σ(ewB))
info = (X
′
, V, σ,m, sm)
EpkB′ (Y )- 3. obtain Y with skB′
Figure 3.6. The watermark generation and embedding protocol of the Type I
BSW protocol performed between S and B
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X. All messages are transferred over a secure and anonymous communication
channel. Figure 3.6 depicts the protocol with the following steps:
1. B generates a one-time anonymous public and private key pair (pkB′, skB′)
on input 1n, where n is a security parameter. B computes an escrow cipher
C = EpkJ (skB′) to recover B’s private key skB′ from the GM in case of
disputes. The verifiable proof pfskB′ for C is to assure S that the encrypted
message is valid without compromising skB′ to S. In each transaction, B
generates B’s secret watermark W and encrypts W using pkB′, as ewB =
EpkB′(W ). For the message m = (pkB
′, j, ewB, pfskB′ , C), B runs the group-
sign algorithm GSsig to create a group signature sm to m using B’s group
signature key gsk, as sm = GSsig(gpk, gsk,m). Then B sends (m, sm) to S.
2. S first verifies B’s the verifiable proof pfskB′ , and executes the group signature
verification algorithm to verify B’s group signature sm with the group
public key gpk, as GSverify(gpk,m, sm). If the verification fails, the protocol
halts. Otherwise, S generates a unique watermark V in compliance with
the features of X and embeds V to X, performs the bit-wise watermark
embedding WATemb(swk, X, V ) to obtain the intermediate watermarked
content, as
X
′
= X ⊕ V = {x1 ⊕ v1, x2 ⊕ v2, ..., xn ⊕ vn} (3.1)
where ⊕ denotes the watermark embedding operation in the plaintext
domain.
Next, S generates a random permutation function σ to permute the elements
of the encrypted W . The bit-wise encryption of B’s watermark W can be
written as
EpkB′(W ) = EpkB′({w1, w2, ..., wn})
= {EpkB′(w1), EpkB′(w2), ..., EpkB′(wn)}, (3.2)
S computes permuted watermark encryption as
σ(EpkB′(W )) = EpkB′(σ(W )). (3.3)
S then performs the second watermark embedding in the encrypted domain
WATemb(swk, X ′, σ(ewB)) by applying homomorphic cryptosystem as
EpkB′(Y ) = EpkB′(X
′
)⊗ EpkB′(σ(W ))
= EpkB′(X
′ ⊕ σ(W )), (3.4)
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where ⊗ denotes the watermark embedding operation in the encrypted
domain.
Note that the above computation is possible because we assume the en-
cryption EpkB′(·) is homomorphic with respect to the watermark embedding
operation ⊕. S stores info = (X ′ , V, σ,m, sm) in the transaction table as the
record, and delivers the encrypted content of Y to B.
3. B obtains the watermarked content Y by decryption DskB′EpkB′(Y ).
3.5.4 Type I Identification and Arbitration Protocol
The identification and arbitration protocol, executed among the seller S, the judge
J , and the GM, is depicted in Figure 3.7.
1. Once a pirated copy Y of X is found, S runs the watermark detection
algorithm WATdet(swk, Y ) and extracts the watermark U from Y , where
swk is the watermarking secret key. S correlates U with every V in the
transaction table to choose the record info with the highest correlation. In
addition, S computes the encryption of the secret watermarking key swk
for J , as ck = EpkJ (swk). It is to enable GM to perform the watermark
detection using the same secret watermarking key as S. Then S sends the
unauthorized copy Y , the transaction record info, and the watermarking
secret key ck to J .
2. Upon receiving the message from S, J parses info as (X ′ , V, σ,m, sm), and
m as (pkB′, j, ewB, pfskB′ , C) where sm = GSsig(gpk, gsk,m). J verifies the
group signature GSverify(gpk,m, sm) and performs a number of decryptions
to obtain B’s private key skB′ = DskJ (C), the secret watermarking key
swk = DpkJ (ck), and B’s secret watermark W = DskB′(ewB). Next, J
permutes the watermark W as σ(W ), and runs the watermark detection
algorithmWATdet(swk, Y ) and checks if σ(W ) indeed presents in the content
X ′. If σ(W ) is found, the suspected buyer is guilty, and J sends a court
order Mopen = (m, sm) to GM. Otherwise, J informs S that the buyer is
innocent and the protocol halts. Note that until now, the buyer has been
anonymous.
3. To recover B’s identity, GM accesses the registration table reg and runs
the group signature open algorithm GSopen(gpk, osk, reg, pkB′, sm) using its
opening key osk and its registration table reg, and obtains the identity Bi
and a claim proof τ .
4. J verifies GM’s claim by running the group signature judge algorithm
GSjudge(gpk,Bi, upki, pkB′, sm, τ). If the GM’s claim is verified, J closes the
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S J GM
1. ck =
EpkJ (swk),
U ← WATdet
(swk, Y )
info, Y, ck 2. GSverify(gpk,m, sm),
skB′ = DskJ (C), swk =
DpkJ (ck)
W = DskB′ (ewB)
σ(W ) ?← WATdet(swk, Y ) sm, pkB
′
- 3. (Bi, τ) ← GSopen
(gpk, osk, reg,m, sm)
(Bi, guilty) 5. GSjudge(gpk,Bi, upki,
m, sm, τ)
(Bi, τ)
Figure 3.7. The identification and arbitration protocol of the Type I BSW
protocol performed among S, J , and GM
case and adjudicates that the buyer whose identity is Bi is guilty. Otherwise,
J informs S with an empty string (⊥) and the protocol halts.
3.6 Type II BSW protocol
3.6.1 Intuition Behind the Construction
The Type II BSW protocol has the similar design principle as that of the Type I
BSW protocol (in Section 3.5). The protocol also involves the seller S, the buyer
B, the trustworthy group manager GM, and a trustworthy judge J ; and it consists
of three phases, namely registration, watermarking, and arbitration.
The essential difference between the Type II and Type I BSW protocols lies
in the watermark generation and embedding. In the watermarking phase, B
and S both contribute their secret watermarks WB and WS . B first sends the
encryption of WB to S, and S computes the encryption of a composite watermark
W based on the encryptions of WB and WS by using homomorphic encryptions.
In addition, S needs to perform a double watermark embedding. S first generate
a unique watermark V with the only purpose to identify a transaction record in
S’s transaction table later on, and S embeds V to the original content X in the
plaintext domain to obtain an intermediate watermarked content X ′. Hereafter,
S embeds the composite watermark W to X ′ in the encrypted domain by using
homomorphic encryptions to obtain the encrypted version of the final watermarked
content Y . After receiving the encryption of Y from S, B performs decryption and
obtains Y .
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S B
j - 1. (pkB′, skB′)← BKeygen(1n)
C = EpkJ (skB
′), proof pfskB′ for C
generate WB, ewB = EpkB′ (WB)
m = (pkB′, j, ewB, pfskB′ , C),
2. GSverify(gpk,m, sm) (m, sm) sm = GSsig(gpk, gski,m)
verify (pfskB′ , C)
generate VWS
X
′
= X ⊕ V
W ← (WS ,WB)
EpkB′ (Y ) = EpkB′ (X
′
)⊕ EpkB′ (W )
info← (V,WS , X′,m, sm)
EpkB′ (Y )- obtain Y with skB′
Figure 3.8. The watermark generation and embedding protocol of the Type II
BSW protocol performed between the seller S and the buyer B
In this scheme, neither B nor S knows the composite watermark W . B doesn’t
learn anything about S’s watermark WS , the original content X and the index
watermark V . Besides, B’s watermark WB and the final watermarked content Y
remains unknown to S. Subsequently, the watermark detections by the judge J
in the arbitration phase needs to be adjusted to accommodate the modifications
in the watermarking phase. Apart from that, the assumptions of the Type I BSW
protocols still hold for the Type II BSW protocols.
The justification for the algorithm selection of the Type II BSW protocol is the
same as what has been explained in Section 3.5.1.
3.6.2 Type II Registration Protocol
In the registration phase, the buyer B registers at the group manager GM with
B’s public and private key pair (upki, uski), the signing and verification key pair
(skB , pkB) and B’s identity Bi. In return, GM issues B a private group signature
key gsk and stores B’s information in GM’s registration table reg. The data flow
of the Type II BSW registration protocol is the same of the one in the Type I
BSW protocol, which is depicted in Figure 3.5.
3.6.3 Type II Watermark Generation and Embedding Protocol
The watermark generation and insertion protocol is executed between the seller S
and the buyer B, and it is depicted in Figure 3.8.
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1. B first orders an item j from S, and j uniquely bind a particular transaction
to the item of interest X. B generates a one-time anonymous public and
private key pair (pkB′, skB′). For key escrow, B encrypts the secret key skB′
with J ’s encryption key pkJ , and computes a verifiable proof pfskB′ for the
escrow cipher C to assure S that the encrypted message is valid without
compromising skB′. For each transaction, B generates a unique watermark
WB, and sends the encrypted WB and the other public information as a
message m = (pkB′, j, ewB, pfskB′ , C) to S. Besides, B also creates a group
signature ofm with the private signature key gsk as sm = GSsig(gpk, gski,m),
and sends the signature sm to S.
2. S verifies B’s verifiable proof pfskB′ and the group signature sm, and
generates two unique watermarks V and WS for each transaction. The first
round of watermark insertion WATemb(swk, X, V ) is performed as:
X
′
= X ⊕ V, (3.5)
where ⊕ the watermark embedding operation in the message space. Note
that the only purpose of V is to search the sales record in case S finds a
pirated copy of her products [203, 189].
3. S computes the composite watermark W in the encrypted domain using
additive homomorphic encryptions:
EpkB′(W ) = EpkB′(WS)× EpkB′(WB)
= EpkB′(WS +WB), (3.6)
where + denotes addition and × denotes multiplication defined in the Galois
field, respectively.
4. S performs the second round of watermark insertion in the encrypted domain
WATemb(swk, X ′ , EpkB′(W )):
EpkB′(Y ) = EpkB′(X
′
)⊗ EpkB′(W )
= EpkB′(X
′ ⊕W ), (3.7)
where ⊗ denotes the corresponding operation in the encrypted domain. This
computation is possible because we assume the encryption EpkB′(·) is privacy
homomorphic with respect to ⊕. S then stores (V,WS , X ′,m, sm) as info in
the transaction table, and delivers the encrypted content Y to B.
5. After decryption DskB′EpkB′(Y ), B obtains the watermarked content Y from
S.
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S J GM
1. ck =
EpkJ (swk),
U ← WATdet(swk,
Y )
info, Y, ck 2. GSverify(gpk,m,
sm), skB′ = DskJ (C),
swk = DpkJ (ck)
WB = DskB′ (ewB)
W ← (WS ,WB)
W
?← WATdet(swk, Y ) Mopen- 3. (Bi, τ) ← GSopen
(gpk, osk, reg,m, sm)
(Bi, guilty) 5. GSjudge(gpk,Bi,
upki,m, sm, τ)
(Bi, τ)
Figure 3.9. The copyright violator identification and arbitration protocol of the
Type II BSW protocol performed among the seller S, the judge J , and GM
3.6.4 Type II Identification and Arbitration Protocol
The identification and arbitration protocol is executed among the seller S, a judge
J , and GM, as depicted in Figure 3.9.
1. In case S finds a pirated copy Y , S extracts the watermark U from Y , and
searches the sales record by correlating U with every V in S’s table. Then
S provides the encryption of the secret watermarking key ck = EpkJ (swk)
and B’s relevant information info together with the unauthorized copy Y to
J .
2. Upon receiving the message from S, J parses info as (V,WS , X ′,m, sm)
and m as (pkB′, j, ewB, pfskB′ , C). J first verifies the group signature
GSverify(gpk,m, sm), and aborts if the signature is not verified. Otherwise,
J recovers B’s private key and the secret watermarking key swk from the
decryptions skB′ = DskJ (EpkJ (skB′)) and swk = DpkJ (ck), respectively,
and further obtains B’s secret watermark as WB = DskB′(ewB). Then J
computes W = WB +WS . Then J performs the watermark detection and
checks if W indeed presents in the pirated copy Y . If W is found in Y , J
sends a court orderMopen = (m, sm) to GM. Otherwise J sends (not guilty)
to S, and the protocol halts. Note that, the buyer’s identity is not exposed
until now.
3. To recover the buyer’s identity, GM opens the buyer’s group signature
executes the group signature open algorithm GSopen(gpk, osk, reg,m, sm), to
obtain the identity Bi and a proof τ .
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4. Upon receiving the recovered identity Bi and a claim proof τ , J verifies
GM’s claim. If the claim is verified, J closes the case and informs S that
the buyer with identity Bi is guilty.
3.7 Type III BSW protocol
3.7.1 Intuition Behind the Construction
The Type III BSW protocol improves the Type I and Type II BSW protocols in
a number of aspects. Primarily, the double watermarking embedding from the
Type I and Type II BSW protocols is avoided. Double watermark insertions may
cause a degradation of the final quality of the distributed content. When applied
independently, the second watermark could confuse or discredit the authority of
the first watermark, thus acting as an actual “ambiguity attack” [105]. That is
avoided by first computing a composite watermark W , which is composed of the
buyer’s secret watermarkWB, the seller’s secret watermarkWS , and a transaction
index ϕ.
Moreover, the protocol consists of four phases: setup, registration, purchase,
and arbitration. The involved parties are a buyer B, a seller S, a judge J , a
registration authority R, and a deanonymization authority D. It is assumed that
the registration authority R, the deanonymization authority D, together with the
judge J are trustworthy.
In the setup phase, a Trusted Registration Authority releases the group public key
gpk, gives the issuer secret key isk to the registration authority R and the opener
secret key osk to the deanonymization authority D. R acts as the issuer of the
group signature scheme, and D as the opener. Additionally, buyers register their
public keys at the Trusted Registration Authority, and J also registers a public
key.
In the registration phase, buyers query R and obtain a private signing key gsk of
the group signature scheme. R obtains registration information reg.
In the purchase phase, a buyer B requests the item j from S, randomly picks a
watermark WB and sends the bitwise encryption of WB to S. Then, B computes
a group signature sm on the request message m, sends it to S and proves in zero-
knowledge that the request is correctly computed. S randomly picks a unique
index ϕ and S’s watermark WS , and computes the encryption of the composite
watermark w by using the homomorphic property of the encryption scheme such
that W = ϕ||(WS ⊕WB), where ϕ ∈ {0, 1}l1 and WS ∈ {0, 1}l2 are chosen by the
seller, while WB ∈ {0, 1}l2 is chosen by buyer. S embeds W in the original content
X in the encrypted domain and sends the encryption of the watermarked content
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to B. B then decrypts the message to obtain the watermarked content Yj from S.
In such a way, the double watermark embedding is avoided. None of the parties
knows the composite watermark W . S does not learn B’s watermark WB and the
final watermarked content Yj , and B doesn’t know S’s watermark WS , the index
ϕ and the original content X.
Justification for the Algorithm Selection
The third improvement of the Type III BSW protocol is to incorporate zero-
knowledge proofs of knowledge in the watermarking phase. A proof of knowledge
PK{(sk′) : (pk′, sk′)← BKeygen(1k) ∧ C ← Enc(pk, sk′)} is employed, i.e., a proof
that C is a correct encryption under pk of the secret key sk′ related with public
key pk′, so that a party in possession of the secret key sk related with pk can
recover sk′ from C. Two candidate schemes can be employed to instantiate the
encryption scheme (JKeygen, JEnc, JDec) used in the construction in Section 3.7.2,
namely the verifiable encryption by Camenisch et al. [88] and the fair encryption of
RSA keys by Poupard and Stern [248]. Despite the claim of Camenisch et al. [88]
that Poupard and Stern’s solution [248] may overlook the fact that the underlying
encryption scheme provides security against chosen ciphertext attacks, we decide to
employ Poupard and Stern’s scheme due to its efficiency of zero knowledge proofs.
Besides, a proof of knowledge of the statement PK{(b) : c← Enc(pk, b)∧b ∈ {0, 1}}
is also employed, i.e., a proof that the value b encrypted in ciphertext c under public
key pk is a bit. Such a proof is described in [108].
We employ a public key homomorphic encryption scheme that supports two
operations. An operation ⊙ that, on input two ciphertexts Enc(pk, x) and
Enc(pk, y) that encrypt messages x and y, outputs a ciphertext Enc(pk, x + y) =
Enc(pk, x)⊙Enc(pk, y) that encrypts the addition of the messages, and an operation
⊗ that, on input a message x and a ciphertext Enc(pk, y), outputs a ciphertext
Enc(pk, xy) = x ⊗ Enc(pk, y) that encrypts the multiplication of the messages
x and y. Following the same reason explained in Section 3.5.1, the public key
homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by Paillier [230] and its generalization
by Damg˚ard and Jurik [108] support these operations, and therefore can be
used to instantiate the encryption scheme (BKeygen,BEnc,BDec) employed in
Section 3.7.2. In the protocol, we need a function that, on input bit b and an
encryption Enc(pk, b′) of bit b′, computes the encryption Enc(pk, b ⊕ b′), where
⊕ denotes the exclusive or operation. With Paillier encryption, the function
can be computed as follows. If b = 0, output Enc(pk, b′). If b = 1, output
Enc(pk, b)⊙ (−1⊗ Enc(pk, b′)).
There are a number of assumptions for the Type III BSW protocol. We require
a Trusted Registration Authority (e.g. a public key infrastructure) that certifies
public keys of the parties. It is assumed that the judge J and the Trusted
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Registration Authority (do not confuse this entity with R) are trustworthy. For
consistency and ease of explanation, the digital content is assumed to be an image,
although the protocol can be applied to other multimedia formats. In addition,
the protocol is suitable to employ any types of group signature schemes, and we
follow the group signature construction formalized in Section 3.3. Finally, the
messages in the purchase phase are transferred over anonymous communication
channels [132] to ensure anonymous outgoing connections between B and S.
Anonymous channel provides privacy, which prevents a malicious opener that
eavesdrops the communication channel from deanonymizing the buyer that is
requesting an item (by opening the group signature it eavesdrops). The messages
in the registration phase and the arbitration phase are transferred over a secure
(i.e. encrypted and authenticated) communication channel.
3.7.2 Type III Protocol Construction
The security definition of BSW protocols is provided in Section 3.4. This section
specifies the construction of the proposed Type III BSW protocol. In the following,
(JKeygen, JEnc, JDec) and (BKeygen,BEnc,BDec) stand for the algorithms for key
generation, encryption and decryption of the public key encryption schemes used
by J and B respectively. They are described in Section 3.3.
In the setup phase, the trusted registration functionality FREG runs the setup
algorithm GSgkg of the group signature scheme, stores the group public key gpk
and sends the issuer’s secret key isk to R and the opening secret key osk to D.
Every party can obtain gpk by sending (crs) to FREG.
Additionally, each buyer Bi runs GSukg to obtain a user key pair (upki, uski) and
registers upki at FREG. The judge J runs his key generation algorithm JKeygen
in order to generate a key pair (pkJ , skJ ) and registers pkJ at FREG. Every party
can retrieve public keys of other parties by querying FREG.
Finally, the seller S executes the watermarking setup algorithmWATsetup to obtain
secret watermarking key swk. S encrypts ck = JEnc(pkJ , swk) and sends ck to J .
After the setup phase, our protocol consists of three phases: registration, purchase,
and arbitration. We begin with a high level description of our construction. Details
of the algorithms can be found below.
Protocol BSW
• Registration. When Bi is activated with (register), Bi and R execute
GSjoin and GSiss respectively. Bi inputs (gpk, uski), and R inputs
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(gpk, isk, upki). Bi obtains a private signing key gski and outputs
(regresp, 1), while I obtains registration information regi to be stored
in the registration table reg.
• Purchase. When Bi is activated with (request, j) and S is activated
with (reqresp,X), Bi and S run the interactive algorithms Request and
Response respectively. Bi inputs the group public key gpk, her private
signing key gski, j and the public key pkJ of J . S inputs gpk, pkJ ,
the secret watermarking key swk and the original content X . S obtains
transaction information info and stores it in the table entry Tab, where
Tab is a table that stores information of all the transactions. Bi outputs
watermarked content (reqresp,Y ).
• Arbitration. When S is activated with (detect,Y ), S runs
Detect(swk,Y ,Tab) to obtain the table entry info that corresponds to
Y and sends (info) to J . J runs Check(gpk, info, skJ ) to obtain a bit
b and a deanonymization message Mopen. If b = 0, J sends (not guilty)
to S and outputs (detresp,not guilty). Otherwise J sends Mopen to D,
which runs Identify(gpk, osk,Mopen, reg) (reg is obtained from R) and
returns Bi and a proof τ that deanonymization was done correctly. J
runs VerifyId(gpk,Bi, τ, upki,Mopen) to check the validity of the proof
τ . If the output is b = 0, J sends (⊥) to S and outputs (detresp,⊥).
Otherwise J sends (Bi, guilty) to S and outputs (detresp,Bi, guilty).
• Request(gpk, gski, j, pkJ ). Run BKeygen(1k) to obtain a key pair (skB′, pkB′).
Run JEnc(pkJ , skB′) to get an encryption C of skB′. Pick a random
string WB ← {0, 1}l2 and, for i = 1 to l2 , run ci = BEnc(pkB′,WBi)
to encrypt bitwise WB. Set a message m = (pkB′, j, (ci)l2i=1, C) and run
GSsig(gpk, gski,m) to compute a signature sm. (If m does not belong to the
message space of the group signature scheme, use a collision-resistant hash
function H to compute a hash H(m) that belongs to the message space and
signH(m).) Send (m, sm) to S. As the prover, engage with S in the following
interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge: a proof π1 = PK{(skB′) :
(pkB′, skB′) ← BKeygen(1k) ∧ C ← JEnc(pkJ , skB′)} that (pkB′, skB′) are
correctly setup and that C is an encryption of skB′ under pkJ ; for i = 1 to
l2 , a proof π2i = PK{(WBi) : ci ← BEnc(pkB′,WBi) ∧ WBi ∈ {0, 1}} that
each ci encrypts a bit. Upon receiving ct, decrypt Y = BDec(skB′, ct) and
output Y .
• Response(gpk, pkJ , swk,X). Receive message (m, sm). Parse m as (pkB′,
j, (ci)l2i=1, C). Run GSverify(gpk,m, sm) and abort if the output is 0. As
the verifier, engage in the execution of the interactive proofs π1 and, for
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Setup
1. (gpk, isk, osk)← GSgkg(1k) 2. B : (upki, uski)← GSukg(1k)
3. J : (pkJ , skJ )← JKeygen(1t) 4. S : swk ← WATsetup
Figure 3.10. The setup phase of the BSW protocol: 1) group key generation, 2)
B key generation, 3) J key generation, 4) S sets up the watermarking scheme and
obtains secret watermarking key
i = 1 to l2 , π2i, and abort if any of them is not correct. Pick random
WS ← {0, 1}l2 and, for i = 1 to l2 , compute BEnc(pkB′,WS i ⊕WBi). Pick
random unique ϕ← {0, 1}l1 and, for i = 1 to l1 , encrypt BEnc(pkB′, ϕi). Set
the watermark to be embedded as W = ϕ||(WS ⊕WB), and let its bitwise
encryption be BEnc(pkB′,W ). Perform the watermark embedding operation
WATemb(swk,X ,BEnc(pkB′,W )) in the encrypted domain to obtain an
encrypted watermarked content ct = BEnc(pkB′,Y ). Send (ct) and output
transaction information info = (ϕ,WS ,m, sm).
• Detect(swk,Y ,Tab). Execute the watermark detection algorithm WATdet
(swk,Y ) to obtain the watermark W = ϕ||x, parse the table entry (ϕ,WS ,
m, sm), compute WB = WS ⊕ x and output info = (WB,m, sm).
• Check(gpk, info, skJ ,Y ). Parse info as (WB,m, sm) and m as (pkB′, j,
(ci)l2i=1, C). Run GSverify(gpk,m, sm) and abort if the output is 0. Decrypt
JDec(skJ , C) to obtain skB′. For i = 1 to l2 , decrypt BDec(skB′, ci) to
obtain WB′i. Check whether WB′ = WB. If it is the case, output b = 1 and
Mopen = (m, sm). Otherwise output b = 0 and Mopen = ⊥.
• Identify(gpk, osk,Mopen, reg). ParseMopen as (m, sm). Run GSopen(gpk, osk,
reg,m, sm) to obtain an identity Bi and a proof τ . Output (Bi, τ).
• VerifyId(gpk,Bi, τ, upki,Mopen). Parse Mopen as (m, sm). Run GSjudge(gpk,
Bi, upki,m, sm, τ) to obtain a bit b. Output b.
3.7.3 Type III Setup Phase
As a preparation for the buyer-seller watermarking protocol, a setup phase is
necessary to generate keys of B and J , and group keys for the group signature
scheme. The setup phase is presented in Figure 3.10. All messages are sent over a
secure channel.
1. The Trusted Registration Authority executes the group-key generation
algorithm GSgkg and generates a group public key gpk, an issuing key isk for
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R B
2. regi ← GSiss(gpk, isk, upki)  - 1. gski ← GSjoin(gpk, uski)
Figure 3.11. The registration protocol performed between the buyer B and the
registration authority R
the registration authority R to issue signature keys to group members, and
an opening key osk for the deanonymization authority D to open signatures
and retrieve the group member’s identity.
2. The buyer B begins with the user-key generation algorithm GSukg to obtain
a public and private key pair (upki, uski).
3. The judge J performs the judge-key generation algorithm JKg to obtain a
public and private key pair (pkJ , skJ).
4. The seller S executes the watermarking setup algorithm WATsetup to obtain
secret watermarking key swk for the watermark embedding and detection.
For instance, in a secure watermark embedding scheme based on dither
modulation techniques [186, 250], the dithering value δ of can be considered
as a secret parameter. In practice, one can use a different δ for each scalar
feature, so that the secret key is actually a vector of dithering values. Besides,
the set of marked features M can be considered as a secret parameter.
Therefore, in such a watermarking scheme the secret watermarking key can
be K = (δ,M).
3.7.4 Type III Registration Protocol
The registration protocol performed between the buyer B and the registration
authority R is depicted in Figure 3.11.
1. To join the group, the buyer B executes the group-join algorithm GSjoin with
the inputs (gpk, uski) and obtains a private signing key gski.
2. The registration authority R executes the group-issue algorithm GSiss with
the inputs (gpk, isk, upki) and stores the registration information regi in the
registration table reg.
3.7.5 Type III Watermark Generation and Embedding Protocol
The watermark generation and embedding protocol can be executed multiple
times for multi-transactions between the seller S and the buyer B, as depicted
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S B
j - 1. (skB′, pkB′)← BKeygen(1k)
2. C = JEnc(pkJ , skB′)
3. WB ← {0, 1}l2
ci = BEnc(pkB′,WBi)
4. m = (pkB′, j, (ci)l2i=1, C)
5. GSverify(gpk,m, sm) (m, sm) sm = GSsig(gpk, gski,m)
6. Verifier π1, π2 π1, π2 - Prover π1, π2
7. WS ← {0, 1}l2 , ϕ← {0, 1}l1
WSB ← (WS ,WB), W ← (ϕ,WSB)
WATemb(swk,X,BEnc(pkB′,W ))
8. info = (ϕ,WS ,m, sm) ct - 9. Y = BDec(skB′, ct)
Figure 3.12. The watermark generation and embedding protocol of the Type III
BSW protocol performed between the seller S and the buyer B
in Figure 3.12. S and B first negotiate a purchase order j, which uniquely binds
a particular transaction to the original digital content X .
1. The buyer B first runs BKeygen(1k) to generate a one-time anonymous key
pair (skB′, pkB′).
2. Next, B computes an encryption of skB′ as C = JEnc(pkJ , skB′), in order to
let J retrieve B’s private key in the arbitration phase.
3. B generates B’s secret watermark as a l2 -bit random string WB ← {0, 1}l2
and, for i = 1 to l2 , computes the bitwise encryption of WB as ci =
BEnc(pkB′,WBi) . The encrypted watermark is presented as (ci)l2i=1.
4. B sets a message m = (pkB′, j, (ci)l2i=1, C) and runs the group-sign algorithm
GSsig(gpk, gski,m) to obtain a signature sm. B sends (m, sm) to S.
5. After receiving the message (m, sm), S parses m as (pkB′, j, (ci)l2i=1, C), runs
the group-verify algorithm GSverify(gpk,m, sm), and aborts if the output is
0.
6. B as the prover and S as the verifier engage in the execution of the following
two interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge: a proof π1 = PK{(skB′) :
(pkB′, skB′) ← BKeygen(1k) ∧ C ← JEnc(pkJ , skB′)} that (pkB′, skB′) are
correctly setup and that C is an encryption of skB′ under pkJ ; for i = 1 to
l2 , a proof π2i = PK{(WBi) : ci ← BEnc(pkB′,WBi) ∧ WBi ∈ {0, 1}} that
each ci correctly encrypts a bit. S aborts if any of the proofs is not correct.
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7. S generates randomly S’s secret watermark WS ← {0, 1}l2 and an index
ϕ ← {0, 1}l1 to locate the current transaction record in S’s table Tab. Let
WSB = WS ⊕WB, W = WSB + ϕ2n. W consists of the l2 -bit WSB and
the l1 -bit ϕ. W can be decomposed into l1 + l2 binary numbers, with
Wi ∈ {0, 1}, satisfying W =
∑l1+l2−1
i=0 Wi2i, i.e., W = ϕ||(WS ⊕ WB).
The watermark embedding can be considered as a function which takes the
encrypted watermark bits EpkB′(Wi), the secret watermarking key swk, and
the content X as input, and returns the encrypted watermarked content
EpkB′(Y ) as output, where EpkB′(·) denotes BEnc(pkB′, ·). The encrypted
watermark can be computed in the encrypted domain as
EpkB′(W ) = {EpkB′(ϕ1), .., EpkB′(ϕl1 )}||{EpkB′(WSB1), .., EpkB′(WSB l2 )}
(3.8)
where, for i = 1 to l2
EpkB′(WSBi) = EpkB′(WS i⊕WBi) =
{
EpkB′(WBi) WS i = 0
EpkB′(1) · EpkB′(WBi)−1 WS i = 1
(3.9)
where || denotes concatenation, and ⊕ denotes exclusive OR. S performs
the watermark embeddingWATemb(swk,X ,BEnc(pkB′,W )) in the encrypted
domain to obtain an encrypted watermarked content ct = BEnc(pkB′,Y ).
We have a generalized formula for watermark embedding in the encrypted
domain
EpkB′(Y ) = EpkB′ [f(X)]EpkB′(W )g(X) (3.10)
where f(X) and g(X) depend on the chosen watermarking technique, such
as additive spread-spectrum schemes or QIM watermarking schemes.
8. S stores the transaction information info = (ϕ,WS ,m, sm) in S’s transaction
record table Tab, and delivers the encrypted watermarked content ct to B.
9. Upon receiving ct, B decrypts Y = BDec(skB′, ct) and obtains the
watermarked content Y .
3.7.6 Type III Identification and Arbitration Protocol
The identification and arbitration protocol, performed among the seller S, the
judge J , and the deanonymization authority D, is depicted in Figure 3.13.
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S J D
1. W
′ ←
WATdet(swk,Y ),
WB
′ ←W ′
info,WB
′
 - 2. GSverify(gpk,m, sm),
skB′ = JDec(skJ , C)
3. WBi = BDec(skB′,
ci), WB′
?= WB
Mopen- 4. (Bi, τ) ← GSopen
(gpk, osk, reg,m, sm)
(Bi, guilty) 5. GSjudge(gpk,Bi, upki,
m, sm, τ)
(Bi, τ)
Note: m = (pkB′, j, (ci)l2i=1, C), sm = GSsig(gpk, gski,m), info = (ϕ,WS ,m, sm)
Figure 3.13. The copyright violator identification and arbitration protocol of
the Type III BSW protocol performed among the seller S, the judge J , and the
deanonymization authority D
1. Once a pirated copy Y of the original content X is found, S detects the
watermark W ′ from Y and retrieves the most significant l1 bits of it as
an index ϕ′ to search in S’s table Tab, by choosing the ϕ from the table
that is mostly correlated with ϕ′ . Besides, S also recovers a watermark
WB′ from W ′ = ϕ′||(WS′ ⊕ WB′). S provides the collected information
info = (ϕ,WS ,m, sm) and WB
′
to the judge J .
2. J receives info as (ϕ,WS ,m, sm) and m as (pkB′, j, (ci)l2i=1, C). J runs the
group-verify algorithm GSverify(gpk,m, sm), and aborts if the output is 0. If
verified, J decrypts JDec(skJ , C) to obtain B’s private key skB′.
3. For i = 1 to l2 , J performs bitwise decryption BDec(skB′, ci) to obtain
bitwise WBi, and checks whether WB′ = WB. If they match with a high
correlation, J sends a court order Mopen = (m, sm) to D. Otherwise J
sends (not guilty) to S, and the protocol halts.
4. D executes the group signature open algorithm GSopen(gpk, osk, reg,m, sm),
where reg is obtained fromR, to obtain the identity Bi and a proof τ . Output
(Bi, τ).
5. J runs the group signature judge algorithm to GSjudge(gpk,Bi, upki,m, sm,
τ) to check the validity of the proof τ . If τ is verified, J closes the case
and sends (Bi, guilty) to S. Otherwise, J returns (⊥) to S and the protocol
halts.
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3.7.7 Zero Knowledge Proofs
The additive homomorphic cryptosystem used to encrypt the
buyer’s and the seller’s watermark is Paillier’s cryptosystem [230] which has been
explained in Section 3.3.2.
Zero Knowledge Proof for Fair Encryption Of Private Keys π1
In our protocol, B (as the prover) needs to convince S (as the verifier) that given
the ciphertext C = JEnc(pkJ , skB′) is an encryption of B’s private key skB′, such
as the factorization of the modulus n, without revealing any secret information;
and the trustworthy judge J is able to recover the buyer’s private key, with the
encryption C and J ’s private key pkJ . Indeed, B’s Paillier public key is n = pq
and g, and B’s Paillier private key is λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1) which is equivalent to
the factorization of the modulo n.
We employ the fair encryption of RSA keys by Poupard and Stern [248]. The
encryption scheme of a private key and the proof of fairness work as follows:
Key Generation Let N be an RSA modulus N = P · Q, where P and Q are
primes, gcd(N,φ(n)) = 1, and G be an integer of order multiple of N modulo
N2. The third party CA’s public key is (N,G), and the private key is λ(N). The
buyer’s private key is λ(n) = lcm(p − 1, q − 1), with the factoring components
p and q such that n = pq, which is the modulus of the Paillier cryptosystem’s
between the buyer and the seller.
Encryption P (the buyer) computes x = n−φ(n) = p+ q− 1, randomly chooses
u ∈ Z∗n and computes Γ = Gx · uN mod N2.
Non-interactive proof The common inputs to P and V are randomly chosen
integers zi ∈ Z∗n for i = 1..K.
P randomly chooses r1, r2 ∈ [0, A[ and v1, v2 ∈ Z∗n, and computes the commitment
t1 =
(
Gr1v1
N mod N2, (zr1j mod n)j=1..K
)
,
t2 =
(
Gr2v2
N mod N2, (zr2j mod n)j=1..K
)
, and e1 = H (t1, N,G, (zj)j=1..K , n),
e2 = H (t2, N,G, (zj)j=1..K , n). P computes y1 = r1 + e1(n − φ(n)), y2 = r2 +
e2(n − φ(n)) and s1 = ue1 · v1 mod N , s2 = ue2 · v2 mod N . The non-interactive
proof is a 6-tuple (y1, s1, e1, y2, s2, e2).
V checks 0 ≤ y1 < A and 0 ≤ y2 < A,
computes t1′ =
(
Gy1 · yN1 /Γe1 mod N2, (zy1−e1nj mod n)j=1..K
)
and t2′ =
(
(Gy2 · yN2 /Γe2 mod N2, (zy2−e2nj mod n)j=1..K
)
,
checks e1 = H (t1′, N,G, (zj)j=1..K , n) and e2 = H (t2′, N,G, (zj)j=1..K , n). V
accepts if and only if this holds.
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Zero Knowledge Proof for Bit Encryption π2
The zero knowledge proof π2 should be repeated l2 times, where l2 is the bit
length of the buyer’s watermark. The buyer (as the prover) needs to prove to the
seller (as the verifier) that a given ciphertext C is an encryption of a bit without
disclosing the bit value. Our proof protocol is based on the zero knowledge proof
by Damg˚ard and Jurik [108].
Since Paillier’s encryption is E(i) = gi ·rn mod n2, and it can be seen a specialized
form of the Damg˚ard-Jurik cryptosystem. Given ciphertext c and two candidate
plaintexts w1 = 1 and w2 = 0, P and V both compute u1 = cg−w1 mod n2 and
u2 = cg−w2 mod n2. It is easy to see that the proof is equivalent to convincing
V that either u1 or u2 is a n-th residue modulo n2. We assume that P knows an
n-th root u1, and M is the honest-verifier simulator for the n-th residue modulo
n2 protocol.
The honest-verifier zero knowledge proof consists of two building blocks: 1) to
prove a value is n-th residue modulo n2, and 2) to prove a value is 1-out-of-2 n-
th residue modulo n2. To construct four-round perfect zero-knowledge proofs
of knowledge based on honest-verifier zero knowledge proofs, we refer to the
framework introduced by Cramer, Damg˚ard, and MacKenzie [103].
Prove a value is n-th residue modulo n2:
Common input: n, u
Private input for P: v, such that u = vn mod n2
1. P chooses at random r ∈ Z∗n, and sends a = rn mod n2 to V.
2. V chooses a challenge e, a random k-bit number, and sends e to P.
3. P sends the response z = rve mod n2 to V.
4. V checks that zn = aue mod n2, and accepts if and only if this holds. Otherwise,
the protocol halts.
Prove a value is 1-out-of-2 n-th residue modulo n2:
Common input: n, u1, u2
Private input for P: v1, such that u1 = v1n mod n2
1. P chooses at random r1 ∈ Z∗n, and then invokes M on input n, u2 to get a
conversation a2, e2, z2. P sends a1 = r1n mod n2, a2 to V.
2. V chooses a challenge d, a random t-bit number, and sends d to P. Note that if
k is the bit length of n, we can set t = k/2 and be assured that a cheating prover
can made the verifier accept with probability ≤ 2−t.
3. P computes e1 = d−e2 mod n2 and z1 = r1v1e1 mod n2, and sends e1, z1, e2, z2
to V.
4. V checks that d = e1+e2 mod 2t, zn1 = a1u1e1 mod n2 and zn2 = a2u2e2 mod n2,
and accepts if and only if this holds. Otherwise, the protocol halts.
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3.8 Conclusion
Multimedia content distribution through the Internet has become a popular
technology in today’s digital world. While it provides many advantages to both
customers and content providers, its main drawback is that it permits digital
content to be illegally redistributed by dishonest users. One of the adopted
strategies for deterring illegal redistribution of multimedia content is the buyer-
seller watermarking BSW protocols based on digital watermarking technology and
cryptography. A unique code is embedded into each copy of the distributed
content, linking that content to a particular user or device receiving it. If an
unauthorized content is found, the user who has redistributed the content can
be traced by detecting the watermark. In additional, buyer-seller watermarking
protocols provides copyright protection for the content providers, piracy tracing of
the unauthorized content, and privacy protection for the customers. The protocol
is anonymous when the identity of buyers is not revealed if they do not release
pirated copies.
In this chapter, we defined the fundamental requirements of such watermarking
protocols, proposed the constructions of three types of anonymous buyer-seller
watermarking (BSW) protocols based on homomorphic encryption and group
signatures. In contrast to earlier work, the proposed anonymous BSW protocols
fulfill the desired security properties simultaneously.
Primarily, the Type I BSW protocol extends and improves its predecessors and
ensures revocable anonymity for buyer and security for both buyer and seller.
Homomorphic encryptions facilitate operations such as watermark embedding in
the encrypted domain. Group signatures introduce piracy traceability, buyer’s
anonymity, and transactions unlinkability. Besides, anonymous communication
channels enable both anonymous outgoing connections and anonymous hidden
services. It also supports multiple transactions between buyers and sellers and
doesn’t require buyers to participate in the dispute resolution phase.
Moreover, the Type II BSW protocol improves the Type I BSW protocol for that
watermark generation and embedding scheme, such that each of buyer and seller
contributes a share of a secret composite watermark, however, none of them knows
the exact watermark embedded in the original content. This improvement insured
that the underlying watermarking scheme is not required to be linear or to tolerate
the permutation of watermarks to permutation tolerant or linear watermarks, such
that given a number of watermarked content Y1 and Y2, ϕ(Y ) (ϕ is a permutation
function) or aY1 + bY2 (a, b ∈ R) is another valid watermarked content. In our
protocol, we need functionality such that, given a vector of encrypted watermark
bits E [wi] and a content X, it is able to produce the encrypted and watermarked
content E [Y ]. Every watermarking scheme that is invisible and robust to counter
post image processing or malicious attacks that are possibly encountered later,
130 ANONYMOUS BUYER-SELLER WATERMARKING PROTOCOLS
and supports the above functionality can be used with our scheme. Possible
watermarking schemes include the spread-spectrum watermarking scheme, QIM,
DC-QIM and RDM algorithms.
Finally, the Type III BSW protocol further improves the Type I and Type II BSW
protocols by incorporating blind watermarking schemes, homomorphic encryp-
tions, group signature schemes and several zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge as
main cryptographic building blocks. Existing buyer-seller watermarking protocols
are not provided with a formal analysis of their security properties. We have
proposed a formal security definition for copyright protection protocols in the
ideal-world/real-world paradigm. Furthermore, we have analyzed the security of
an anonymous buyer-seller watermarking protocol and proven that it fulfills our
definition. In particular, we have shown that the protocol is secure against any
p.p.t. adversary when instantiated with a watermarking scheme, an encryption
scheme, a group signature scheme and zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge that
provide security against any p.p.t. adversary. Unlike the other building blocks, no
watermarking scheme has been proven to offer this security level, and thus the
actual security of the protocol against malicious buyers is lowered to the security
offered by the watermarking scheme.
Chapter 4
Privacy-Friendly Architecture
to Manage Distributed
E-Health Information
4.1 Introduction
Recent years have drawn increasing attention from both industry and research
communities towards the technological evolution of electronic health (e-Health)
systems. The goals of these systems are threefold. A first goal is to provide
ubiquitous access to lifelong clinical records of a patient to all relevant stakeholders,
including the patient, anytime, anywhere, on any device. A second goal is to
integrate and enrich the clinical, medical and operational knowledge to support
lifelong health guidance of citizens within a community, region, and country.
A third goal is to streamline the workflow into shared clinical and operational
pathways in order to enable disease management and optimally support the clinical
process. Combining these three goals facilitates inter-professional collaboration,
while guaranteeing the privacy of the patient.
The major technical challenges facing e-Health services are facilitating efficiency,
information retrieval and availability, and cross-context interoperability, without
compromising the patient’s privacy. The rapid aging of populations, combined
with pressure on budgets for healthcare delivery, and technological advances are
the driving forces behind these challenges. Hence, in the realm of e-Health,
security and privacy issues have a deep impact. Privacy refers to protect private
information, such as patient’s ID and sensitive medical information, of certain
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entities. Security techniques, such as access control mechanisms, are adopted in e-
Health systems to ensure that only involved and properly authorized parties have
access to sensitive data.
4.1.1 From Provider-Centric Towards User-Centric
Traditional e-Health solutions were mainly concerned with a limited view on the
patient information, taking a provider-centric approach, and mostly limited to a
single e-Health service provider. A paradigm shift is taking place in the e-Health
domain, which is evolving from provider-centric towards user-centric healthcare.
The adoption of user-centric and privacy-friendly identity and information
management systems can help to keep the number of parties who deal with a
person’s healthcare information as small as possible. For example, the circle
of trusted parties should not be extended or broken by moving from a paper-
world to an e-Health administration. A patient expects a trust relation with
medics, however, as in the past with a doctor’s secretary, the trust with a system
administrator may not be the same as with medics.
In provider-centric identity and information management systems, patient’s e-
Health data is hosted and managed by a service provider using a central repository.
This has various advantages from the service provider’s point of view, such as being
cost effective and easily scalable. The disadvantage is that by applying such an
approach, the user loses control over the use of personal information. The user
can regain this control with a user-centric identity and information management
(IDM) system.
In user-centric identity and information management systems, the user is put in
the center of interest and is given control over personal information. In particular,
this means that the user can influence or even specify the policies that must be
enforced when e-Health service providers wish to process his information. This
has the obvious advantage of better protecting the privacy of each individual user.
However, responsibility for storing and updating correct data then lies with the
user.
4.1.2 Towards Interoperable and Privacy-Friendly E-Health Ar-
chitecture
The Need for Interoperability
Interoperability and privacy protection have become important issues, especially
as more and more healthcare service providers start collaborating online, using a
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wide range of e-Health systems, certainly if they refer to the e-Health information
stored in each other’s systems.
Previous work mostly emphasizes the e-Health solutions from a single provider
viewpoint, and reveals an unsatisfactory provision for the interoperability and
privacy protection problem in cross-context IDM systems. This is why a
generic interoperable and privacy preserving identity and information management
framework is necessary, where each application domain may deploy a user-centric
IDM system, allowing the collaboration and interoperation of a multitude of
heterogeneous IDM systems.
In order to improve the quality of a patient’s experience, one important
requirement is the continuous and transparent availability of medical information,
independent of the location where the information has been actually stored.
Although a patient will typically visit different healthcare providers over time,
and hence the medical information will be dispersed over several locations, the
medical record of a patient should be available anytime and anywhere, in a location-
independent way. To this aim, healthcare providers, such as hospitals, general
practitioners, research laboratories, etc., should federate to share their e-Health
information.
Privacy Concerns
Personal medical data is of sensitive nature, and therefore several laws and
regulations mandate to protect the privacy of the patient, which is to be introduced
in Section 4.2. In contrast to traditional e-Health systems where full trust is
granted to service providers, a new trend for e-Health systems is to limit the
trust in service providers to protect patient privacy. In fact, the aforementioned
federation scenario presents two specific privacy threats, because it makes intensive
use of identity information. One privacy threat is that, for instance, in order to
retrieve all the necessary data relevant for the “treatment” of a patient, there must
be a mechanism to cross-reference medical documents across several healthcare
providers. That is, it should be possible to search and retrieve documents
from several locations on the basis of the patient identity. Naturally, access to
such documents is restricted by authorization rules, which, yet again, make an
intensive use of identity information about both the healthcare professionals and
the patients. Examples clarifying the role of identity in the authorization process
are provided in Section 4.3.2.
From a functional perspective, the simplest solution would be use of global
identifiers, such as national identification (ID) numbers, across different healthcare
providers, or ‘contexts’ from this point on. However, this is not a feasible strategy
for two reasons. First, healthcare providers would require maintaining control
over the process of issuing identifiers. This is mainly due to legacy constraints,
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as relevant legislation will be introduced in Section 4.2. Second, if medical data
sources would use global identifiers, the risk of the privacy threat of linkability, such
as massive data aggregation and profiling, would be much higher. An attacker that
got to know the content of two medical databases could be able to correlate the
data quite easily.
Instead of global identifiers, it is common practice for each healthcare provider to
issue a unique identifier for an entity, such as a patient. When context-specific
information is transferred from one context to another, the same information is
expressed by means of different types or values. Typically, healthcare providers
use different terms for the same entity, strictly relying on dictionaries may be very
misleading. Besides, all information exchanged between healthcare providers in an
e-Health system needs to be uniquely identified. Note that the above problem is a
cross-context issue when global identifiers should not be shared directly among
contexts, mainly due to legislation. Linking information from one context to
another should not be straightforward, hence the need for a privacy-friendly
but interoperable IDM system. Solutions to this problem will be explained in
Section 4.4.
Another privacy threat is that, for instance, when staff from one healthcare
provider (such as a generic hospital) retrieves a patient’s e-Health information
from another healthcare provider (such as a psychiatric hospital), to gain a
complete overview of the patient’s medical history. If we consider service providers
untrustworthy, it is obviously not privacy friendly for the patient, because excessive
personal e-Health information has been provided to the service provider. Therefore,
a technical enforcement is needed in order to facilitate a privacy enhancing sharing
of distributed e-Health information. This will be elaborated further in Section 4.5.
To accommodate these conflicting forces, namely the need of cross referencing
and sharing documents and the avoidance of the aforementioned privacy threats,
some solutions have been proposed that employ a mediating component, in
which a mapping of context-specific identifiers and a conversion of context-specific
information occurs when data is exchanged among different contexts. Local
identifiers are used within each context and the mediator provides translation
services from one context to another. However, if the mediator maintains the
translation information on board, such as in the form of a lookup table, it becomes
a likely target for attackers. An attacker could steal that information and use it
to perform the correlation mentioned above. State-of-the-art solutions in the e-
Health domain are vulnerable to such attack scenario.
4.1.3 Summary of Contributions
In this chapter, we introduce an interoperable and privacy friendly identity and
information management framework that builds on previous work [18, 25, 24], and
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on ongoing research [279, 39]. We instantiate this generic framework in the e-
Health domain, while taking the specificities of the healthcare sector into account.
These specificities include the ability to uniquely refer to a person across different
medical domains such as a hospital, general practitioner, clinical research lab
by means of unique identifiers or pseudonyms; the ability to allow a person to
specify which actors are allowed to use his personal data by means of rule-based
authorization; the ability to map information types and values used in one medical
domain onto those that are semantically equivalent in another domain; and the
ability to limit which information can be linked within and across medical domains.
In particular, we move towards this framework by defining a new model to
manage identifiers and translate context-specific (or domain-specific) to ensure
information interoperability, and introducing technical countermeasures to ensure
data minimization and privacy enhancement in e-Health. Specifically, this chapter
introduces a cryptographic algorithm to be used in issuing context-specific, hence
local, identifiers. Local identifiers are derived from a unique global identifier in
a reversible way. The algorithm is meant to be used by the identity providers
located at each healthcare provider. Further, for cross-context interoperability,
a state-less mediation service is presented. The mediation service leverages
the reversibility property of local identifiers and does not maintain any cross-
referencing information on board. Further, the entity that functions as the
mediator is not fixed and may vary. Moreover, we ensure that only the minimum
necessary patient’s personal information is provided to the authorized parties,
such that the data minimization principle is complied. This is accomplished
by introducing a data anonymization mechanism to obfuscate the sensitive part
according to the patient’s privacy preference. This user-centric architecture is able
to provide interoperability and privacy protection at the same time.
4.1.4 Publication Details
The work described in this chapter has been published as conference papers [118,
128], an international journal paper [120], and a book chapter [119].
4.1.5 Chapter Outline
In this chapter, legislation on privacy in e-Health and the use of national
identification numbers, and the previous work are briefly reviewed in Section 4.2.
The rest of the chapter outlines the e-Health user-centric architecture with
an introduction to its functional components in Section 4.3.1, followed by a
discussion of the relation between identity and authorization to access distributed
personal e-Health information in Section 4.3.2, an explanation of the proposed
interoperable and privacy enhancing identity and information management service,
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and a definition of the reversible algorithm to issue and convert context-specific
identifiers in Section 4.4. Next, how the proposed interoperable and privacy
preserving information management framework can be integrated in an e-Health
system is illustrated in Section 4.5, with an e-Health platform as a case study.
In particular, the motivating scenario, the system model and players, the attack
model and assumptions are defined. Services of each entity, the command flow
for a service request, and the protocol with the proposed scenario are discussed
accordingly in Section 4.5.3. Finally, a conclusion is provided in Section 4.6.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Legislation and Standards
Medical data is of sensitive nature, and therefore several laws and regulations
mandate to protect the privacy of the patient.
In 2006 the United States Department of Health and Human Service Health
issued the Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [16]. This is a
regulation in healthcare to demand the protection of patients data shared from its
original source of collection. Since 1995 the processing and movement of personal
data is legally regulated by the EU with the Directive 95/46/EC [140]. A citizen’s
right of privacy is also recognized in the Article 8 [135] of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
The debate surrounding the usage of single national identification numbers has
longstanding historical roots. EU countries have sought to regulate their national
number(s) in a variety of ways. Art. 8.7 of Directive 95/46/EC [140] provides
that “Member States shall determine the conditions under which a national
identification number or any other identifier of general application may be
processed”, indicating that governments should carefully consider how they allow
national numbers to be used. Regardless of how national identification numbers
are regulated in each respective State, they constitute “personal data” by nature
that fall under the meaning of Directive 95/46. Art. 16 and 17 of the Directive
that impose upon the controller a general confidentiality and security obligation,
including the obligation for the controller to take all reasonable measures “to
prevent all other unlawful forms of processing” (Art. 17). Regardless of the possible
perception that this might lead to massive data aggregation and profiling by the
government, on the value of which we would not make judgments, it is manifestly
clear that the national number is not intended for use outside the governmental
context.
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4.2.2 Related Work
A number of user-centric identity management systems developed over the past
years include Shibboleth [11, 263], Liberty Alliance [17, 27], U-Prove [252] and
CardSpace [22], OpenID [226], Higgins Project [162], and Idemix [26, 85].
In the literature, there were some schemes proposed for e-Health utilizing a user-
centric approach. Peyton et al. [236] used a simple ePrescription scenario to
analyze the business and technical issues to be addressed in a Liberty Alliance-
based federated identity management framework for e-Health. They look at
the potential impact of privacy compliance on three existing components of the
framework, namely, Discovery Service, Identity Mapping Service and Interaction
Service. A fourth component Audit Service is proposed to address potential
privacy breaches in Liberty Alliance. Au and Croll [57] proposed a new framework
for a consumer-centric identity management for distributed e-Health. The
healthcare consumer maintains a pool of pseudonym identifiers in their personal
secure device for use in different healthcare services, perhaps in the form of
a smart card. Without revealing consumer identity, health record data from
different medical databases distributed in various points of clinical service can
be collected and linked together on demand. In particular, pseudonym identifiers
are cryptographically generated by a trustee, and the binding of an identifier to the
identity key or another identifier is certified by a Key Binding Certificate issued
by the trustee. Hence, security of the interactions among different entities in the
architecture is guaranteed by certification and cryptographic technologies.
Some results have been published on privacy protection and secondary use issues
of EHR (Electronic Health Record). Iacono et al. [164] discussed the importance
of protecting the privacy of patient data kept in an EHR in cases where it
leaves the control- and protection-sphere of the health care realm for secondary
uses such as clinical or epidemiological research projects, health care research,
assessment of treatment quality or economic assessments. The work focuses on
multi-centric studies, where various data sources are linked together using Grid
technologies. It introduces a pseudonymization system which enables multi-centric
universal pseudonymization, meaning that a patient’s identity will result in the
same pseudonym, regardless of which participating study center the patient data
is collected. Pommerening and Reng [244] addressed the issue of secondary uses of
EHR, such as health economy and health care research, or disease specific clinical
or epidemiological research. For these uses in general, the patient identity must be
anonymized or pseudonymized. Their work describes possible model architectures,
developed for medical research networks, but useful in broader contexts.
In Europe, there were several research projects on privacy and cross-border identity
management. The concept of context-specific identifiers was introduced in the
Modinis Study on Identity Management [18], which was an EU funded research
project which focused interoperability aspects of identity management systems
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used in the EU Member States. It aims was to build on expertise and initiatives
in the EU Member States to progress towards a coherent approach in electronic
identity management in eGovernment in the European Union. The study addresses
interoperability issues in cross-context IDM in eGovernment, without ignoring
differences in legal and cultural practices within the EU framework for data
protection. GUIDE [15] was also an EU funded project aiming the creation of
an architecture that will enable open and interoperable eGovernment electronic
identity services in the EU. Its objective concerns interoperability across national
systems and structures within broader transnational, policy, legislative, and socio-
economic boundaries. The PRIME [28] project looked at the applicability issues
of using the federated identity management system Idemix open source initiative
and digital credentials in detail. The main contribution of this European research
project is a broader understanding of the dependencies between the different
components in such a system. These dependencies are reflected by both an identity
management architecture and an integrated prototype. The PrimeLife [249]
project builds upon and expands the foundation of the PRIME [28] project that
has shown privacy technologies can enable citizens to execute their legal rights
to control personal information in on-line transactions. PrimeLife resolves the
core privacy and trust issues pertaining to two new privacy challenges: A first
technical challenge is how to protect privacy in emerging Internet applications such
as collaborative scenarios and virtual communities. A second challenge is how to
maintain life-long privacy. To resolve these issues, PrimeLife aims substantially
advance the state of the art in the areas of human computer interfaces, configurable
policy languages, web service federations, infrastructures and privacy-enhancing
cryptography. FIDIS [32] was a EU-sponsored Network of Excellence targeting
various aspects of digital identity and privacy. FIDIS areas of interest includes new
forms of ID cards, usage of identifiers in information systems, technologies used for
citizen’s identification and profiling. Research projects in Belgium, such as Identity
Management for eGovernment [25], focus on the identity management aspects that
are relevant in an heterogeneous eGovernment context and compare the different
governments in Flanders, Brussels, and Wallonia that have to interoperate with the
Federal services. The European TAS3 [279] Project aims to provide an integrated
and context independent trusted services network that advances the current state
of the art of isolated and context-dependent solutions, such as for developing
service user-centric tools and programs related to e-Health. The goal is to provide
a transparent framework in which process-based services can securely process
and depend on personal information, regardless from the context in which this
information was collected.
There are some governmental or industrial partners in Belgium active in the related
fields of IDM or e-Health. The Crossroads Bank for Social Security [19] is active in
the field of IDM of eGovernment in the social sector. This organization provides
technical solutions to function as a mediator for cross-context communications
among different sectors, and proposed an algorithm to issue one-way only context-
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specific identifiers. Custodix [23] is a company active in the e-Health sector.
Generally, Custodix is a Trusted Third Party that provides security solutions
based on privacy enhancing techniques at international level. The services lay
special emphasis on anonymization and pseudonymization.
4.3 Preliminaries
4.3.1 An E-Health Infrastructure
Classic community healthcare systems utilize an e-Portal functionality to provide
a many-to-one connection between many GPs (general practitioners) and one
hospital, based on propriety solutions. The disadvantages of this approach
are twofold. First, it is impossible to interconnect different entities, such as
hospitals. Second, one GP needs multiple portals to access patient data in different
hospitals. As an improvement, a centralized infrastructure is enabled in community
healthcare. Note that this does not need to imply that data physically resides in a
central data store. The advantage of this approach is that users gain a consolidated
overview on the clinical data of the patient, to which clinical research institutes
and healthcare providers can interconnect.
To illustrate the concept, we present in this section an e-Health architecture
developed in the E-Health Information Platforms (EHIP) project [24], which has
been completed successfully in Flanders, Belgium, to create a clinical data sharing
infrastructure among multiple healthcare providers. The e-Health information
platform is designed with information, such as patient e-Health records, always
available and accessible only to authorized actors, at the time and place it is
required. Several key players in the healthcare section, including leading sector
companies, several university research groups and large hospitals, have contributed
to ensure that the research outcome is valid within a genuine context. In addition,
a lifetime view is projected, which will be instrumental in guiding the transition
in healthcare systems from provider-centric towards patient-centric.
The e-Health infrastructure aims to promote community healthcare and inter-
national standards on different fora. It provides a horizontal infrastructure
for e-Health applications compatible with international standards of Cross-
Enterprise Document Sharing [21] by Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise [33]
and technologies such as Web 2.0 to be used in web-based portals [12, 245],
which are interoperable within the Belgian e-Health digital platform Be-Health [13]
infrastructure and hospital IT systems, with respect to security and privacy. On
the other hand, it provides a vertical application-based prototype for hospitals
and GPs to share a patient’s Electronic Health Record (EHR), such as medical
summary, clinical results and patient discharge letters.
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Take in Figure 4.1 for the functional components of the e-Health platform. Based
on a Service Oriented Architecture, where each subsystem exposes its functionality
through a service interface, it utilizes a central document registry to contain
the metadata of all available documents, and distributed document stores, where
medical documents are stored in local repositories of the corresponding healthcare
providers. This e-Health platform also contains a gateway to support healthcare
providers with limited resources, such as small practices that cannot afford a
repository. Further, the platform provides Internet-enabled access to the resources
through a web portal, which facilitates actions such as accessing the platform after-
hours. Documents in the platform share a common content model as Clinical
Document Architecture [20], such that all parties, despite their heterogeneous
internal systems, gain easy access. The architecture employs federated security,
in which security is embedded in middleware. Federated policy enforcement
at hospitals and GPs surgeries with a central policy management are deployed
for access control, i.e., authentication and authorization, in compliance with the
EU data protection directive. According to Cross Enterprise Document Sharing
(XDS [21]), the EHR security is covered by the following Integration Profiles: the
Audit Trail and Node Authentication Profile to provide audit trail and the Cross
Enterprise User Authentication Profile to provide a federated identity management
framework based on SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) that enables
Single Sign-On functionality across multiple enterprises [21]. A security enhanced
software architecture with an analysis of potential security risks in the e-Health
infrastructure has been proposed by Wuyts et al. [293].
4.3.2 Roles of Identity in Distributed E-health Network
It is well known that identification plays a key role in supporting authorization.
From the study of typical authorization rules we realized that such role is even more
fundamental in a distributed e-Health network. The e-Health platform described
in Section 4.3.1 is a communication infrastructure that allows many healthcare
providers to collaborate by sharing the medical information they produce. In
collaboration with clinical partners, we have elicited and analyzed the low level
policy rules used in a real hospital setting. Consequently, we have extracted the
authorization rule types that are relevant in the federated case.
Roles have been adopted in the past as the cornerstone technique to manage
permissions in e-Health, e.g., in the context of the UK National Health
Service [219]. In fact, we observed that roles are less central than expected in
deciding whether an access request to medical information should be granted
or not. Rather, we discovered that existing relationships between patients and
GPs, besides other context-dependent parameters, such as time and location,
are of primary importance in the authorization process. Hence, establishing the
identity of involved parties is often a primary pre-requisite to authorization. In the
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Figure 4.1. Bird-view of the e-Health infrastructure
remaining of this section we illustrate some typical policy rule types and highlight
the identity-related information that is important for the decision process.
Rule-Based Authorization in Distributed E-Health Network
This section describes some generic authorization rules, each requiring the
establishment of the identity of a specific patient in order to be enforced. Identity is
typically used to verify the presence of a certain relationship between the patient
and the GP requesting access to the patient data. Each rule type is described
according to the same template: first we give a general description of the rule
type, then we provide one example of a possible instantiation, and finally we
provide a detailed explanation of the rule with particular focus on the role played
by identity.
1) Patient-GP treatment relationship
Rule: GPs who treat a patient, either as supervisor or executing GP, are granted
access to patient data related to that treatment.
Example: A screening center has access to the mammographic pictures of the
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radiology center to perform a reading, because the screening center is implicitly
treating the patient.
This policy provides an example of the treatment relationship, which is the relation
between a patient and the GPs who are dealing with the patient during a treatment
process. This relationship can be explicit or implicit. In an explicit relationship
the treating GP is explicitly assigned, for instance by name, to the patient. Note
that there is a clear relationship, as seen by both the GP and the patient. The
implicit relationship is illustrated by the example, where the radiologist from the
screening center is implicitly assigned to the patient by performing his function
and can be considered as part of the treating process of the patient. Note that
there is no direct relationship between the patient and the radiologist.
The policy will grant access to the patient data if a relationship exists, and will
deny access if no relationship has been established. To decide whether or not
a relationship exists, the identity of both the requester, such as a GP, and the
patient must be established. Note that in a cross-context access request, identities
are expressed in the ‘vocabulary’ of the requester, i.e., using identifiers that are
local to the requester’s context, which may not be meaningful to the authorization
service of the context where the requested data belongs to.
2) Patient-department relationship
Rule: A GP is granted view access to the patient’s data, if the patient resides or
resided less than two weeks ago in a department to which the GP is assigned to.
Example: When a patient is transferred between hospitals, the GP of the hospital
where the patient resided less than two weeks ago, can also access relevant data
of the patient from the other hospital.
For this policy, the patient history has to be taken into account. The transfer of the
patient between departments, or more in general, between healthcare institutions,
needs to be tracked. The time the patient has spent in the hospital has to be
considered as well. This policy is clearly related to the treatment relationship case.
However, in this case, GPs no longer holding a current treatment relationship, can
still access the patient’s data.
3) GP-department relationship
Rule: A specific GP can view patient data that originated within one of the
departments the GP is assigned to.
Example: A GP can remotely access data of the patient via a web portal if the
data was created by the GP’s department.
This policy is enforced by establishing the GP’s affiliation. The example described
above is rather narrow. This could be extended to data within the same discipline,
spread over several healthcare institutions, instead of just within one department.
Obviously, this rule requires that the patient-department relationship is verified,
as in the previous case.
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4) GP-patient relationship
Rule: A general practitioner (GP) retains the access to the medical reports
concerning the patient as long as she remains registered as the patient’s GP.
Example: A GP can always access medical reports of all of her patients.
A GP needs specialized rules, in contrast with other healthcare providers, because
a GP does not belong to a healthcare institution. Therefore, the GP will not be
granted access on the basis of a treatment relationship or because she belongs to
a certain department. Rather, access decisions are only based on the long-lasting
relationship with the patient.
5) Identity in obligations
Rule: A GP can overrule an access denial, provided that a detailed reason is
specified. The system is obliged to log the identity, the reason, the access time,
and the accessed resources.
Example: Before a surgical operation, an anesthetist does not automatically get
access to the information about the allergies of a patient, because at that time the
patient is not yet admitted, so the anesthetist is not a treating GP. An anesthetist
can overrule the denial in order to better prepare for the operation. Overruled
access is logged.
It is a strong requirement from the regulatory perspective to establish the identity
of the GP who overruled the decision of the authorization service, and the identity
of the patient for which such overruling took place. Therefore, policies exist
describing what and how to log and they all require that the individual’s identity
is traced for auditing and possible legal reasons.
Identity and Authorization
An interesting result of this study is that role-based access control does not suffice
in the distributed e-Health scenario. This section has identified several cases where
verifying identity, rather than role-related credentials, is a pre-requisite to the
enforcement of cross-context e-Health authorization rules. Further, in real world
scenarios there are many, often complex, exceptions to the baseline rules described
above, such as the following one: “no access to application X except for personnel
of unit 500, for department PNE, LOG, PSY, unless they are assistants in training
or if they have user-ID ABC or XYZ.” This shows that identifiers play a key role
in these cases.
In summary, the policies described above have illustrated that establishing
identifiers is necessary to enforce authorization rules, which involve:
• current and historical treatment relationships: identities are used to evaluate
the access rights of the GP on a need-to-know basis;
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• visit history of the patient: identities are used to verify the relationship with
a department, a discipline, and so on;
• long-lasting relationships: such as contractual relationships between patients
and the GPs;
• exceptions: identities are directly referenced in the rules;
• auditing: identification is required by policy.
4.4 Proposed Architecture
In this section, we introduce an interoperable and privacy preserving architecture
for identity and information management in e-Health. In general, there are two
types of identifiers in the e-Health system: a global identifier of a patient, e.g.,
the national identification number, and context-specific identifiers. The context-
specific identifiers in the system are used to locally identify a patient and the
patient’s medical record within a specific context, e.g., a healthcare provider.
4.4.1 Basic Concept
As mentioned in previous sections, all healthcare providers may have heterogeneous
internal systems, and each healthcare provider typically issues its own unique
context-specific identifier to patient as well as to the patient’s medical record, that
will be stored in the local repository of the corresponding healthcare provider. This
means, the one patient will be issued different identifiers from different healthcare
providers, similarly the patient’s medical records stored in different healthcare
providers will be assigned with different document identifiers. According to the
legal restrictions explained in Section 4.2, it is not advised to share the patient’s
global identifier among contexts for privacy protection reasons.
We now attempt to expand the notion to multiple contexts interacting and com-
municating with each other. One complication that occurs is that administrations
need to exchange information coming from different contexts. For example, one
healthcare provider tries to query the medical record concerning a patient from
another healthcare provider, such that context-specific information is exchanged
from one context to another. Further, the personal information exchanged needs to
be uniquely identified, but the same identifier should not be shared among contexts.
Whenever information is exchanged between different contexts a mapping and
conversion of identifiers is required. In order to exchange information between
contexts, an identifier mapping and conversion is performed by a trusted party
which is available for each context [18]. Since linkability of information from
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one context to another is desirable but not yet feasible, a manageable system for
information interoperability is required. Therefore, or goal is to provide a cross-
context, and hence interoperable, and yet privacy-friendly system, compatible
with all the internal systems employed by the entities in the e-Health platform,
to translate and convert context-specific information and identifiers used and
exchanged between the concerned entities.
Figure 4.2 depicts a structure to facilitate cross-context information sharing
in e-Health. An administrative organization of a healthcare provider can be
separated as front and back offices. The front office is connected with portals
and local repositories. It directly interacts with its users, while the back office
provides services for system support, such as identity management, authentication,
authorization, information sharing, and auditing. The identity provider from
the back office issues context-specific identifiers to its patients. Each healthcare
provider is responsible for the issuance and use of context-specific identifiers
within its context. Accordingly, one healthcare provider cannot prevent another
healthcare provider from issuing context-specific identifiers for its patients within
a particular context. When healthcare providers communicate, information can
be exchanged through a mediating service provided by the e-Health platform.
The mediating service, that is to say a trusted party available for each context,
is responsible for mapping and converting context-specific information, such as
identifiers, exchanged between the communicating parties. Note that here we
not focus on how information is exchanged exactly, since it depends on semantic
models and application or communication-specific scenarios. Instead, the contexts
and entities involved in this communication are explored. In later sections, we
explain how context-specific information can be converted and exchanged between
contexts within a real-life scenario.
As shown in Figure 4.3, the abstract structure of the cross-context interoperable
and privacy enhancing identity and information management system can be
presented as an inter-connected solar system. In e-Health, node A, B, E,
etc. denote back offices in healthcare providers. For instance, these can be
the central server of a hospital, or a gateway connecting various portals of
different departments of a hospital. When communicating cross-context between
a healthcare service provider and a service requester, context-specific identifiers
mapping and context-specific information conversion will be performed by a
trustworthy agent called mediator, as denoted by node C, D, and G.
In the following sections, we introduce a reversible algorithm to issue and convert
context-specific identifiers.
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Figure 4.2. Cross-context information exchange in the e-Health infrastructure
Figure 4.3. An abstract structure of an interoperable and privacy-friendly
information management system with context-specific information conversion
4.4.2 Algorithms for Context-Specific Identifier Issuance
The algorithm to issue a context-specific identifier is run by the mediator in each
context.
Definition 2. Anon is a deterministic algorithm to issue a context-specific
identifier. The algorithm’s public inputs are the global identifier of an objective
entity Gid of fixed-length, and a context-specific reference Ref of variable length.
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The private inputs are two symmetric secret keys Ke and Kh, for the pseudo-
random function and the symmetric encryption function, respectively. The
algorithm provides a fixed length context-specific identifier as:
Prefix = MACKh(Ref ),
Anon(Gid,Ref ,Ke,Kh) = EKe
(
MACKh(Ref )∥Gid
)
,
= EKe(Prefix∥Gid).
Take in Figure 4.4 for the construction of the context-specific identifier issuance
algorithm. The context-specific reference of any length is the input to a pseudo-
random function with a secret key, such as using a Message Authentication Code
(MAC). For instance, with HMAC-SHA256, it results in a 256-bit message digest
as a prefix. Then the prefix is concatenated to the global identifier, and encrypted
using a symmetric encryption algorithm with a second secret key, such as AES in
CBC mode [107]. The output is the context-specific identifier. Note that the secret
keys (Ke,Kh) for encryption and pseudo-random function should be different.
Figure 4.4. Algorithm to issue context-specific identifiers from the subject’s
global identifier
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4.4.3 Algorithm for Context-Specific Identifier Conversion
The algorithm to extract the global identifier from a context-specific identifier is
run by the mediator in each context.
Definition 3. Deanon is a deterministic algorithm to extract a context-specific
identifier from the objective entity’s global identifier. The algorithm’s public inputs
are the context-specific identifier Aid, and the private input is the symmetric secret
key Ke, for the symmetric decryption function. The algorithm provides a fixed-
length global identifier as:
Deanon(Aid,Ke) = [DKe(Aid)]LSBn .
Note that the symbol [X]LSBn refers to the extraction of the n least significant bits
of X, as these correspond with the bits holding the global identifier.
Take in Figure 4.5 for the construction of the reverse process to convert a context-
specific identifier from the global identifier. The context-specific identifier Aid is
the input to a symmetric decryption algorithm, controlled by the secret key Ke.
The result is the prefix concatenated with the global identifier Gid. The prefix is
easily removed allowing the global identifier to be recovered.
Figure 4.5. Algorithm to convert a context-specific identifier back to the
subject’s global identifier
4.5 Integration to the E-Health Infrastructure
In this section, we explain how context-specific identifiers can be converted and
exchanged across-context in the e-Health platform, using a real-life scenario.
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Consider the following scenario: suppose in the e-Health network, a medical staff
in a generic hospital H1 intends to query a medical record of a patient X from a
psychiatric hospital H2, through the e-Health registry Y.
4.5.1 System model
With each entity denoting a context (i.e., an environment), we consider the scenario
consists of the following entities:
1. Healthcare provider H1 is a generic hospital context, whose back office
contains a file repository FR1, a patient ID provider PIP1, a document ID
provider DIP1, and a document anonymizer DA1.
2. Healthcare provider H2 is a psychiatric hospital context, whose back office
contains a file repository FR2, a patient ID provider PIP2, a document ID
provider DIP2, and a document anonymizer DA2.
3. Patient X is a subject that requests healthcare services from a healthcare
provider and the holder of an electronic health record (EHR) DocX j . Let Gid
denote X ’s global identifier, e.g., the patient’s national number. Let PidX j
denote X ’s context-specific identifier in a context j, namely a pseudonym
assigned by the patient ID provider PIPj of the healthcare provider Hj .
DidX j denotes X ’s electronic health record DocX j ’s document ID, namely
a pseudonym assigned by the document ID provider DIPj to be used in the
healthcare provider context Hj .
4. E-Health Registry Y is a central registry that maintains a link between a
patient’s global ID and the locations of each healthcare provider that stores
the patient’s medical record.
4.5.2 Attack model and assumptions
In the aforementioned scenario, trust to the healthcare provider H1 and the e-
Health network service provider (such as the system administrative staff) are
limited. Therefore, an attacker to the system can be located inside any healthcare
provider or from the system support staff. That is Eve, as the attacker, can be
either internal to the e-Health network, or external. An internal attacker can either
be an authorized or unauthorized recipient of the e-Health system services. We
assume all the external attackers outside the e-Health network are unauthenticated
and unauthorized entities to the system.
Eve’s objective is to obtain any private information from a particular patient.
In particular, Eve tries to obtain either the patient’s global ID or the patient’s
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sensitive medical information from the psychiatric hospital H2. In order to do so,
Eve has several options: first, she tries to request the patient’s global identifier
from the identity providers of each healthcare provider or the central registry.
Then, Eve tries to request the sensitive medical data directly from the hospital
H2. Afterwards, Eve tries to steal the secret keys of any identity provider or the
document anonymizer in the system, in order to access the sensitive data. In
addition, Eve tries to break into the system. Finally, she could try to eavesdrop
the communication channel to obtain the desired content.
The following assumptions hold for the proposed system. All entities that have
been authenticated and authorized by the system are assumed trustworthy. The
system is not protected against malicious entities that are able to authenticate
themselves and who are authorized to use the system’s services. We assume that
all security-enhancing functionalities employed in the system are robust and well-
deployed. All secret keys of the entities in the system are stored physically secure.
The communication takes place through a secure (i.e., privacy and authenticated)
communication channel.
4.5.3 Proposed Approach
Services provided by each entity
Consider in a hospital Hj , let KP j denote the secret key of the patient ID provider
PIPj , and let KDj denote the secret key of the document ID provider DIPj . The
ID providers PIPj and DIPj are able to provide the IDIssue and the IDConvert
services. Let KDocj denote the secret key of the document anonymizer DAj .
DAj is able to provide the DocAnon and the DocDeanon services. Both Hj ’s file
repository FRj and the e-Health central registry Y can provide the Query service.
Each kind of service is described as follows:
1. IDIssue: is a service to issue context-specific identifiers. Let K = {Ke,Kh},
then,
Aid = IDIssue(Gid,Ref ,K) = Anon(Gid,Ref ,K).
2. IDConvert: is a service to convert context-specific identifiers back to the
global ID.
Gid = IDConvert(Aid,K) = Deanon(Aid,Ke).
3. DocAnon: is a service to pseudonymize part of a documentDoc by encryption,
which contains sensitive medical information. In other words, this is a data
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anonymization algorithm to obfuscate the sensitive part, according to the
patient’s privacy preference or privacy policies.
ADoc = DocAnon(Doc,K) = EKe(Doc).
4. DocDeanon: is an algorithm to convert a pseudonymized document back to
the non-pseudonymized version by decryption.
Doc = DocDeanon(ADoc,K) = DKe(ADoc).
5. Query: is a database query service with the input of some attributes and
the output of some other attributes from the database.
Proposed approach to request a service
As depicted in Figure 4.6, each time before a service is delivered to a service
requester from a service provider, first of all, the service requester needs to be
authenticated and authorized.
1. A service requester sends a service request to a service provider.
2. The service provider forwards the request to its security facade to check the
requester.
3. The security facade checks the requester’s authenticity and authorization.
4. If the checks are passed, the security facade informs the service provider to
deliver the required service. Otherwise, the service delivery is denied.
5. The service provider delivers the service to the service requester.
Protocol of the proposed scenario
Figure 4.7 presents the protocol of the scenario that a Hospital H1 queries a
medical record of a patient X from Hospital H2 through the registry Y in the
e-Health network. Note that Y serves as the mediator for the cross-context
communication between H1 and H2, while interacting with the ID providers of the
two contexts and performing context-specific identifier issuance and conversion.
Take in Figure 4.8. Information is transferred cross-context in the following steps:
1. H1 queries Y with the context-specific patient ID PidX 1 of a patient X .
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Figure 4.6. Check service request commands flow
Figure 4.7. The protocol of the scenario of cross-context sharing of an electronics
health document in the e-Health infrastructure
2. Y requests the IDConvert service with PidX 1 from H1’s patient ID provider
PIP1, in order to receive the global ID GidX of X .
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3. After the authentication and authorization check of Y by H1, PIP1 runs
IDConvert(PidX 1,KP 1) and delivers the result GidX to the registry Y.
4. Y queries its database Reg to retrieve the corresponding location of the
hospital where X ’s medical record is stored Loc(H2) ← Query(GidX ,Reg),
assuming that the document is at H2.
5. Y requests the IDIssue service from H2’s document ID provider DIP2 with
GidX .
6. After the authentication and authorization check of Y, DIP2 provides Y
the context-specific document ID of X ’s medical record stored in H2 by
performing DidX 2 ← IDIssue(GidX ,KD2).
7. Y sends DidX 2 and H2’s location information Loc(H2) to H1.
8. H1 sends a query to H2 with DidX 2.
9. H2 queries its file repository FR2’s database TabH2 and retrieves X ’s medical
record DocA2, DocX 2 ← Query(DidX 2,TabH2 ).
10. H2 requests the DocAnon service from its document anonymizer DA2 for an
anonymized version of DocX 2.
11. After the authentication and authorization check, DA2 performs the
document pseudonymization AnonDocX 2 ← DocAnon(DocX 2,KDoc2), and
obtains a pseudonymized health document ADocX 2.
12. H2 delivers the pseudonymized health document ADocX 2 to H1 through a
secure channel.
4.5.4 Security Discussion
In this section, we analyze security of the proposed solution, in correspondence
to the attack models. We will show, under the predefined assumptions, those
potential threats described in Section 4.5.2 cannot be performed successfully in our
proposed protocol setting. First of all, it is important to recall two assumptions.
Primarily, all entities that are authenticated and authorized to obtain a certain
service from a service provider are trustworthy, and vice versa. Additionally, any
entity that fails to pass a service provider’s authentication or authorization check
should not obtain the corresponding service.
As explained above, it is obvious that the proposed architecture cannot be
protected against a malicious entity who has been checked as an authenticated
and authorized party. Considering the attacker Eve as an unauthenticated or
154 PRIVACY-FRIENDLY ARCHITECTURE TO MANAGE DISTRIBUTED E-HEALTH INFORMATION
Figure 4.8. The command flow in the scenario of the cross-context document
sharing in the e-Health infrastructure
unauthorized entity, we examine the five misuse cases that Eve may perform. In the
first and the second misuse cases, Eve tries to request the patient’s global identifier
with the IDConvert service from any of the healthcare provider’s identity providers
or from the central registry. Or, she tries to request the sensitive medical data
directly from the hospital H2. However, neither case is possible, because in order
to receive the service, Eve has to pass the authentication and authorization check
by the service providers. The third attack Eve may perform is to attempt to steal
the secret keys of any identity providers or the document anonymizer in the system,
such that she could perform the IDConvert service or the DocDeanon service to
obtain the desired information. This is infeasible for Eve, since we assume all
secret keys of the entities in the system are stored securely. In the next misuse
case, Eve may try to hack the system and breakdown the security. This option is
not feasible either, because all the security-enhancing functionalities employed in
the system are assumed to be robust and well-deployed in the proposed system.
If Eve fails to perform all the above attacks, Eve can still try to eavesdrop on
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the communication content. However, presumably, the communication is taking
place through a secure communication channel with client-side and server-side
authentication.
Due to space limitations, a formal proof of security of the proposed scheme will
not be provided in this chapter. As future work, for instance, one could prove that
the security of the proposed system depends on the security of the secret key, the
security of the communication channel, and the security of the underlying system
security infrastructure, such as the security of the authentication and authorization
mechanisms.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented an interoperable and privacy friendly architecture
to manage the sharing of distributed personal e-health information. Previous
e-Health solution mainly have a limited view on patient information, where a
provider-centric approach usually was restricted to a single healthcare provider.
Interoperability and privacy protection in the healthcare systems become more
problematic in an e-Health infrastructure when more actors collaborate, such as
hospitals, GPs, clinical research labs, pharmacists and so on. In particular, the
protection of a patient’s identity information and the patient’s sensitive health
data against unauthorized entities are the two main privacy concerns. However,
the issues of interoperability and privacy protection have not been addressed in
the state of the art. In this chapter, we proposed the technical enforcements to
countermeasure these threats.
In the proposed setting, each patient is issued with a different and unique
context-specific identifier by each healthcare provider. In communications across
different healthcare providers (or contexts), the same information can be expressed
by means of different types or values. Since patient’s identity is not shared
between contexts directly, linkability from one context to another should not be
straightforward. To accommodate these conflicting forces, namely on one hand
to protect patient’s ID and personal e-Health information against unauthorized
parties (even those within healthcare providers), and on the other hand to facilitate
the possibility to follow-up a patient’s medical treatment history by authorized
parties, we introduce the concept of the mediating service to map and convert
context-specific identifiers or information, when data is exchanged among different
authorized healthcare providers. Further, we ensure that only the minimum
necessary patient’s personal information is provided to the authorized parties,
such that the data minimization principle is complied. This is accomplished
by introducing a data anonymization mechanism to obfuscate the sensitive part
according to the patient’s privacy preference. This user-centric approach is able
to satisfy both interoperability and privacy protection.
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At the algorithm level, we proposed an algorithm for issuing and converting
context-specific identifiers, based on cryptographic techniques. As an illustration
of the concept, we presented the e-Health architecture with a real-life use case
scenario to explain how the proposed architecture can be integrated in the e-Health
platform.
Chapter 5
Personal Rights Management
for Individual Privacy
Enforcement
5.1 Introduction
Over the last years, privacy protection has become a major issue, and both the
European Union and the US are investing significantly into research on this area.
However, almost all of the current work assumes an asymmetric model; the privacy
violator is a corporate or governmental institution (or at least an employee thereof),
while the victim is a normal citizen. Correspondingly, the main research areas
cover issues such as identity management, policy enforcement, and anonymous
communication. In the last years, however, a new privacy threat has emerged
that cannot be addressed by such means. Due to improvements as well as the
growing distribution of various handhold devices, an increasing number of people
are equipped with miniature cameras (in their mobile phones) and voice recorders
(in their music players).
Until the 1990s, public distribution of images could only happen in the press,
either in print or in electronic broadcast media. To challenge the unauthorized
distribution of an individual’s image, a media company could be identified and
contacted. Furthermore, the media company usually would know who the
photographer was.
With the advent of the Internet as a public communication platform, fast and
global distribution of images in public with web pages became common means.
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Scanned photos then were available from an unknown number of private web
pages. The availability of digital cameras reduced the cost and shortened the time
it took to put images online. However, due to the physical dimension pointing a
digital camera at a person can still be noticed in many situations.
In recent years, camera-phones were introduced. The build-in camera lens on a
mobile phone can hardly be recognized, which brings the possibility that anyone
who holds a camera-phone in an individual’s surroundings could be taking a photo
of the individual without being noticed. The individual won’t be able to see a
camera while being photographed or filmed, and won’t know whether his images
are put on the web or not.
With massive numbers of camera-phones out in the public, photos can be taken at
any place. News stories about offenders being caught while shooting photos under
women’s dresses in public are available from the United States, Japan, Great
Britain, Malaysia or even Saudi Arabia. Web sites like voyeurweb.com have been
around longer than digital camera phones even exist to commercially distribute the
content. While this intrusive and offensive use of cameras is regarded as illegal in
many places in the world, other uses seem to create benefits for society – other news
stories tell of offenders being identified thanks to camera-phone photos taken by
bystanders of a crime. Considering the favorable uses of camera-phones in public,
a solution that does detect, but not prevent from taking photos in public places
may seem appropriate.
It has already shown to be a significant problem. At some beaches and in various
companies, camera-phones are completely banned, and a number of countries have
significantly increased the penalty for illegally taken pictures. Unfortunately, these
countermeasures are by far not sufficient, as a growing number of web sites boasting
such pictures demonstrates. As it is impossible and unwanted to enforce a broad
ban on camera-phones, and technical measures such as a simulated shutter noise
when a picture is taken appear to be insufficient, we propose a novel way to
complement such measures.
This chapter deals with the challenge of protecting one’s private data, such as
image, and privacy issues attached to it. With respect to new mobile technologies
and distribution channels, we sketch a privacy threat posed by millions of privately
owned cameras in mobile phones.
Instead of preventing the picture from being taken, or call attention on the
photographer when he takes the picture, we attack the distribution channel: if
an inappropriate picture of an individual is taken and published, the victim has a
fair chance of being the first one to actually find this picture, which enables her
to request the pictures removal or invoke legal actions before significant privacy
violation is done. The authors are aware that in extreme cases it will be impossible
to remove a picture from the Internet by legal means. However, we expect that
most of the privacy violations we address occur in a context where the publisher
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could be convinced to remove the offending material without legal escalation. To
achieve this, we propose that each picture receives an identity, which is contained
in the picture and broadcasted to the victim that is photographed. Although
this approach may be insufficient against a highly dedicated attacker, it can
help to prevent privacy violations from becoming a mass phenomenon, without
inhibiting the use of camera-phones, motivating users to manipulate their devices,
or significantly increasing the costs of the devices.
5.1.1 Examples of legal context
Because of the fast growth of Internet new technologies as well as the incompatible
policies between the different countries, in this context privacy issues are complex.
From a technical perspective, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament
and the Council of 24 October 1995 [140] describes the protection of individuals
regarding the processing and free movement of their personal data.
The right to privacy in the EU is defined as a human right under Article 8 of the
1950 European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).
The implicit principles and constructs of The Directive define the enforcement
and the representation of data protection. The terms privacy and data protection
are often used interchangeably, though they are not necessarily equivalent. The
Directive applies to all sectors of public life, with some exceptions. It specifies
the data protection rights afforded to “data subjects”, plus the requirements
and responsibilities obligated for “data controllers” and by association “data
processors” [140].
Several countries enacted laws against unauthorized taking of photos with
individuals. More countries are debating legislation that is intended to ban camera-
phones or their use. Some examples are given below.
In Germany, a copyright law (“Kunsturhebergesetz”) protects one’s own image
against unauthorized publication since Bismarks’s times. Photos can legally be
taken without authorization, but their distribution without authorization, even
to small audiences, is illegal. Exceptions are photos taken in public places at
events where (press) photography usually happens. Also, individuals of “public
interest” (e.g. politicians, actors, celebrities) can be photographed and published
with limited restriction (see [133]).
In Australia, under the Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914 - Part VIIB, Section 85ZE
it is an offence for “a person to knowingly or recklessly use a telecommunications
service supplied by a carrier in such a way as would be regarded by reasonable
persons being, in all the circumstances, offensive”. In addition, following the
widespread introduction of the Internet, state laws were changed to address this
issue. For example the Crimes Act in Victoria was amended in 1995 to include the
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offence of “Stalking”. This includes telephoning and sending electronic messages
with the intention of causing physical or mental harm.
While many countries do have legislation about camera based privacy invasions
and the distribution of photos without consent of the photographed individuals,
the question of the enforcement remains.
5.1.2 Current Solutions
The problem of secret photography has been recognized by most of the involved
parties, including the manufacturers, politics and private citizens. Some actions
have been taken, though with limited effect.
One solution is to fortify the privacy right on personal pictures and increased the
punishment for the publication of such by tougher laws. However, this right may
be hard to enforce. The photographed individual may never find out about the
publication nor could do anything about it. Even though an offender may be
caught on the scene, the phone could have already digitally transmitted the photo
away. Even with laws enacted, the only choice of an individual would be to arrest
the offender instead of waiting for the police to show up. This is not a setting that
helps all members of a society with their privacy rights.
The second approach is to ban the use of camera-phones in places, such as public
swimming pools, gyms and saunas. Though banning camera-phones could be the
first choice in some places, this approach is only suitable for controlled areas with
a high risk of secret photographing, such as companies or confidential institutes
to counter espionage. The approach has also lead to the situation that even
some mobile phone producers banned their own devices from their premises, e.g.
Samsung and Motorola.
A more common sense solution is to add a sufficient loud shutter-noise such that
whenever a picture is taken, it can be noticed by the environment. However, the
feature is often poorly implemented. For example, if a mobile phone is switched
into silent mode, the shutter noise is also turned off. Besides, given the noise
pollution created by mobile phones anyhow, adding shutter noise can add to the
annoyance of the technology. More, it violates the privacy of the photographer, as
people around immediately learns about who being present with a camera. The
approach is mostly ineffective, because the noise can be hard to hear due to general
background noise or the environment, e.g. in a Discotheque, and it usually does
not help the victim.
Given the difficulty to prevent pictures from being taken without dramatically
infringing the rights of harmless photographers, our approach targets the
distribution channel rather than the creation of the picture, i.e. pictures can be
taken without restriction. However, the individual is made aware that some picture
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has been taken. As soon as the picture appear on the Internet, she has a realistic
chance to locate it at an early point in time, when it is still possible to inhibit the
distribution by legal means. As an added value, outside of protecting the victim’s
privacy, this technology can also be used to distribute pictures to interested parties.
Another solution is to enforce safe zones by broadcast. Several businesses have
developed a so-called safe haven technology which is intended to create zones
where a broadcast unit tells camera-phones that photographing is forbidden there
[267]. It enables digital cameras within a variety of electronic devices to be disabled
including camera phones, camera PDA’s, digital cameras and multipurpose MP3
players. HP is developing a privacy technology that can jam still and video cameras
and blur faces of people who don’t want to have their picture taken [255]. While
this approach empowers property owners to define non-photographing zones, it
also restricts a user’s freedom of taking pictures with consent in the area. Another
problem is that here is a need to implement the receiver technology into all
manufacturers’ handsets for an effect. Furthermore, to protect individual rights,
one needs a portable unit. This only could guarantee personal rights independent
from one’s property protection policy.
5.1.3 Conflict of Interest
In order to protect the privacy rights of the parties involved in our setting, it
is necessary to make a tradeoff between the interests of the individual being
photographed and the photographer. As the balance between the right to privacy
and the right to photograph, we will now state the minimum rights of each party
that should be preserved.
Ideally, the individual should have the right to give consent to every picture she
plays a major role in; this is the actual right granted by law in the European
Union [140]. This right is hard to enforce technologically, however, as it includes
judgment on when a picture is a picture of a person, or just a picture of a
marketplace that happens to have people on it. As a minimum, the individual
has the right to know she has been photographed, and to have a chance to get an
early warning if the picture is being published, which allows her to take appropriate
steps in needed.
As long as the photographer does not infringe any personal rights, he should have
the right to take pictures without any major obstacles. In this, the protocol should
preferably be passive, and not prevent him from taking pictures unless under well
defined and measurable circumstances. Furthermore, the photographer has the
right to stay anonymous, as long as he does not infringe anybody else’s rights.
Finally, the photographer has the right to modify his device; for example, the
camera in a PDA should not stop working if the operating system is modified or
replaced.
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5.1.4 Summary of Contributions
With ubiquitous use of digital cameras, e.g. in mobile phones, privacy is no longer
threatened by governments and companies only. A new threat exists by people,
who take photos of unaware people with no risk and little cost anywhere in public
and private spaces. Fast distribution via online communities and web pages expose
an individual’s private life to the public. Social and legal measures are taken to
deal with this, but they are hardly enforceable. In this chapter, we introduce
the concept of Personal Rights Management, to protect one’s privacy interests in
data that is related to that person but held (or owned) by other people. As it
is infeasible to enforce a broad ban on camera-phones or artificially inhibit their
usage by technical measures, such as with simulated shutter noise, we propose
a novel way to complement such measures – attacking the distribution channel.
Without eroding the privacy of photographers and putting strong restrictions on
cameras, we provide a model for a privacy infrastructure, in which if the picture
gets publicly available, the exposed individual has a chance to detect it and take
proper actions in the first place.
We exploit several content protection techniques to support the infrastructure.
Digital rights management techniques are applied in our proposed infrastructure,
and data identification techniques such as digital watermarking and robust
perceptual hashing are proposed to enhance the distributed content identification.
The implementation with hard- and software solutions of the proposed system are
discussed.
5.1.5 Publication Details
The work described in this Chapter has been published in [121, 122].
5.1.6 Chapter Outline
This chapter is organized as follows. The privacy threat is discussed and the
attack model is defined, where the attacker and attack scenarios are discussed in
Section 5.2.1. The basic protocol on an abstract level is introduced in Section 5.2.2.
At the architecture level, Section 5.2.3 proposes a generic evolutionary approach
from Digital Rights Management to Personal Rights Management. We propose the
protocol based on content identification techniques such as digital watermarking
or perceptual image hashing and broadcast channels to enable individuals to take
notice when being photographed. After that, Section 5.3 analyzes the hardware
infrastructure to implement our protocol, and investigate possible attacks on the
hardware. Following this, Section 5.4.1 describes the software implementation of
the protocol, both on the side of the camera device and on Internet search engines.
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Finally, we discuss the various modifications of the basic scheme in Section 5.5,
and draw conclusions towards the feasibility of the technology on mobile phones
with particular respect to already existing digital rights management technologies
in Section 5.6.
5.2 An Infrastructure for Personal Rights Manage-
ment
5.2.1 Attack Model
Possible attacks from both the technical and legal aspects will be discussed. From
a technical point of view, even with a technically perfect scheme, an attacker could
easily circumvent the entire system by using a traditional camera with strong zoom
optics or a traditional mini-camera. The problem is not only in the professional
voyeurs, but also in the wide deployment of photographic devices and the ease
of secret photographing. We assume the attacker can do simple modifications to
the device and the picture, and that the corresponding instructions will eventually
be published on the Internet. For instance, there are Internet sources to offer
modified operating systems for mobile phones to turn off the noise generated while
taking a picture. On the other hand, there are many possible attacks for content
identification techniques proposed in the literature. However, there is always a
balance between the risks for the service provider if the watermarking or hashing
scheme is circumvent, and the benefit for the attacker to attempt to break the
scheme compare to the amount of effort spent.
From the privacy and legal point of view, it is an unavoidable issue that we
want to protect the rights of the harmless photographers. Unless we treat every
owner of a mobile phone as a criminal, it would be possible for a sufficiently
motivated attacker to escape from the scheme. Apart from making the technology
stronger and therefore less attractive to the attackers, our protocol also has its
merit if combined with legal measures. By attacking the scheme, it demonstrates
a photographer has a “criminal intent”. Therefore, it is easier to distinguish a
normally harmless person that just couldn’t resist taking a picture in a particular
situation from a semiprofessional voyeur with manipulated equipment.
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5.2.2 Basic Protocol
Players
There are three major players in our setting: the photographer, the individual, and
the search engine. The photographer (Bob) is the person who takes the pictures.
Bob uses a camera-phone, which is a mobile phone with a build in camera. From
a privacy point of view, Bob has the right not to be inhibited while taking the
pictures and has his identity preserved as long as he does not infringe the rights
of anybody. Bob also has the right to perform some “standard” changes to his
camera-phone, such as updating the operating system.
The individual (Alice) is the person that is photographed by the photographer.
The interest of Alice is to have control over the pictures taken of her. It means
that in the case she is the focal point of the picture, this picture should (ideally)
not been taking without her consent. In our protocol, we grant her a lesser right:
if a picture taken from her is published, she gets a fair chance to find out early.
Alice uses a receiver, which registers the identities of pictures taken in her vicinity.
The receiver could be her own mobile phone or a specialized piece of hardware.
It can also be integrated in the infrastructure provided by external parties, for
instance, the owner of a discotheque or even the GSM operators.
Finally, the search engine searches the Internet for picture identities and makes
them publicly available. They are similar as any Internet search engines, with
slightly modified rules.
Proposed Protocol
A possible scenario of our scheme will be discussed in this section. The goal is to
let an individual “Alice” detect unauthorized publication of personal images taken
by others “Bob”. We name the complete setting a Personal Rights Management
(PRM) system.
In the first step, Bob secretly takes private photos of unaware Alice with malicious
intent, as shown in Figure 5.1. Luckily, the camera on Bob’s mobile phone applies
PRM to the photo when it is taken. The photo can be identified and marked
by using several data protection techniques, such as digital watermarking, robust
perceptual hashing, or Digital Rights Management technology.
In case digital watermarking techniques are used, Bob’s camera embeds the image
content identification in the picture. In case robust perceptual hashing techniques
are used, Bob’s camera sends the image hash values optionally together with
a thumbnail of the picture itself. All the possible techniques used for content
identification will be discussed in the software implementation section.
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Figure 5.1. The first two steps of the protocol, communication between Alice
and Bob. Bob secretly takes private photos of unaware Alice with malicious intent.
Alice’s image together with identification information are sent to the receiver of
Alice
On the other hand, the identity of the photo is broadcast with a short-range radio.
Alice’s receiver picks up the picture identification information and stores it for
later use, as shown in Figure 5.1.
In the next step, Bob publishes the unauthorized photo from Alice to an online
community which is very unfavorable to Alice. Alice would take action on this
if she knew the photo was published. Luckily, Alice can detect the unauthorized
publishing of the photo using the PRM search engine (see Figure 5.2). When Bob
puts the picture from Alice on the Internet, the specialized search engines find
it and index it by the extracted watermark or the perceptual image hash values.
Alice uploads the collected photo marks or identification numbers to a specialized
search engine. Then the search engine checks photos published on the web by photo
identifications. Upon notification from the search engine, Alice checks whether the
photos found have her image on them and takes appropriate actions to protect her
privacy. Note that while it is hardly possible to remove data from the Internet if
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Figure 5.2. The last two steps of the protocol, Bob publishes the unauthorized
photo from Alice to an online community which is very unfavorable to Alice. Alice
can detect the unauthorized publishing of the photo using the PRM search engine
the publisher is determined to keep it public, we assume that in most real cases the
publisher can be identified due to the publishing medium, and convinced to remove
the offending material either of the publisher’s own accord or by legal means; the
possibility for malicious publishers to get away with publishing pictures seems
unavoidable unless we want to restrict the privacy of photographers.
In summary, the photo taking is not prevented. From the beginning to the end,
Alice and Bob both remain anonymous. Only upon publishing of an image, the
image will be detected and reported to Alice.
5.2.3 Architecture Evolution from DRM to PRM
As explained in Section 1.3, the DRM concept can not only be used to protect
commercial content, but also be exploited to design systems to protect personal
content. At the architecture level, there is a potential of adapting Digital Rights
Management (DRM) systems for the purpose of Personal Rights Management
(PRM) according to the legal requirements. DRM technology, developed for
protecting intellectual property rights, appears to have features that would allow
the development of a system-based approach to data protection compliance, i.e.
Personal Rights Management.
DRM architectures support description, trading, protection, monitoring and
tracking of the use of digital content. These technologies may be contained within
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operating systems, program software, or in the hardware of a device.
PRMmanages personal data from the data subject, the originator and the owner of
the personal data. The EU Data Protection Directive [140] defines the authorities
and boundaries of the relationships between each of the participants. The driving
purpose behind DRM, thus the content distribution management, relates easily to
data protection constructs constraining the exchange of personal data [180].
For the purpose of expressing privacy in a PRM system, the Open Digital Rights
Language (ODRL) [168] and extensible rights mark-up language (XrML) [36] can
be applied, which are similar as the rights expression languages used in a DRM
system.
Korba et al. [180] propose an adaptation of DRM functionality to provide PRM
for individuals by assigning names to the functional parts in the DRM setting
from the privacy enhancing techniques vocabulary. Thus it brings some form of
taxonomy or meta-design for PRM.
5.3 Hardware Implementation
5.3.1 Basic Proposal
The hardware and software implementations of the proposed protocol will be
discussed in the following sections. We assume that no mobile phone manufacturer
will be willing to add a completely new communication technology into the
devices to enable a protocol such as the one presented above. Therefore, we
restrict ourselves to the current hardware available in the market. Three possible
communication standards, Infrared, Bluetooth, and GSM network, can be used to
establish the link between camera-phone from Bob and the receiver from Alice.
Infrared
One feature of infrared communication is that it is directed, i.e., the signal can
be sent in a way that only the devices in the view of the camera can receive it.
The penalty paid is that the bandwidth of infrared communication is fairly low,
and the transmitting distance might be too small. It can cause a problem on the
receiving side: if the receiver is not directed to the camera, it may not get any
signal at all. It is fairly easy to block the communication by simply gluing an
object onto the infrared port. This problem can be solved by building the receiver
into the enabling function of camera lens. This way, blocking the communication
would disable the ability to take pictures. The second problem could be to block
the communication by jamming the signal with a strong infrared light. Though
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the problem is harder to deal with, it is possible to design a camera that cannot
take pictures if exposed to a strong infrared signal. However, another problem
arises when the jamming signal may be directed and allow for a denial of service
attack, i.e., preventing all camera phones to take pictures at all.
Bluetooth
Bluetooth communication is the complement of Infrared. The communication is
very difficult to jam, and the bandwidth is sufficient even for interactive protocols.
The disadvantage is that a Bluetooth signal is undirected and all devices that are
not in the visual scope of the camera get the signal as well. Another disadvantage
is that currently enabling Bluetooth on a phone may pose a security risk. Recent
studies [70] show that many Bluetooth phones are open to attacks that may reveal
the entire phone memory, including the address book, the calendar etc. Thus,
unless the security of this technique can be improved, to protect the privacy of
Alice’s pictures she may have to risk a privacy-invasion on her phone book.
GSM-Network
It is by the nature of mobile phones to communicate on the GSM network.
However, the GSM protocol is ill-suited for device-to-device communication.
Adding this capacity would require major changes in the GSM standard, which is
unlikely to happen for the purpose of protecting people from illegal pictures. It
would be possible to use the base-station as an intermediate in a way that the
photographer’s device sends a signal to the base-station, which in turn sends a cell
broadcast to all devices in the area. This creates new problems. One on hand,
many devices that don’t have anything to do with the picture will be noticed
altogether. On the other hand, phones at the same location may be locked into
another cell or use a different provider.
All of the above
A combination of those techniques can be proposed, for instance, an infrared flash
could be used to command the device to listen to a Bluetooth signal or a GSM
cellular broadcast. If implemented properly, this could combine the advantages of
all technologies. As the infrared signal only has to carry a binary signal, the low
bandwidth and limited range are not problematic anymore. As receivers neither
see the flash nor listen to the radio signals, they can be configured not to pick up
the pictures out of their interests, though it cannot be excluded that they do.
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5.3.2 Attacks on the Hardware
A few examples are given here on how an attacker can disable the proposed
functionality by manipulating their devices. For some mobile phones, the shutter
noise can be manipulated to be turned off when the entire phone is put in silent
mode. For our protocol, it is possible to block the transmission by deactivating
Bluetooth or by using it to communicate with another device while the picture
is taken. Some users directly modify their mobile phone hardware to detach
the infrared light or the Bluetooth antenna. For some mobile phones, there is
some firmware to manipulate the corresponding functionality available on the
Internet. However, mobile phone manufacturers have recently started to think
about other functionalities that a user may not manipulate, e.g., Superdistribution
and Micropayment from Nokia. It is foreseeable that this problem will be solved in
the near future, e.g. by using a core-operating system which cannot be changed by
the owner and building the real operating system on top of this core, or by TCPA
(Trusted Computing Platform Alliance)/TCG (Trusted Computing Group)-like
technologies [280].
5.4 Software Implementation
5.4.1 Digital Image Watermarking
Digital watermarking is a technique for embedding information in digital content
without perceptually altering its appearance [102, 60]. In our system, one intuitive
way could be to append a visible watermark on the host image. The visible
watermark can be any information that identifies the photographer and/or the
time stamping analogous to analog cameras. However, the obvious drawback is
that an attacker can easily remove the watermark by an image editing software
despite of destroying the watermarked region of the image.
Various imperceptible robust image watermarking applications are studied [174,
55, 60]. In the system we proposed, the key point is to identify the secretly
photographed image rather than to authenticate the image integrity. This is
because Alice is more interested to identify whether the image is from her or not.
The owners’ and/or user’s information can be embedded directly into the images to
protect copyright. And a rather high level of robustness against malicious attacks
is required.
For watermarking system, it should be computationally infeasible to extract the
watermark information even if the algorithm of the watermarking principle is
known. Therefore, secret or public keys should be used to provide the security
of watermarking.
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The design of a watermarking algorithm always involved a tradeoff between
robustness, imperceptibility and capacity [197]. In our proposed scheme, the
optimal balance among these three attributes should be found if properly designed.
The capacity of the watermark does not have to be large, thus extra robustness
could be gained. In order to get optimal robustness, watermark should be
embedded just below the perceptual level, and the knowledge of human vision
systems (HVS) are applied to the imperceptible watermarking schemes [291]. A
few benchmarking of watermarking to provide a fair evaluation of watermarking
parameters are introduced, such as Stirmark [234], Optimark [220], and Checkmark
[232] and so on.
From a practical point of view, with an expected 70 million camera-phones sold
by 2006, a 40-bit image identifier should be sufficient even for high usage of the
cameras. Although there are no firm numbers, to embed a 40-bit watermark into
a picture with 640× 480 pixels is quite realistic. For example, the Stirmark [234]
can perform the test with 100 bit watermarks on 512×512, 24-bit colored pictures.
When facing a general audience, in order to prevent that everyone has the ability
to extract the watermark information from the picture, public key watermarking
scheme is used. The photographer embeds the watermark by the public key of
the search engine, and the search engine can extract the watermark by using its
private key.
5.4.2 Search Engines
The final player of our protocol is a search engine that allows the individual to
locate the pictures on the Internet. The search engines could work just like any
ordinary one, except for the ability to extract the identification information from
the pictures and use it as an index. It requires that the watermark detection or
other algorithms to be computationally feasible. Commercial web spiders are
already available for copyright protection. As reported in [262], Digimarc, a
company which holds most of the core patents on digital watermarking, introduced
a tool called MarcSpider [167], purported to crawl the web to search images, test
them for watermarks and report on infringers. Due to the fact that crawling the
web quickly became an intractable task, as well as that only a small number of
copyrighted images installed on the web, MarcSpider didn’t work out as a huge
success.
Some counter technologies have been developed to hide the pictures from the
spider, for example by splitting it into many small pictures or by embedding it
using JavaScript. This is another point where a sufficiently motivated attacker
can circumvent the scheme, which is hard to deal with unless the privacy of the
photographer is inhibited.
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There could be a privacy problem introduced by the search engine, such as profiling
of all watermarks Alice submits in order to create an album of Alice’s life. To avoid
linking of ID and image requests, we assume that the search engine is to be used
with some anonymous connections.
5.5 Modifications
5.5.1 Perceptual Robust Image Hashing
The watermark-based approach is expected to be sensitive to malicious modifica-
tions of the media, thus brings the robustness issue dependent on applications.
When the watermark is embedded into the host data, the data content is altered
and image manipulations may be localized in most schemes [270].
Robust perceptual hashing, which can be used in multimedia applications both
for data identification and robust data authentication, is meant to complement
digital watermarking. The main advantage for perceptual hashing schemes is that
the data is neither altered nor degraded. If a malicious attack on a watermarking
scheme succeeded, the watermark would be destroyed. However, the perceptual
hash value will remain the same as long as the perceptual features of the data
are unchanged. This is also the reason why perceptual hashing is used instead of
cryptographic hashing, which is very sensitive to a single input bit. Perceptual
hash functions can be particularly useful to identify illegal copies, since the illegal
copies are usually lossy copies of the original.
The main requirement of our scheme is the image identification. An occasional
collision between two picture-identities does not cause a significant trouble,
although it merely poses a minor annoyance to a user. Therefore, the picture
identity does not need to be excessively long. With a k-bit identifier, we need
1.2 × 2k pictures to get 0.5 probability of a collision. Therefore, it is proper to
apply perceptual hashing schemes to our application.
Four requirements for image hash functions are defined in [205]. A generic image
hashing can be achieved in two steps: feature extraction and secure compression
of the feature vector. It is shown that the robust feature vector detection is
the key point for robust image hashing. Various feature extraction methods are
developed based on different concepts, such as by using wavelet [205, 209, 208],
DCT [146], matrix invariance [183], different descriptors [206]. The second step
that secure compress the feature vector can be based on cryptographic hash
functions procedure [270], error correcting codes [205, 209], and secure compression
for authentication applications [171].
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Having generality and robustness as the two attributes, a feature detection
algorithm can be considered robust if it identifies the same feature locations
independent of different attacks, such as Stirmark attacks, compression, image
processing or geometric distortions. Hamming distances between the hash values
of perceptually similar images and between different images can be examined to
evaluate the algorithm.
5.5.2 Broadcasting a Sample Picture
In addition to the image identifier, a strongly compressed sample version of
the picture could be broadcasted as well. This would inform the individual
whether there is a need to take immediate action or not, such as when a specially
compromising picture has been taken or a credit card has been photographed.
However, this costs a significant bandwidth, and significantly infringes the privacy
of the photographer. Due to the fact that the image content taken by the
photographer is broadcasted, the photographer could be identified, and therefore,
the privacy of the photographer could be violated. Besides, the intellectual
property of the photographer, i.e. his work of art in arranging and taking the
photo, could be infringed by broadcasting it to the world.
5.5.3 Hybrid DRM Solutions
Several DRM techniques can be integrated into our scheme. In a generic DRM
mechanism, digital watermarking and perceptual hashing are used for content
protection and/or identification, while encryption and digital signature are used
for content confidentiality and integrity [185]. New watermarking based techniques
can be used to identify, trace and control the use of digital copy and enhance
the content protection, and thus strongly improve DRM [197, 262]. In the
application of mobile DRM, watermarking has been suggested as a key technology
for media identification [282, 159], especially since user’s identity is known in
mobile networks. Since the market thrives by delivering multimedia content
through Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS), the content should be wrapped
in DRM packages prior to distribution. The proposed DRM technology for
the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) specifies three different methods that vary
in complexity requirements, and that offer different levels of security for the
distributed content [48]. The piracy tracing with the defense of intellectual
property rights and the copy protection where a copy-bit is unremovable from
the host content [197] require different levels for watermarking robustness.
Encryption and watermarking are to be combined as two defensive lines to
enhance DRM. For image content, selective encryption [44] is introduced to
encrypt a portion of the compressed data. In our proposed scheme, to protect the
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photographer’s privacy, the watermarking embedded information can be further
encrypted by the user’s ID as a secret key, so that only the authenticated
party can extract the information [43]. A watermark can be used to serve as
a proof of ownership but is vulnerable to attacks such as average and collusion
attacks [292]. In addition to ensuring that a watermark cannot be removed, the
DRM system has to ensure that a fake watermark cannot be inserted. Several
DRM scenarios related to image distributions were analyzed in [197], and a fair and
efficient benchmarking of open-source web based evaluation system was proposed.
Benchmarking parameters and requirements are scenario dependent.
While discussing the image content protection or identification from a technical
perspective, it is important to note that any technique that allows a user to
assert their ownership of any digital object must also be placed in the context
of intellectual property right law [291].
5.6 Conclusions
Camera-phones have been used in much more malicious ways than just to invade
privacy, and control over one’s image is hard to enforce today. Several reports have
been published of cases where credit card information has been obtained by secret
photographing of the card. The problem is analyzed from both the privacy and
technical aspects in this chapter, and possible solutions are proposed. There is a
tradeoff between the privacy rights of the individual to have control over images
and the privacy rights of the photographer. It is of limited effort for initiatives to
enact laws to ban the unauthorized photos when lacking of a technological support
for the enforcement and prosecution. On the other hand, users and consumers
reject technology that presses restrictions on them. While we are aware that our
solution – due to the conflicting interests we need to satisfy – leaves a number of
issues unresolved, we believe that a great advantage for individual privacy can be
achieved by the proposed personal rights management.
This chapter proposes a detection system that combines cryptographic and
content protection technologies together with legal enforcements in order to
control the distribution of private photos online. The scheme can empower
individuals to detect and act upon violations without putting strong restrictions
on cameras and photographers. Content identification mechanisms such as digital
watermarking and robust perceptual hashing are integrated to enhance a PRM
system. Techniques to apply in our scheme are discussed and possible attacks
together with hardware and software solutions are analyzed.
To evaluate the usability of our proposed scheme, it is not difficult for one to
imagine that it will require a significant amount of time and energy if Alice has
to check hundreds of pictures per day from search engines. However, as a normal
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individual the chance that Alice gets a high amount of images taken is fairly low.
This scheme can be interesting for celebrities though, who are able to afford hiring
people to do the checking work in order to make sure that their personal rights
are not violated.
Given the potential commercial value of the privacy market, an investment in
Personal Rights Management appears to be worthwhile both in terms of what has
to be done to achieve compliance with current legislative requirements and to meet
privacy policies towards building a stronger trust relationship with customers.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future
Research
6.1 Conclusions
The goal of this thesis is to investigate privacy issues in content protection
systems and to study techniques for privacy preserving content protection. The
capabilities of content protection technologies have been criticized for implicating
the privacy of content users, by creating the potential for vastly increased collection
of information about an individual’s intellectual habits and preferences. Therefore,
the basic attributes of content protection technologies determine the contradiction
between preserving the interests of the content provider or copyright owner for
content protection and protecting the privacy of individuals.
The research questions addressed in this thesis span two dimensions. Primarily, the
research aims to lay out groundwork for a privacy threat analysis and requirement
engineering methodology. Although digital privacy is one of the identified priorities
in our society, few systematic, effective methodologies exist to deal with privacy
threats thoroughly. We present a comprehensive framework to model privacy
threats for supporting the elicitation and fulfilment of privacy requirements in
application systems. The second part of the research aims to tackle the privacy
protection issues in a number of designated content protection systems. New
privacy threats emerge when limited trust is put on the content or the service
provider. Therefore, the proper balancing between content protection, for the
content provider or service provider, and privacy protection, for the user, remains a
research challenge. The privacy preserving content protection systems proposed in
this thesis can be categorized into two types. The first is privacy preserving DRM
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techniques to protect commercial content, and the proposed solution is anonymous
buyer-seller watermarking protocol. The other is to design systems that protect
personal content using content protection techniques. Such a system targets the
preservation of individuals’ privacy interests when personal content is held by other
parties. The proposed systems include a privacy friendly architecture to manage
distributed e-Health content, and a personal rights management system to enforce
individual privacy rights. The conclusions of this thesis are outlined in the rest of
the section.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the research. First, the research shows that
privacy, just as user behavior regulation, has become one of the values embodied
in content protection system design. In addition, the development of content
protection technologies can respond to privacy protection requirements in a goal-
oriented approach, such as following the proposed framework for privacy threat
and requirement analysis, while complying with relevant legislation. Moreover,
instead of impeding privacy, content protection technologies can be utilized to
preserve and protect it.
6.1.1 Privacy Threats and Requirements Framework
In the first part of the research, we laid out a comprehensive and generic framework
to model privacy threats to elicit privacy requirements and instantiate privacy
enhancing countermeasures. The purpose of this taxonomic framework is to aid the
development of a privacy enhancing system. As presented in Chapter 2, a number
of fundamental questions have been investigated, including conceptualizing privacy
properties and threats, evaluating the relation between privacy and security
properties, and designing a generic methodology to identify privacy threats and
elicit privacy requirements in application-dependent systems.
Conceptualizing Hard Privacy & Soft Privacy Properties. The presented work
further deepens the understanding of privacy as hard privacy and soft privacy, first
introduced by George Danezis [109, 111], by concretely defining privacy properties
(and threats) according to these two concepts. First, the taxonomy of privacy
properties in a broader context is proposed, taking the aforementioned dualism
into consideration; it extends the privacy terminology proposed by Pfitzmann
and Hansen [237]. Hard privacy properties include unlinkability, anonymity
and pseudonymity, plausible deniability, undetectability and unobservability, and
confidentiality. Soft privacy properties are proposed as content unawareness and
policy and consent compliance.
Modeling Privacy Threats in a System. One of the primary contributions of
the work is a methodology to model privacy specific threats in an application
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system. This is achieved by defining a list of privacy threat types and providing
the necessary mappings to the elements in the system model, presented as data flow
diagram for instance. The taxonomy of privacy threats is derived from the privacy
properties, including linkability, identifiability, non-repudiation, detectability and
observability, information disclosure, content unawareness, and policy and consent
noncompliance. The proposed systemic approach to privacy threat modeling is
named LINDDUN, each letter of which stands for a privacy threat obtained by
negating a privacy property.
Instantiating Privacy Threats via Threat Tree Patterns. The second contribu-
tion is represented by the supporting body of knowledge – an extensive catalogue of
privacy specific threat tree patterns – as a guideline to detail the generic LINDDUN
threat categories into specific threat instances that can occur in a system. We
presented a significant number of threat tree patterns to detail the privacy threats
in a system, as an illustrative indication, allowing system analysts to consider the
most common privacy conditions. These privacy threat trees, inspired by security
threat tree patterns in Secure Development Lifecycle (SDL), are based on the
state-of-art privacy developments and are susceptible to a continuous improvement
process based on newly discovered threats. During the risk-analysis phase, some
threat instances might be discarded. Thereafter, misuse cases are instantiated
regarding the result of the above process as a collection of threat scenarios that
need to be documented. A misuse case, in particular, can be viewed as a use case
from an attacker’s point of view.
Selecting Privacy Enhancing Countermeasures. Another contribution is the
provision of the means to map the most commonly known privacy enhancing
technologies (PETs) to the identified privacy threats and elicited privacy require-
ments of a system. Given that both threats and privacy technologies addressing
them are in constant evolution, the privacy threat tree patterns and categorization
of suggested PETs are expected to be continuously updated and improved upon.
Leveraging the link between privacy enhancing technologies and privacy properties,
it is possible to make a distinction between hard and soft privacy enhancing
solutions. Hard privacy technologies are actively researched but inadequate in
deployment, due to cost and technical restrictions. Soft privacy technologies are
the-state-of-art and have fewer research activity. With legal compliance as a strong
driver, soft privacy solutions rely on the stakeholder’s liability and the tradeoffs
between the cost of deploying privacy solutions and the potential costs in case of
massive data breaches.
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6.1.2 Privacy Preserving Content Protection Systems
The second part of our research focuses on exploring and designing individual pri-
vacy friendly content protection systems. We follow the fundamental assumption
that the content provider or the service provider is not trustworthy and hence new
privacy threats emerge. This research question is addressed from two viewpoints:
(1) to design content protection systems with privacy preserving properties for
protecting commercial content, and (2) to design privacy preserving systems to
manage and protect personal data using content protection systems or techniques.
Anonymous Watermarking Protocols. To address the privacy issue in DRM-
supported systems for online distribution of commercial content, anonymous
buyer-seller watermarking protocols have been introduced. Their goal is to
resolve the conflicting interests between copyright protection of the content,
such as the content providers’ need for copyright protections and traceability
for the copyright violator, and privacy protection, such as anonymity (or
pseudonymity) and the unlinkability of online transactions of customers. We
defined the fundamental requirements of such watermarking protocols, proposed
and constructed three types of anonymous buyer-seller watermarking (BSW)
protocols based on homomorphic encryption and group signatures. In contrast
to earlier work, the proposed anonymous BSW protocols fulfill the desired
security properties simultaneously. In addition, we provided a formal security
definition for generic copyright protection protocols in the ideal-world/real-world
paradigm. Furthermore, we have analyzed the security of an anonymous buyer-
seller watermarking protocol and proven that it fulfills our definition. In particular,
we have shown that the protocol is secure against any p.p.t. (probabilistic
polynomial-time) adversary when instantiated with a watermarking scheme, an
encryption scheme, a group signature scheme and zero-knowledge proofs of
knowledge that provide security against any p.p.t. adversary. Unlike the other
building blocks, however, no watermarking scheme has been proven to offer this
security level, and thus the actual security of the protocol against malicious buyers
is lowered to the security offered by the watermarking scheme.
An efficient implementation of the aforementioned buyer-seller watermarking
protocol has been evaluated. The implementation combines existing cryptographic
tools with a composite signal representation in the encrypted domain, allowing
the reduction of both the computational overhead and the large communication
bandwidth introduced by the use of homomorphic public-key cryptosystems.
Considering the computational and network capacity of modern systems, the
results suggest that the proposed technique can be successfully used in practical
applications in the near future. More detailed implementation results are given
in [115, 116, 117].
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Privacy Enhancing Sharing of Distributed E-Health Information. A privacy
friendly architecture to manage distributed personal e-health information has been
presented in this thesis, in order to address the contradiction between privacy
protection for the patient and the sharing of medical data. On the one hand,
the primary goal of an e-Health system is to provide a patient-centric lifelong
view on the medical data under conditional access. On the other hand, e-Health
data have a number of distinguishing features. For example, they are regarded
as sensitive data and, according to European data protection legislation, cannot
be processed or distributed without the patient’s consent. This raises two specific
privacy threats in a distributed e-Health system. Firstly, in order to retrieve all the
necessary medical data of a patient, there must be a mechanism to cross-reference
medical documents across several healthcare providers. This enables, for instance,
patient profiling by data aggregation. Another privacy threat occurs, for instance,
when a patient’s medical data is transferred from one healthcare provider (such as
a psychiatric hospital) to another healthcare provider (such as a generic hospital),
where not all the information should be disclosed to the latter provider due to the
different privacy sensitivity levels of medical data.
To mitigate these two privacy threats, a privacy protection mechanism is proposed,
with a limited trust on the healthcare and service providers, in order to facilitate
a privacy enhancing sharing of distributed e-Health information. In the proposed
setting, each patient is issued with a unique context-specific identifier by each
healthcare provider. In communications across different healthcare providers (or
contexts), the same information can be expressed by means of different types
or values. To accommodate the conflicting forces between protecting a patient’s
ID and personal e-Health information against unauthorized parties (even those
within healthcare providers), and facilitating the possibility to follow-up a patient’s
medical treatment history by authorized parties, we introduce the concept of the
mediating service to map and convert context-specific identifiers or information,
when data is exchanged among different authorized healthcare providers. Further,
we ensure that only the minimum necessary patient’s personal information is
provided to the authorized parties, such that the protocol is compliant with
the data minimization principle. This is accomplished by introducing a data
anonymization mechanism to obfuscate sensitive parts according to the patient’s
privacy preference. This user-centric approach satisfies both interoperability and
privacy protection.
Personal Rights Management. The broad usage of hand-held devices such as
camera-phones has resulted in far more threats than just the demise of privacy,
and control over personal content such as one’s image is hard to enforce today.
For instance, several reports have been published of cases where credit card
information has been obtained by secretly photographing the card. To address
this issue, we introduced the concept of Personal Rights Management to protect
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one’s privacy interests in data that is related to that person but held by other
people. We sketched out a detection mechanism that combines cryptographic and
content protection technologies, in compliance with legal regulations, in order to
control the distribution of private photos online. The proposed infrastructure
targets the distribution channel. As soon as personal content such as a picture
is publicly available, the exposed individual has a chance to find it and take
proper action in the first place, without putting strong restrictions on cameras and
photographers. The implementation issues with hardware and software solutions
of the proposed system are discussed. Digital rights management techniques are
applied in our proposed infrastructure, and data identification techniques such as
digital watermarking and robust perceptual hashing are proposed to enhance the
distributed content identification.
6.1.3 Insights into the Design of Privacy Preserving Systems
During the course of the research, we have gained insights into the design of
privacy enhancing systems. The observations are derived from the various research
challenges investigated in each chapter, and are refined and generalized in the rest
of this section. The range of topics this section touches is broad, and we can only
scratch the surface here. Much further work is needed to develop these concepts as
understanding of privacy evolves. We still hope that our observations can inspire
system designers and privacy engineers.
The Mutually Inclusive Relationship Between Privacy and Security.Our first ob-
servation is the mutually inclusive relationship between privacy and security.
There is an intersection between privacy properties and security properties. This
leads to two observations. On the one hand, privacy can be partially viewed as
a top tier security property, rather than a security tradeoff. The means and
ends of information privacy and information security are essentially similar.
At first, the concept of self-determination for privacy is considered as the
most valued security property. In addition, privacy satisfies some fundamental
security needs of individuals, such as freedom from surveillance and profiling,
freedom from compulsion, and accessibility to content and services. Excessive
violation of privacy undermines security. Furthermore, both depend critically
on technologies, while legal enforcement is necessary but insufficient.
On the other hand, the pluralistic meaning of privacy (explained in Section 1.1.3)
determines that some privacy properties are not included in the category of
security properties. The goals of privacy and security can be in conflict.
One example is, as explained in Section 2.4.5, depending on the application,
plausible deniability (as a privacy property) can at times be desirable over non-
repudiation (as a security property). This contradictory phenomenon can be
understood as follows. When referring to convincing a particular party (within a
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system) about the existence of a particular event, non-repudiation and plausible
deniability are mutually exclusive. However, the two properties can coexist
within the whole system, in which some parties retain evidence of an event
while others don’t, or the evidence is sufficient to convince some parties but not
others.
Privacy in View of Relationships. In the process of conceptualizing privacy prop-
erties, another interesting observation leads us to draw the conclusion that
privacy emphasizes relationships between entities and data. In other words,
privacy cares more about the relationship between instances of the system
DFD (data flow diagram) elements (including entities, data flows, data stores,
and processes), for example, the relationship of two data flows (i.e., two
communication instances cannot be linked), and the relationship between a
DFD element with an entity (i.e., a person sends a message anonymously). On
the contrary, security focuses more on the functionality of each individual DFD
component (i.e., an entity, a data flow, a data store, and a process) from a more
isolated view.
Privacy and Security Analysis in Synergy.We pointed out the synergy between
the privacy analysis and security threat analysis, and we recommend analyzing
both privacy and security threats and requirements together as one complete
process. An example is, when taking privacy threat trees, one can see many
privacy threats leading to security threats (e.g. information disclosure and
tampering). This implies that, privacy objectives often depend on security
objectives (e.g. confidentiality and integrity of data flow, data store or process).
Three motivations support this statement. First, the aforementioned fact
confirms that security is a necessary means to achieve privacy. Second, both
the proposed LINDDUN framework (in Chapter 2) for privacy and the STRIDE
framework for security can be well integrated into the Security Development
Lifecycle. This synergy brings advantages in terms of time and cost for system
designers to work with. Third, in spite of the coexistence of security and
privacy in one system, security objectives might conflict with privacy objectives
(e.g. non-repudiation and plausible deniability as explained in the previous
paragraphs). It is thus useful to do the threat analysis and consider requirements
both for security and privacy together.
Integrated Approach to Build in Privacy.A high-performance architectural design
process to build in privacy cannot be achieved unless an integrated design
approach is deployed. Privacy, just like security, is part of the entire design-and-
build process. Privacy cannot be achieved solely through individual components
without considering the system as a whole. In the integrated design approach
for building in privacy, the privacy objective needs to be identified right at the
start of the design process, and held in proper balance among the stakeholders
during the design process. Later in the planning and implementation phase,
the relationships and interdependencies of the privacy components with all the
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other components in the system should be concurrently evaluated, appropriately
applied and coordinated. In the meanwhile, the effectiveness and impact of
privacy measures must be constantly reassessed to ensure the coordination of
the privacy objective with all the components in the system. This assessment
does not only address the privacy outcomes when the system is working correctly,
but also considers the harm to the system caused by potential failures.
Balancing Privacy with Cost and Efficiency.Good privacy or security engineering
does not always mean to provide perfect or nearly perfect solutions. Instead, it
needs to find a proper balance among several tradeoffs, while taking the system’s
practical constraints into consideration. One tradeoff is between privacy and
efficiency; the other is between privacy and cost. These two tradeoffs are
interactive. Generally speaking, the more privacy enhancing a system is, the
less efficiently it works, and the more costly it is. The deployment of privacy
enhancing solutions is usually at the price of increasing the implementation
budget or lowering the performance efficiency of the system. One observation
is that mathematically proven secure and private systems tend to be more
complex and costly than those with a lesser degree of security and privacy.
Take the example of the anonymous buyer-seller watermarking protocols we
developed (in Chapter 3). Adding zero-knowledge proofs to such a cryptographic
protocol generally intends to offer designated privacy or security properties, at
the expense however, of degraded implementation efficiency.
One pragmatic approach to address this issue is through cost-benefit analysis.
The cost of building in privacy can be evaluated both in terms of the research
and development cost (e.g. investment in R&D projects) and in terms of the
potential degradation of system performance (e.g. efficiency reduction). The
cost of building in no privacy can be evaluated, for example, in terms of direct
and indirect financial loss and reputation damage caused by potential privacy
breaches in the system. Overall, building in privacy or security could be an
option as long as it costs less than building in no privacy or security.
With balancing between cost and efficiency being one challenge for privacy
research, designing more efficient systems at a lower cost, while still preserving
designated privacy and security properties, remains another research challenge.
Both Technical and Legal Enforcement.Our last part of conclusion is that one
needs both technological and legal mechanisms to ensure privacy protection.
This means that, on the one hand, legal enforcement plays an important role.
Assuming secret information was disclosed, one needs to rely on law or policy
that shapes the potential future behavior around the exposed information. On
the other hand, relying only on legal enforcement does not suffice; technology
is an indispensable means for privacy assurance. There are already a large
number of privacy enhancing technologies that effectively ensure direct privacy
preservation. However, despite technology insuring privacy with high confidence,
legal enforcement is still necessary to ensure the technological enforcement is in
compliance with legislation.
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As a summary, we provide a few lines of insights into privacy engineering. (1)
Privacy threats can elicit requirements, and requirements must specify privacy
objectives. (2) After requirements are determined, they should be implemented.
(3) Comparable with security, privacy needs to be technologically supported,
whereas privacy legislation is necessary but insufficient to protect privacy.
6.2 Future Work
Building privacy in content protection systems is an emerging and challenging
research topic that has attracted an increasing amount of research activities. This
thesis has laid the general groundwork for instantiating privacy threats to support
the elicitation and fulfilment of privacy requirements in an application-dependent
systems. Moreover, three kinds of privacy preserving content protection systems
for both commercial content and personal data have been explored. The following
section will bring forward an assessment of the most prevalent and promising
directions for future research.
Privacy Framework.
Practical Validation.As future work, the proposed framework can be applied to
larger scale case studies. Although not discussed in this thesis, a validation in
the context of a national e-health system has been performed [127]. Future work
includes the privacy threat analysis of the proposed buyer-seller watermarking
protocols and the personal rights management system using the privacy
framework.
Risk Assessment.Risk assessment to privacy threats is another challenge, not only
because of its academic value but also the industrial relevance. Intuitively
speaking, it could be infeasible to assign a specific risk level to a certain privacy
threat when generalizing all types of systems. However, we believe it is a valid
approach to provide risk priority classifications for a particular type of system
(such as social networks, e-health systems, anonymous communication systems,
etc.) on a case-by-case basis. One of the methods to achieve risk assessment
is, for instance, by exploiting privacy metrics. This risk assessment will merely
be useful as a guideline because the actual risk levels will still depend on the
designated system’s requirements.
Automated Design.Another direction to complete the privacy framework is
to develop software design programs to enable an automated process for
instantiating privacy threats and requirements. Privacy requirements can
be elicited in a goal-oriented approach, e.g. using a requirements modeling
language proposed by Yu et al. [298].
184 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Watermarking Protocols.
New Properties. Further research can be conducted to adapt or extend our defi-
nition of anonymous buyer-seller watermarking protocols that offer additional
properties. For example, one desirable property for e-commerce protocols is
transaction fairness [184], and thus defining and designing privacy-preserving
fair buyer-seller watermarking protocols is an interesting goal.
Hardware Implementation.Another research challenging is to implement the
protocol in hardware, such as a portable device, bringing the potential to be
released on markets as a commercial product.
Distributed E-Health Systems.
User-Centricity – Patient Specification.E-health systems are evolving towards
user-centric systems, in which the patients are able to control the granularity
of healthcare information disclosed to third parties, and specify the content of
the health information and to which healthcare provider it can be disclosed, the
purpose of processing the information, etc.
Transparency – Patient Verification.Transparency needs to be emphasized more
in e-Health systems such that the patients should be able to access and query
the logs of their health records, in order to verify if their records were accessed
according to the rules they have defined.
API Interoperability.Application Programming Interface (API) is used to specify
how an individual e-Health system works within each healthcare provider. So
far there is no interaction between different APIs. The next generation e-Health
systems should be able to offer collaboration between healthcare providers by
using a data bus interconnecting different service providers, so that each API
is not only available but also used for the exchange of health information. The
healthcare information stored in the local database is transferred and translated
by the data bus and can be shared between two or more healthcare providers.
This interoperability can be realized by implementing the interoperable APIs
across different healthcare providers.
Personal Rights Management.
Software and Hardware Implementation.The general concept of Personal Rights
Management is designed to keep protection as well as to track the sharing
process of personal data. Based on the PRM concept to control personal images
as we proposed in this thesis, further research can be focused on working out the
protocol prototype implementations and security. For example, TCPA/TCG-
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like [280] trusted computing platforms and DRM systems could be integrated
into the prototype to achieve a generic PRM architecture.
Efficiency Improvements.We discussed the time problem if Alice has to check
hundreds of pictures per day. We propose to ease the problem by adding
location and biometric (e.g. facial) data recognition algorithms to search engines
to reduce the complexity for Alice. Future research could address this feature’s
implementation.
New Applications.New applications of PRM could be expanded into other aspects
of peer-to-peer privacy violations. While private image taking is the most
eminent area of privacy issues caused by peers, other threats are emerging.
There is a vast increase of video camera-phones on the market, which brings a
similar privacy threat as the privacy image scenario. There are many mp3
players equipped with recording functions. There is a tendency to upload
electronically recorded conversations or videos online, and the presence of a
high number of uncontrolled recording devices may pose a significant problem
in the future. A recent story of a high school teacher Jay Bennish in the US
shows an example of a problem caused by privately owned recording equipment.
The teacher’s speech was investigated, because of a student’s recording in class,
and complained to the principal [218]. Another emerging problem is the ever-
increasing number of blogs and web sites similar as YouTube.com, combined
with search engines to efficiently find personal information therein. Furthermore,
PRM scenarios could be applied to protect personal geographical location data
as well.
Commercial Value.Given the potential commercial value of the privacy market,
an investment in Personal Rights Management appears to be worthwhile both
in terms of what has to be done to achieve compliance with current legislative
requirements and to meet privacy policies towards building a stronger trust
relationship with clients.

Appendix A
Privacy Misuse Case Examples
A.1 MUC 2: Linkability of the User-Portal Data
Stream (Data Flow)
Summary: Data flows can be linked to the same person (without necessarily
revealing the person’s identity)
Asset: PII of the user
• The user:
1. data flow can be linked to each other which might reveal the
person’s identity
2. the attacker can build a profile of a user’s online activities (interests,
active time, comments, updates, etc.)
Primary misactor : skilled insider / skilled outsider
Basic Flow:
1. The misactor intercepts / eavesdrops two or more data flows
2. The misactor can link the data flows to each other and possibly link
them (by combining this information) to the user / data subject
Trigger : by misactor, can happen whenever data is communicated
Preconditions:
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1. No anonymous communication system used
2. Information disclosure of data flow possible
Prevention capture points:
1. Use strong anonymous communication techniques
2. Provide confidential channel
Prevention guarantee: Impossible to link data to each other
A.2 MUC 3: Linkability of the Social Network Users
(Entity)
Summary: Entities (with different pseudonyms) can be linked to the same
person (without necessarily revealing the person’s identity)
Asset: PII of the user
• The user:
1. data can be linked to each other which might reveal the person’s
identity
2. attacker can build a profile of a user’s online activities (interests,
actives time, comments, updates, etc.)
Primary misactor : skilled insider / skilled outsider
Basic Flow:
1. The misactor intercepts or eavesdrops two or more pseudonyms
2. The misactor can link the pseudonyms to each other and possibly link
(by combining this information) to the user / data subject
Trigger : by misactor, can happen whenever data is communicated
Preconditions:
1. Information Disclosure of the data flow possible
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2. Different “pseudonyms” are linked to each other based on content of the
data flow
Prevention capture points:
1. protection of information such as user temporary ID, IP address,
time and location, session ID, identifier and biometrics, computer ID,
communication content, e.g. apply data obfuscation to protection this
information (security)
2. message and channel confidentiality provided
Prevention guarantee: Impossible to link data to each other
A.3 MUC 4: Identifiability at the Social Network
Database (Data Store)
Summary: The user’s identity is revealed
Asset: PII of the user
• The user: revealed identity
Primary misactor : skilled insider / skilled outsider
Basic Flow:
1. The misactor gains access to the database
2. The data is linked to a pseudonym
3. The misactor can link the pseudonym to the actual identity
(identifiability of entity)
4. The misactor can link the data to the actual user’s identity
Alternative Flow:
1. The misactor gains access to the database
2. The can link information from the database to other information (from
another database or information which might be publicly accessible)
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3. The misactor can re-identify the user based on the combined information
Trigger : by misactor, can always happen
Preconditions:
1. no or insufficient protection of the data store
2. no data anonymization techniques used
Prevention capture points:
1. protection of the data store (security)
2. apply data anonymization techniques
Prevention guarantee: hard-impossible to link data to identity (depending on
applied technique)
A.4 MUC 5: Identifiability of the User-Portal Data
Stream (Data Flow)
Summary: The user’s identity is revealed
Asset: PII of the user
• The user: revealed identity
Primary misactor : insider / outsider
Basic Flow:
1. The misactor gains access to the data flow
2. The data contains personal identifiable information about the user (user
relationships, address, etc.)
3. The misactor is able to extract personal identifiable information from
the user / data subject
Trigger : by misactor, can happen whenever data is communicated
Preconditions:
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1. no or weak anonymous communication system used
2. Information disclosure of data flow possible
Prevention capture points:
1. apply anonymous communication techniques
2. Use confidential channel
Prevention guarantee: hard-impossible to link data to identity (depending on
applied technique)
A.5 MUC 6: Identifiability of Social Network System
Users (Entity)
Summary: The user’s identity is revealed
Asset: PII of the user
• The user: revealed identity
Primary misactor : skilled insider / skilled outsider
Basic Flow:
1. The misactor gains access to the data flow
2. The data contains the user’s password
3. The misactor has access to the identity management database
4. The misactor can link the password to the user
Alternative Flow:
1. The misactor gains access to the data flow
2. The data contains the user’s password
3. The misactor can link the user’s password to the user’s identity (e.g.
passwords as initials followed by birthdates)
192 PRIVACY MISUSE CASE EXAMPLES
Trigger : by misactor, can happen whenever data is communicated and the
user logs in using his “secret”
Preconditions:
1. Insecure IDM system OR
2. weak passwords used and information disclosure of data flow possible
Prevention capture points:
1. Strong pseudonymity technique used (e.g. strong passwords)
2. privacy-enhancing IDM system
3. Data flow confidentiality
Prevention guarantee: hard(er) to link log-in to identity.
A.6 MUC 7: Information Disclosure at the Social
Network Database (Data Store)
Summary: Data is exposed to unauthorized users
Asset: PII of the user
• The user: revealed sensitive data
Primary misactor : skilled insider / skilled outsider
Basic Flow:
1. The misactor gains access to the database
2. The misactor retrieves data to which he should not have access
Trigger : by misactor, can always happen
Preconditions:
1. no or insufficient internal access policies
Prevention capture points:
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1. strong access control policies (security). For example, rule-based access
control based on friendships in the social network
Prevention guarantee: hard-impossible to obtain data without having the
necessary permissions
A.7 MUC 8: Information Disclosure of the User Data
Stream (Data Flow)
Summary: The communication is exposed to unauthorized users
Asset: PII of the user
• The user: revealed sensitive data
Primary misactor : skilled insider / skilled outsider
Basic Flow:
1. The misactor gains access to the data flow
2. The misactor retrieves data to which he should not have access
Trigger : by misactor, can happen whenever messages are being sent
Preconditions:
1. communication goes through insecure public network
Prevention capture points:
1. messages sent between user and social network web client is encrypted
and secure communication channel is ensured
Prevention guarantee: hard-impossible to gain access to the data flow without
having the right permissions
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A.8 MUC 9: Content Unawareness
Summary: User is unaware that his or her anonymity is at risk due to the fact
that too much personal identifiable information is released
Asset: PII of the user
• The user: revealed identity
Primary misactor : skilled insider / skilled outsider
Basic Flow:
1. The misactor gain access to user’s online comments
2. The misactor profiles the user’s data and can identify the user
Trigger : by misactor, can always happen
Preconditions:
1. User provides too much personal data
Prevention capture points:
1. User provides only minimal set of required information
Prevention guarantee: user will be informed about potential privacy risks
A.9 MUC 10: Policy and Consent Noncompliance
As explained in Section 2.5.2, the policy and consent noncompliance threat affects
the system as a whole (including data flow, data store and process). We only
illustrate one of the misuse cases for the policy and consent noncompliance threat
in the rest of the section.
Summary: The social network provider doesn’t process user’s personal data
in compliance with user consent, e.g., disclose the database to third parties
for secondary use
Asset: PII of the user
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• The user: revealed identity and personal information
• The system / company: negative impact on reputation
Primary misactor : Insider
Basic Flow:
1. The misactor gains access to social network database
2. The misactor discloses the data to a third party
Trigger : by misactor, can always happen
Preconditions:
1. misactor can tamper with privacy policies and makes consents
inconsistent OR
2. policies not managed correctly (not updated according to user’s
requests)
Prevention capture points:
1. Design system in compliance with legal guidelines for privacy and
data protection and keep internal policies consistent with policies
communicated to user
2. Legal enforcement: user can sue the social network provider whenever
his or her personal data is processed without consents
3. Employee contracts: employees who share information with 3th parties
will be penalized (fired, pay fine, etc.)
Prevention guarantee: Legal enforcement will lower the threat of an insider
leaking information but it will still be possible to breach user’s privacy

Appendix B
Security analysis of Type III
BSW protocol
Theorem 1. This BSW scheme securely realizes FDRM.
In order to prove this theorem, we need to build a simulator E that invokes
a copy of adversary A and interacts with FDRM and environment Z in such
a way that ensembles IDEALFDRM,E,Z and REALDRM,A,Z are computationally
indistinguishable.
We analyze formally the security of our scheme when the seller and a subset
of buyers are corrupted, and when (a subset of) buyers are corrupted. We
also describe briefly the security guarantees that our scheme provides when the
registration authority and the deanonymization authority are corrupted.
B.1 Security Analysis When Seller Is Corrupted
Claim 1. When the seller and a subset of the buyers are corrupted, the
distribution ensembles IDEALFDRM,E,Z and REALDRM,A,Z are computationally
indistinguishable under the zero-knowledge property of the proofs of knowledge, the
IND-CPA security of encryption schemes (BKeygen,BEnc,BDec) and (JKeygen,
JEnc, JDec), and the traceability, non-frameability and anonymity properties of the
group signature scheme.
Proof. We show by means of a series of hybrid games that the environment Z
cannot distinguish between the real execution ensemble REALDRM,A,Z and the
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simulated ensemble IDEALFDRM,E,Z with non-negligible probability. We denote
by Pr [Game i] the probability that Z distinguishes between the ensemble of
Game i and that of the real execution.
• Game 0: This game corresponds to the execution of the real-world protocol
with a subset of honest buyers and honest J , R and D. Thus Pr [Game 0] =
0.
• Game 1: This game proceeds as Game 0, except that Game 1 aborts if
the received message-signature pair (m, sm) is correct according to algorithm
GSverify but cannot be successfully opened through algorithm GSopen. The
probability that Game 1 aborts is bounded by the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Under the traceability property of the group signature scheme,
|Pr [Game 1]− Pr [Game 0]| = ν1.
Proof. We construct an algorithm T that, if there exists an adversary A
that makes Game 1 abort with non-negligible probability ϵ, breaks the
traceability property of the group signature scheme with non-negligible
probability ϵ. The traceability property is formally defined in [66] as a game
between a challenger C and an adversary. First, C gives to the adversary
(gpk, osk) and access to several oracles (we refer to [66] for the description of
the oracles). Eventually, adversary submits a message-signature pair (m, sm),
and wins the game if GSverify(gpk,m, sm) outputs 1 and if GSopen(gpk, osk,
reg,m, sm) outputs a pair (i, proof ) such that either i = 0 or GSjudge(gpk, i,
upki,m, sm, proof ) outputs 0.
Algorithm T operates as follows. First, T receives (gpk, osk) from C and
sends gpk to A when queried with (crs). For each honest buyer Bi, T
invokes oracle AddU(i) and later on oracle USK to obtain the secret key uski
and the private signing key gpki. Each time A wants to register a public
key upki of a corrupted buyer Bi, T invokes the corruption oracle CrptU(i,
upki). When A sends a request m to register a corrupted buyer Bi, T
invokes oracle SndToI(i,m). T simulates purchase requests by honest buyers
following algorithm Request. Each time A sends an arbitration message (ϕ,
WS ,m, sm), T runs GSopen(gpk, osk, reg,m, sm) to obtain i and proof . If
either i = 0 or GSjudge(gpk, i, upki,m, sm, proof ) outputs 0, T sends (m, sm)
to break the traceability property.
• Game 2: This game proceeds as Game 1, except that Game 2 aborts
if, in the arbitration phase, A sends a message-signature pair (m, sm) that
algorithm GSopen opens successfully to an uncorrupted buyer’s identity i
and buyer Bi did not send a signature on m to A. The probability that Z
distinguishes between Game 2 and Game 1 is bounded by the following
lemma:
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Lemma 2. Under the non-frameability of the group signature scheme, |Pr
[Game 2]− Pr [Game 1]| = ν2.
Proof. We construct an algorithm T that, if there exists an adversary A
that makes Game 2 abort with non-negligible probability ϵ, breaks the
non-frameability property of the group signature scheme with non-negligible
probability ϵ. The non-frameability property is formally defined in [66] as a
game between a challenger C and an adversary. First, C gives to the adversary
(gpk, isk, osk) and access to several oracles (we refer to [66] for the description
of the oracles). Eventually, adversary submits a message-signature pair
(m, sm) and a proof (i, proof ), and wins the game if GSverify(gpk,m, sm)
outputs 1, if i belongs to an honest user and if GSjudge(gpk, i, upki,m, sm,
proof ) outputs 1.
Algorithm T operates as follows. First, T receives (gpk, isk, osk) from C and
sends gpk to A when queried with (crs). Each time A wishes to register
a public key upki of a corrupted buyer Bi, T invokes oracle CrptU(i, upki).
Each time A wishes to register a corrupted buyer, T runs GSiss(gpk, isk, upki)
with A. For every honest buyer Bi, T invokes oracle SndToU(i, ·) and
stores the output. For each purchase request made by an honest buyer
Bi for item j, T computes a request message m following algorithm
Request, obtains a signature sm by invoking oracle GSig(i,m) and sends
(m, sm) to A. Each time A sends an arbitration message (ϕ,WS ,m, sm),
T runs GSopen(gpk, osk, reg,m, sm) to get i and proof . If i belongs to
an honest buyer, A did not receive before a signature by i on m, and
GSjudge(gpk, i, upki,m, sm, proof ) outputs 1, then T sends (m, sm, i, proof )
to C to break the non-frameability property.
• Game 3: This game proceeds as Game 2, except that the proofs π1 =
PK{(skB′) : (pkB′, skB′)← BKeygen(1k) ∧ C ← JEnc(pkJ , skB′)} and π2i =
PK{(WBi) : ci ← BEnc(pkB′,WBi)∧WBi ∈ {0, 1}} are replaced by simulated
proofs. Under the assumption that the proof system is zero-knowledge, |Pr
[Game 3]− Pr [Game 2]| = ν3.
• Game 4: This game proceeds as Game 3, except that the ciphertext C =
JEnc(pkJ , skB′) is replaced by a ciphertext that encrypts a random message.
At this point, the proof of knowledge π1 = PK{(skB′) : (pkB′, skB′) ←
BKeygen(1k)∧C ← JEnc(pkJ , skB′)} is a simulated proof of a false statement.
The probability that Z distinguishes between Game 4 and Game 3 is
bounded by the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Under the IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme that
consists of algorithms (JKeygen, JEnc, JDec), |Pr [Game 4]−Pr [Game 3]| =
ν4.
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Proof. We construct an algorithm T that, given an environment Z
that distinguishes Game 4 and Game 3 with non-negligible probability,
breaks the IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme with non-negligible
probability. Chosen plaintext security is formally defined through a game
between a challenger C and an adversary [155]. First, C provides the
adversary with a public key pk. The adversary sends two messages m0 and
m1. C flips a coin b and sends C = Enc(pk,mb) to the adversary. Finally,
the adversary sends his guess b′ and wins if |Pr[b = b′]− 12 | is non-negligible.
Let N be the number of purchase requests. We consider a sequence of hybrid
games, where, in game-j, ciphertext C is replaced by the encryption of a
random message in the first j purchase requests, while the remaining requests
remain unchanged. Clearly, game-0 corresponds to Game 3 and game-N
corresponds to Game 4. If Z distinguishes Game 4 and Game 3 with non-
negligible probability ϵ, there must be an index j such that Z distinguishes
game-j from game-(j + 1) with non-negligible probability ϵ/N .
Our algorithm T operates as follows. First, T receives the public key pk
from C. T computes (gpk, isk, osk) by running GSgkg and sends gpk to
A when queried with (crs). T registers adversarial buyers as usual. T
computes (pkB′, skB′). For i = 1 to j, it computes purchase requests
following algorithm Request, except that C is replaced by the encryption
of a random value and π1 by a simulated proof. For i = j + 2 to N ,
purchase requests are computed following algorithm Request. For i = j + 1,
T picks random m and submits (skB′,m) to C. C flips a coin b and returns
C = JEnc(pk,mb), and uses C to compute the request. Z outputs a bit b′,
which is forwarded by T to C.
• Game 5: This game proceeds as Game 4, except that Game 5 aborts upon
receiving an arbitration request (WB,m, sm) where (m, sm) was previously
sent to A and WB was the buyer’s watermark associated with the request
(m, sm). The probability that Z distinguishes betweenGame 5 andGame 4
is bounded by the following lemma:
Lemma 4. Under the IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme that con-
sists of algorithms (BKeygen,BEnc,BDec), |Pr [Game 5]−Pr [Game 4]| =
ν5.
Proof. LetN be the number of purchase requests. We construct an algorithm
T that, given an adversary A that makes Game 5 abort with non-negligible
probability, breaks the chosen plaintext security of the encryption scheme
with non-negligible probability ϵ/N .
Algorithm T operates as follows. First, T receives the public key pkB from
C. T computes (gpk, isk, osk) by running GSgkg and sends gpk to A when
queried with (crs). T registers adversarial buyers as usual. For the first
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purchase request made by an honest buyer Bi for item j, T picks random
m ← {0, 1}l2−1 and, for i = 1 to l2 − 1, encrypts bitwise m using ci =
BEnc(pkB′,mi). To encrypt the last bit, T sends (0, 1) to C and receives
back a ciphertext c, which is used to complete the bitwise encryption of
the buyer’s watermark WB. The rest of the request message is computed
following algorithm Request, except that the encryption C = JEnc(pkJ , skB)
is replaced by the encryption of a random value and the proofs π1 and π2i
are replaced by simulated proofs. (Note that T knows neither skB nor the
bit encrypted in c.) The remaining N − 1 requests are computed following
algorithm Request. A sends an arbitration message (WB,m, sm) that makes
Game 5 abort. If this arbitration message does not correspond to the first
request, T fails. Otherwise, if the last bit of WB is 0, T sends b′ = 0 to C,
and otherwise b′ = 1 to C.
• Game 6: This game proceeds as Game 5, except that all the group
signatures of purchase requests are replaced by group signatures computed
by using the same private signing key of a unique buyer. The probability that
Z distinguishes between Game 6 and Game 5 is bounded by the following
lemma:
Lemma 5. Under the anonymity property of the group signature scheme,
|Pr [Game 6]− Pr [Game 5]| = ν6.
Proof. We note that, at this point, we have already proven that A is not able
to frame honest buyers, who by assumption do not release pirated copies.
Therefore, the identity of an honest buyer will never be revealed at the
arbitration protocol, and so the change we make on the identity of the buyer
that computes purchase requests cannot be detected there. We only have to
prove that this change is indistinguishable at the purchase phase.
The anonymity property of dynamic group signatures is formally defined
in [66] and it consists of a game between a challenger C and an adversary.
First, the challenger gives the adversary (gpk, isk) and access to several
oracles. Then adversary gives the challenger a message m and two identities
i0 and i1. C flips a coin b and sends to adversary a group signature
s = GSsig(gskib ,m). A wins if he guesses b with non-negligible probability.
We employ a sequence of hybrid games. Let game-0 denote the game in
which all the group signatures remain unmodified, and game-N denote the
game in which all of them have been replaced. Clearly, game-0 corresponds
to Game 5 and game-N corresponds to Game 6. If there is an environment
Z that distinguishes Game 6 and Game 5 with non-negligible probability
ϵ, then there exists an index j such that Z distinguishes game-j and game-
(j + 1) with non-negligible probability ϵ/N . Given such Z, we construct an
algorithm T that breaks the anonymity property of the group signature
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scheme with non-negligible probability ϵ/N . Our algorithm T receives
(gpk, isk) from C. T invokes oracle SndToU(i′, ·) to register the new honest
user i′ employed to simulate purchase requests. T follows algorithm Request
to compute the request message m. Then T sends (m, i, i′), where i is the
identity of the original buyer Bi that sends the request, as its challenge. C
flips a coin b returns a signature sm = GSsig(gskib ,m) of m, and T sends
(m, sm) to A. If b = 0, the distribution corresponds to game-j, and, if b = 1,
to game-(j + 1). Z outputs a bit b′, which is forwarded by T to challenger
as its guess.
E performs all the changes described in Game 6, and forwards and receives
messages from FDRM as described in our simulation below:
• Setup. When A sends a request (crs) to obtain gpk, E runs GSgkg to obtain
the group public key gpk, the issuer’s secret key isk and the opening secret key
osk. E sends (crs, gpk) to A. When A sends a request (retrieve,J ), E runs
JKeygen in order to generate a key pair (pkJ , skJ ) and sends (retrieve,J ,
pkJ ) to A.
• Registration. Upon receiving a registration request from A, E executes the
interactive algorithm GSiss on input (gpk, isk, upki). If the execution ends
successfully, E stores regi in reg and sends (register) to FDRM on behalf of Bi.
E knows the identity Bi of the corrupted buyer because the communication
channel is authenticated.
• Purchase. Upon receiving (buyrequest, j) from FDRM, if this is the first
request E runs GSukg to obtain a user key pair (usk, upk) and algorithms
GSiss and GSjoin on input (gpk, isk, upk) and (gpk, usk) respectively to obtain
a private signing key gsk. This key is used to simulate all the requests.
E follows the interactive algorithm Request(gpk, gski, j, pkJ ) with all the
changes described until Game 6 to compute a request for item j and receive
watermarked content Y . E stores the request (m, sm) along with WB in the
request table Treq and sends (reqresp,Y ) to FDRM.
• Release. Upon receiving a pirated copy Y ′ from A, E sends (release,Y ′) to
FDRM and stores Y ′ in a table Trel of released copies.
• Arbitration. When A sends (info), E parses info as (WB,m, sm), verifies
sm and checks if m encrypts WB. If it is not the case, E sends (detect,⊥)
to FDRM, receives (detresp,not guilty) and forwards (detresp,not guilty)
to FDRM. Otherwise E runs GSopen(gpk, osk, reg,m, sm) and obtains an
identifier i and a proof proof . (E aborts if (WB,m, sm) fulfills any of the
conditions described in the sequence of games.) Then E proceeds as follows:
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– If i corresponds to an adversarial buyer, E chooses any of the pirated
copies Y ∈ Trel and sends (detect,Y ) to FDRM. FDRM returns (detresp,
A, guilty), which is forwarded to A.
– If i corresponds to the buyer used by E to simulate purchases, E sends
(detect,⊥) to FDRM. (Note that we assume that honest buyers never
release pirated copies.) FDRM returns (detresp,not guilty), which is
forwarded to A.
The distribution produced in Game 6 is identical to that of our simulation. By
summation we have that |Pr [Game 6] ≤ ν7.
B.2 Security Analysis When Buyers Are Corrupted
Claim 2. When only (a subset of) the buyers are corrupted, the distribution en-
sembles IDEALFDRM,E,Z and REALDRM,A,Z are computationally indistinguishable
under the traceability and non-frameability properties of the group signature scheme
and the collusion resistance of the watermarking scheme.
Proof. We show by means of a series of hybrid games that the environment Z
cannot distinguish between the real execution ensemble REALDRM,A,Z and the
simulated ensemble IDEALFDRM,E,Z with non-negligible probability.
• Game 0: This game corresponds to the execution of the real-world protocol
with honest S, J , R and D. Therefore, Pr [Game 0] = 0.
• Game 1: This game proceeds as Game 0, except that Game 1 aborts if
the received message-signature pair (m, sm) is correct but cannot be opened
through algorithm GSopen. The probability that Game 1 aborts is bounded
by the following lemma:
Lemma 6. Under the traceability property of the group signature scheme,
|Pr [Game 1]− Pr [Game 0]| = ν1.
The proof of this lemma follows the proof of traceability given in Ap-
pendix B.1.
• Game 2: This game proceeds as Game 1, except that Game 2 aborts
if the received message-signature pair (m, sm) is opened correctly to an
uncorrupted buyer’s identity i. The probability that Game 2 aborts is
bounded by the following lemma:
Lemma 7. Under the non-frameability property of the group signature
scheme, |Pr [Game 2]− Pr [Game 1]| = ν2.
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The proof of this lemma follows the proof of non-frameability given in
Appendix B.1.
• Game 3 : This game operates as Game 2, except that the string W =
ϕ||(WS⊕WB) that is used to compute the watermark embedding is replaced
by a random string. Since the strings ϕ and WS are picked at random by
the honest seller, W is a random string that leaks no information on WB.
Therefore, |Pr [Game 3]− Pr [Game 2]| = 0.
• Game 4 : This game operates as Game 3, except that Game 4 aborts if A
releases a watermarked content Y whose watermark W does not equal that
of any of the watermarked content previously received by A. The probability
that Game 4 aborts is bounded by the following lemma:
Lemma 8. Under the assumption that the watermarking scheme is collusion
resistant, |Pr [Game 4]− Pr [Game 3]| = ν3.
We construct an algorithm T that, given an adversary A that makes
Game 4 abort with non-negligible probability, breaks the collusion resistant
property of the watermarking scheme with non-negligible probability. T
interacts with the challenger C of the collusion resistant game described in
Definition 1. First, T receives the challenge (Y1, . . . ,Yl) from C. T computes
(gpk, isk, osk) by running GSgkg and sends gpk to A when queried with (crs).
T registers adversarial buyers as usual. When receiving a purchase request
for item 1, T replies by encrypting a not previously used Yi with pkB′. (We
assume that item 1 is requested no more than l times.) For other purchase, T
replies as usual. Eventually, A releases a pirated copy Y ′ whose watermark
does not equal any of the watermarks embedded in (Y1, . . . ,Yl). T forwards
Y ′ to C.
E performs all the changes described in Game 4, and forwards and receives
messages from FDRM as described in our simulation below.
• Setup. When A sends a request (crs) to obtain gpk, E runs GSgkg to obtain
the group public key gpk, the issuer’s secret key isk and the opening secret
key osk. E sends (crs, gpk) to A. When A sends a request (register, upki)
to register the public key upki of buyer Bi, E stores (Bi, upki). When A
sends a request (retrieve,J ), E runs JKeygen in order to generate a key pair
(pkJ , skJ ) and sends (retrieve,J , pkJ ) to A.
• Registration. Upon receiving a registration request from A, E behaves as
in Appendix B.1.
• Purchase. Upon receiving (m, sm) from A, E checks whether GSverify(gpk,
m, sm) is correct. As verifier, E executes the proofs π1 and, for i = 1 to l2 ,
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Requirement Opener Issuer
Anonymity uncorrupt fully corrupt
Traceability partially corrupt uncorrupt
Non-frameability fully corrupt fully corrupt
Table B.1. Levels of trust in authorities for each security property
π2i, and ignores the request if any of them fails. E runs (i, π) ← GSopen
(gpk, osk, reg,m, sm), parses m as (pkB′, j, (ci)l2i=1, C) and sends (request, j)
to FDRM on behalf of Bi. FDRM returns (reqresp,Y ). E computes ct =
BEnc(pkB′,Y ) and sends ct to A.
• Release. Upon receiving a pirated copy Y ′ from A, E sends (release,Y ′) to
FDRM.
The distribution produced in Game 4 is identical to that of our simulation. By
summation we have that |Pr [Game 3] ≤ ν4.
B.3 Security Analysis When Other Parties Are Cor-
rupted
We do not formally analyze the security of our scheme in these cases since in prac-
tical application scenarios the registration authority R and the deanonymization
authority D are trusted. We note that the security of our scheme relies on the
security of the group signature scheme. In our scheme, R acts as the issuer of
the group signature scheme, and D acts as the opener. Bellare et al. [66] analyze
the security of the group signature scheme when the adversary corrupts the issuer
and the opener. In Table B.1, they describe the maximum level of corruption
that the scheme tolerates so that anonymity, traceability and non-frameability
still hold. (Partial corruption means that the secret key of a party is revealed to
the adversary, but the adversary cannot influence the behavior of that party.)
Interestingly, non-frameability holds even when the issuer and the opener are
fully corrupted. Therefore, our scheme protects honest buyers from being falsely
accused when S, R and D are corrupted. We recall that we assume that the judge
is always uncorrupted.

Appendix C
Implementation of Type III
BSW protocol
This section briefly discusses the implementation of the proposed Type III BSW
protocol. The protocol efficiency is first verified by estimating the complexity of the
different parts of the protocol, considering well-known practical implementation
designs for the cryptographic primitives employed therein. Then, realistic
performance measures are derived by running a practical implementation of the
buyer-seller watermarking protocol on a network of general purpose personal
computers. Results on the efficient implementations of using the composite
embedding strategy are presented in [115, 116, 117]. All tested programs have
been implemented in C++ using the GNU Multi-Precision (GMP) library [1] and
the NTL library [6].
C.1 Efficiency Analysis
We estimate the protocol efficiency in terms of computational and communication
complexity for realistic parameters. For the computational complexity, the total
number of exponentiations required by the protocols, with the group size on
which they are performed, are presented in Table C.1. The communication
complexity is evaluated as the sum of the sizes of all messages or rounds, i.e.,
the number of bits exchanged during the protocols. Based on the same group, we
distinguish single exponentiations (denoted as exp.) with multi-exponentiations
(denoted as multi.), taking into consideration that there are algorithms to compute
multi-exponentiations that are faster than first computing each exponentiation
separately and then multiplying the results.
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Table C.1. Computational complexity and communication complexity estimation
of the Type III BSW protocol
Protocol number of exp. or multi-exp. (group size) size (bit)
Protocol 1 (2 exp.+ 4 multi.) (on 2048 bits) 12,853
(embedding)
(–pixelwise) (262,144 multi. (on 2048 bits)) (536,870,912)
(–composite) (3,760 multi. (on 2048 bits)) (6,318,080)
(extraction)
(–pixelwise) (262, 144 multi. (on 2048 bits) 0
(–composite) (3, 760 multi. (on 2048 bits)) 0
Protocol 2
–pixelwise 18 exp. (on 1024 bits), (1,158 exp.+ 524,427
multi.) (on 2048 bits)
538,028,566
–composite 18 exp. (on 1024 bits), (1,158 exp.+ 7,659
multi.) (on 2048 bits)
7,475,734
Protocol 3 (3 exp.+101 multi.) (on 2048 bits) 429,320
Total
–pixelwise 18 exp. (on 1024 bits), (1,163 exp. +
524,532 multi.) (on 2048 bits)
538,470,739
–composite 18 exp. (on 1024 bits), (1,163 exp. + 7,764
multi.) (on 2048 bits)
7,917,907
In Table C.1 we consider a 512×512 image with a size of roughly 512×512×8 t 2
Mbits, so that the size of the host signal is 262,144 pixels, with a watermark (or
fingerprint) of 128 bits, of which 96 bits of the watermark are generated by the
buyer and the seller and 32 bits are used for the index. When considering the
step of the watermark embedding in the encrypted domain, with the pixelwise
approach, each pixel is encrypted using Paillier’s cryptosystem, requiring 262,144
multi-exponentiations on a 2048-bit group. The size of the encrypted image is
262, 144 × 2048 = 536, 870, 912 bits. When using the efficient composite signal
representation [115, 116], we assume that the quantization scale factor Q = 211,
so that we have roughly 3,760 multi-exponentiations on a 2048-bit group and
6,318,080 transmitted bits.
From Table C.1, it is evident that the total number of exponentiations is dominated
by the number of multi-exponentiations, and that the most of the computational
effort is required to encrypt and decrypt the whole image. A great amount of
the computational complexity is located on the seller’s side, since the seller has to
encrypt the digital content and perform the embedding in the encrypted domain.
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However, the composite signal representation can significantly lower this burden.
In the pixelwise case, the number of exponentiations required to encrypt and
decrypt the image takes 99.95% of the total number of exponentiations on a
2048-bit group, whereas in the efficient composite representation case this ratio is
reduced to 96.86%. As to the communication efficiency, the transmission of the
encrypted image takes 99.7% of the bandwidth in the pixel wise case and 79.8%
of the bandwidth in the composite case. The data also shows that the overhead of
the protocol is small compared to image encryption: to protect a 512×512×8 = 2
Mbits image, the data exchanged in the whole protocol (composite version) is
about 7.9 Mbits with the composite embedding. With an expansion rate of 3.95,
relatively small compared to most public key cryptosystems, and considering the
modern network bandwidth capacity, we can conclude that the communication
overhead is within an acceptable range.
C.2 Protocol Implementation
C.2.1 Watermark Embedding
The first step of the protocol implementation is to evaluate the performance gain
obtained by the composite embedding strategy versus the pixelwise embedding
strategy.
In the following paragraph, we show the result of two implementation strategies
of the watermark embedding and extraction. The first version is to encrypt and
decrypt each pixel separately. This strategy is referred to as pixelwise. The second
version employs the composite signal representation [115, 116] and is referred to as
efficient composite. For instance, with the order of the composite representation
R = 85, every 85 pixels of the image are encrypted to a ciphertext.
The aforementioned versions have been run on an IntelrCore(TM)2 Quad CPU at
2.40 GHz, used as a single processor. Preliminary results of the comparison can be
found in [115, 116], where we measured the execution time of both versions using
various image sizes. In each version, a random bit sequence with the same length
(i.e. 128 bits) as the watermark has been embedded using the Quantization Index
Modulation (QIM) [97] watermarking technique. Both implementation strategies
are based on the Paillier’s cryptosystem [230] with a modulus N of 1024 bits. The
implementation results for two different image sizes – 512× 512 and 1024× 1024
– are depicted in Table C.2.
It is evident that the composite signal representation permits reducing the
computational complexity of secure watermark embedding to a great extent.
Namely, when the quantization scale factor is Q = 211, the execution time of
the efficient composite embedding is 70 times less than the pixelwise embedding,
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Table C.2. Execution times (in seconds) of the two implementation strategies
of the watermarking embedding and extraction algorithm: pixelwise and efficient
composite
(in seconds) 512× 512 1024× 1024
pixelwise composite pixelwise composite
embedding 2,058 30 7,528 110
extraction 546 7 2,171 28
and the corresponding extraction operation is about 80 times faster with respect
to the pixelwise version. A 1024 × 1024 image can be processed by the seller in
less than two minutes, whereas the buyer can extract the plaintext image in less
than 30 seconds. For a 512 × 512 image, the watermark embedding by the seller
takes 30 seconds, and the buyer can extract the plaintext image in 7 seconds. Such
timing constraints do not seem prohibitive in view of a practical application of the
proposed techniques.
C.2.2 Complete Protocol
Based on the aforementioned preliminary results, we further tested a complete
implementation of the proposed protocol. The implementation consists of a set
of four programs, each implementing a different entity of the protocol. The
S, the buyer B, and the judge J are implemented as separate programs. The
functionalities of the registration authority R and the deanonymization authority
D are implemented in a single program. The programs communicate with each
other via TCP (Trusted Computing Platform), using the standard socket library
provided by the Linux operating system.
The buyer B and the judge J have been tested on an IntelrCore(TM)2 Quad
CPU at 2.40 GHz, used as a single processor. The seller S has been tested on
an AMD Athlon 64 at 2.40 GHz. The registration/deanonymization authority
has been tested on an IntelrCentrino(TM) at 1.7 GHz. The machines were
connected by a high-speed LAN. We tested two different image sizes, 512 × 512,
and 1024×1024, and two different watermark lengths, 64 and 128 bits. In order to
investigate the effects of security parameters on the complexity, since the number
of group signature operations is negligible with respect to the number of Paillier’s
encryptions, we only change the encryption security parameters. Four different
security levels for Paillier’s cryptosystem were considered, using keys with 512,
1024, 2048, and 3072 bits, whereas the group signature scheme used 2048 bit keys.
In order to minimize the complexity, we used the efficient composite embedding
strategy with a quantization scale factor Q = 211.
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Table C.3. Execution times (in seconds) of the seller and the buyer in the
watermark generation and embedding phase (WGE), zero knowledge proof for
fair encryption of private keys (π1), zero knowledge proof for bit encryption (π2),
watermark embedding (only computation time) and extraction of watermarked
image (only computation time): (a) the overall execution time, as the sum of the
actual computation time and the handshake latency; (b) the actual computation
time
(in milliseconds) Seller Buyer
overall computation overall computation
WGE 68,973 4,7911 79,159 14,372
π1 873 68 962 32
π2 25,684 5,908 24,853 3,088
Embedding – 39,474 – –
Extraction – – – 8,376
For each entity we measured the exchanged bytes, the actual computation time,
and the overall execution time that is the sum of the actual computation time and
the handshake latency. For the Watermark Generation and Embedding Protocol,
the execution times for the seller and the buyer are given in Figure C.1 and
Figure C.2. For the Identification and Arbitration Protocol, the execution times
for the seller, the judge, and the deanonymization authority are given in Fig. C.3,
Figure C.4, and Figure C.5. The latencies in Figure C.3 and Figure C.5 occur
because the seller and the deanonymization authority have to wait for the judge’s
reply in the arbitration phase. For the registration protocol, the overall execution
time is always below 500 milliseconds, so its complexity is negligible with respect
to the other phases.
When taking the following parameters: for an 512×512 image, the watermark size
is 128 bits, and Pailliar’s key size is 1024 bits, Table C.3 depicts the execution times
(in seconds) of the seller and the buyer in the watermark generation and embedding
phase (WGE), zero knowledge proof for fair encryption of private keys π1, zero
knowledge proof for bit encryption π2, watermark embedding (only computation
time) and extraction of watermarked image (only computation time). In the
watermarking phase (WGE), the computation time of the buyer is less than the
seller (less than one third). The latency is due to the fact that the buyer must wait
for the seller to complete the protocol. The computation times for the watermark
embedding (only the seller) and the extraction of the watermarked image (only for
the buyer) are comparable to the preliminary results shown in Table C.2. From
table C.3, we can see that the zero knowledge proof π1’s complexity is negligible
with respect to the other protocols, since all the execution times are less than 1
second. The zero knowledge proof π2 has a lot of handshake latency because it is
repeated 128 times.
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From the above figures, it is evident that the most computationally demanding part
is the Watermark Generation and Embedding Protocol. The overall complexity is
dominated by the computation time of the seller, which is about four times higher
than the computation time of the buyer. It is worth noting how the different parts
of the protocol contribute to the overall complexity. From Figure C.6, Figure C.7,
and Figure C.8, we can see that most of the computation time of the seller is
devoted to the watermark embedding, while the complexity of the buyer is equally
affected by the computation time of the watermarked image extraction and the
round complexity of the zero knowledge proof π2. However, since the complexity of
the zero knowledge proof π2 does not depend on the image size, with larger images
the overall complexity appears to be dominated by the watermark embedding
and extraction parts. Except for the zero knowledge proof π2 and the protocol
executed by the judge, the overall complexity of the other parties is independent
from the length of the watermark. As to the computation time versus the length
of Paillier’s key, we can notice a quadratic law: this is in agreement with the fact
that exponentiations on k bits have an O(k2) complexity.
Finally, the total amount of data exchanged in the Watermark Generation and
Embedding Protocol and in the Identification and Arbitration Protocol are shown
in Figure C.9 and Figure C.10. The communication complexity of the verification
phase is considerably low. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that, because
of the composite representation, the communication complexity of the embedding
protocol does not depend on the length of Paillier’s key.
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Figure C.1. Execution times (in seconds) of the seller in the Watermark
Generation and Embedding Protocol versus the number of bits of Paillier’s key:
(a) the overall execution time, as the sum of the actual computation time and the
handshake latency; (b) the actual computation time
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Figure C.2. Execution times (in seconds) of the buyer in the Watermark
Generation and Embedding Protocol versus the number of bits of Paillier’s key:
(a) the overall execution time, as the sum of the actual computation time and the
handshake latency; (b) the actual computation time
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Figure C.3. Execution times (in milliseconds) of the seller in the Identification
and Arbitration Protocol versus the number of bits of Paillier’s key: (a) the overall
execution time, as the sum of the actual computation time and the handshake
latency; (b) the actual computation time
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Figure C.4. Execution times (in milliseconds) of the judge in the Identification
and Arbitration Protocol versus the number of bits of Paillier’s key: (a) the overall
execution time, as the sum of the actual computation time and the handshake
latency; (b) the actual computation time
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Figure C.5. Execution times (in milliseconds) of the
registration/deanonymization authority in the Identification and Arbitration
Protocol versus the number of bits of Paillier’s key: (a) the overall execution time,
as the sum of the actual computation time and the handshake latency; (b) the
actual computation time
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Figure C.6. Execution times (in milliseconds) of the zero knowledge proof π2
versus the number of bits of Paillier’s key: (a) the overall execution time, as the
sum of the actual computation time and the handshake latency; (b) the actual
computation time
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Figure C.7. Execution times (in seconds) of Watermark Embedding versus the
number of bits of Paillier’s key
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Figure C.8. Execution times (in milliseconds) of Watermarked Image Extraction
versus the number of bits of Paillier’s key
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Figure C.9. Exchanged KBytes in the Watermark Generation and Embedding
Protocol versus the number of bits of Paillier’s key
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Figure C.10. Exchanged KBytes in the Identification and Arbitration Protocol
versus the number of bits of Paillier’s key
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